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Community Property
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nineteen years have passed since the author wrote a modest summary of principal propositions in Washington community property
2
law.' There have been changes and refinements during that period;
hence, this "second edition."
Community property law in the United States is principally of
Spanish origin. 3 Washington, however, has no history of significant
contact with Spanish culture, as do many of the eight community
property states. 4 Nonetheless, Washington's community property
system may derive from a Spanish source, via California, whose laws
apparently furnished the principal model for the territorial laws in

Washington.

5

In contrast to the philosophical premise of the common law system,
in which the wife's juridical personality is submerged into that of her
husband at the time of marriage, 6 the marital property relationship in
the community property system may be regarded as a type of partner1. Cross, The Community Propeity Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. REV. 640 (1955).
2. The most significant change occurred in 1972 when the Washington Legislature
amended the community property statute to establish equality between the husband
and Wife in regard to their community property. For an analysis of these amendments,
see Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-1972
Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527 (1973). The Washington approach may
not be the most desirable; several are discussed in Comment, Equal Rights and Equal
Protection: Who Has Management and Control? 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 892 (1973). See
also Bingaman, The Effects of an Equal Rights Amendment on The New Mexico
System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management and
Control, 3 N. MEX. L. REV. 11 (1973); Comment, The Equal Rights Amendment
and Inequality Between Spouses Under the California Community Property System,
6 LoYoLA L. REV. (Los Angeles) 66 (1973).
3.

W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY ch. 4 (2d

ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN].
4. The other states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico and Texas. The community property system in various forms exists in many
other countries. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN §§ 13-18. There was a flurry of adoptions
of community property laws in other states during a decade in which income tax advantages were sought, followed by repeals when the federal tax laws permitted splitting
income by means ofjoint returns. Id. § 53.1.
5. See generally id., at 46-47. The 1869 Washington statute was repealed in 1871
and a marital partnership act substituted, the latter was repealed in 1873 and five days
later the 1869 act was restored; principal modifications were made in 1879 to the
form that remained substantially unchanged until 1972 (minor modification was
made in 1881). The historical development of Washington community property law
is summarized in Hill, Early Washington Marital Property Statutes, 14 WASH. L. REV.
118 (1939).
6. For example, Blackstone wrote in 1765 that: "By marriage, the husband and
wife are one person in the law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442
1165-69. See generally DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN §§ 1, 2.
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ship. 7 Although spouses in the community property system are not
possessed of the rights and liabilities of ordinary business partners,
each spouse is regarded as contributing equally to and sharing equally
in the economic well-being of the marital enterprise. 8 The fundamental principle of the community property system is thus more in
line with the principle of the proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment 9 than is the "unity of husband and wife" principle underlying the
common law system. While the detailed operations of the eight states'
community property systems do not necessarily satisfy the requirements of that proposed amendment, 10 the 1972 statutory changes in
Washington, a purpose of which was "to establish equality between
the husband and wife in regard to their community property,"" prob2
ably do meet "equal rights" standards.1
7. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 1.
8. Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At the
foundation of this concept is the principle that all wealth acquired by the joint
efforts of the husband and wife shall be common property; the theory of the law
being that, with respect to marital property acquisitions, the marriage is a community of which spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property
after its dissolution. DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § I at 2-3.
9. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971):
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
(Proposed 27th Amendment.)
10. For an excellent analysis of the issues presented by the proposed amendment,
see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L. J. 871 (1971); Symposium,
Equal Rights for Women: A Symposium on the Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 215 (1971).
For a discussion of the impact of the Equal Rights Amendment upon community
property jurisdictions, see Comment, Equal Rights and Equal Protection: Who Has
Management and Control?, 46 So. CAL. L. REV. 892 (1973); Bingaman, The Effects
of an Equal Rights Amendment on The New Mexico System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management and Control, 3 N. MEX. L. REv.
11 (1973); Ellis, Equal Rights and the Debt Provisions of New Mexico Community
Property Law, 3 N. MEX. L. REV. 57 (1973); Comment, The Equal Rights Amendment and Inequality Between Spouses Under the California Property System, 6 LoyOLA L. REV. (Los Angeles) 66 (1973); and Comment, Community Property: Male
Management and Women's Rights, 1972 LAW & THE SOCIAL ORDER 163.
11. Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-1972
Statutory Changes,48 WASH. L. REV. 527, 531 (1973).
12. The requirement exists locally through WASH. CONST. art 31, adopted in the
November 1972 election:
Sec. I Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex.
Sec. 2 The Legislature shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article.
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Washington's present community property regime, with the major
exception of the 1972 amendments, has remained largely unchanged
in its basic structure since enactment by the territorial legislature in
1879.13 The statutes, in two separate sections, 14 provide that property
and pecuniary rights owned by each spouse at the time of marriage,
any property thereafter acquired lucratively, 15 and the rents, issues and
profits therefrom constitute separate property. All property acquired
16
after marriage which is not separate property is community property.
With the 1972 changes now in effect, each spouse has equal management power over the community property. Each spouse has a
general inter vivos power to dispose of the community personal property, l7 but neither alone can acquire, convey, or encumber community
real property,' 8 convey or encumber community household goods, 19
or purchase or transfer community business assets in some situations. 20 Each spouse may devise or bequeath his or her half of the
community property2 ' and may deal in all respects with his or her
22
separate property as if unmarried.
The statutory skeleton outlined above is supplemented, of course,
by a large body of case law interpreting, and filling in the lacunae
between, these statutes. Before launching into the body of this article,
the author feels obligated to comment generally on several themes
underlying the development of this case law. The solicitude with
which the Washington court has viewed the community property position, manifested in various rules and presumptions, is one rather
constant theme: acquisitions by a spouse are presumptively community property; separate property commingled with community property becomes community property by operation of law; obligations
incurred by a spouse are presumptively community in character;
separate property agreements between the spouses must be established
by a higher standard of proof than that required to establish commu13. See generally Hill, Early Washington Marital Property Statutes, 14 WASH. L.
REV. 118 (1939).
14. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010 & .020 (1963).

15.

See note 75 infra.

16.

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1973).

17. Id. But neither spouse can make a gift of community property, personal or real,
without the express or implied consent of the other. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030
(2) (Supp. 1973).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

WASH. REV. CODE
Id. § 26.16.030(5)
Id. § 26.16.030(6)
Id. § 26.16.030(1)
Id. § 26.16.010 &

§ 26.16.030(3)(4) (Supp. 1973).
(Supp. 1973).
(Supp. 1973). Discussed in Part IV infra.
(Supp. 1973).
.020 (1963).
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nity property agreements, and so forth. Another theme, or perhaps
more of an observation, is the relative independence and self-reliance
of the Washington court in generating this body of case law. Only
infrequently has the Washington court relied upon or even cited precedents from other community property jurisdictions. This inbreeding
may help to account for the relative stability which Washington's
community property system has enjoyed.
II.

THE NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP

The Washington Supreme Court has said for an asset to be community property it is first necessary that a lawful marital relationship
exist between the owners. 23 This proposition is inherent in R.C.W. §
26.16.030 which defines community property.2 4 The validity of the
marriage is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage occurred.2 5 Thus, while Washington law does not recognize a
common lawv marriage, such a marriage validly established in another
jurisdiction is recognized in Washington as creating the necessary
26
marital relation.
The division of property acquired during cohabitation of a man
and woman who are not validly married, either under Washington law
or the law of another jurisdiction, raises special problems.2 7 Such
property is not community property, but nonetheless it frequently
would be inequitable to deny that both parties to the relationship may
possess interests in their acquisitions. Although some community
property jurisdictions solve such problems by means of a "putative
marriage" doctrine, 28 Washington does not. Under existing Wash23. Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951); In re Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash. 86, 96 P. 684 (1908).
24. The source Spanish law is the same, DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 55, at 94.
25. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 168-70
(1971); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 220-21 (1968); H. CLARK, LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 55-57 (1968); H. GOODRICH & E. SCALES, CONFLICT OF LAWS

380 (1962); Taintor, Marriage in the Conflct of Law, 9 VAND. L. REV. 607 (1956).
26. See State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wn. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945);
Stans v. Baitey, 9 Wash. 115, 37 P. 316 (1894).
27. Cohabitation contemplates a relationship continuing over a period of time
and not a short term "affair." See, e.g., Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d
835 (1948), where the relationship at issue spanned sevenyears.
28.

See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN

§§

55-56.8. "A putative marriage . . . is a marriage

which is forbidden but which has been contracted in good faith and in ignorance
of the impediment on the part of at least one of the contracting parties." Id. § 56 at
96. See also H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 52-52 (1968); Luther & Luther,
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ington rules, the nonacquiring or nontitle-holding party to an innocent
or to a meretricious relationship may be able to assert an interest in
the acquisitions of the other.
A.

The Innocent Relationship

In Creasman v. Boyle29 the court defined and stated the principles
30
governing innocent relationships:
... [E] ven though there be no lawful marriage... if either or both of
them in good faith enter into a marriage with the other, or with each
other, and such marriage proves to be void, a court of equity will protect the rights of the innocent party in the property accumulated by the
joint efforts of both.

A relationship thus may be defined as innocent if the party to be protected believed in good faith that a valid marriage existed.
In Poole v. Schricte,3 1 Mrs. Poole contended that her relationship
with Mr. Schricte was innocent, rather than meretricious, since she
believed that a common law marriage occured while the two lived
together in Illinois during the first seven years of their 13-year relationship. The court held sufficient evidence had been presented to
support her contention and that an innocent relationship had been
established.
At issue in Poole were the rights of the parties in a tavern and in
personal property acquired in Washington where they had lived together for six years without a formal marriage. The court found authority to divide the property acquired during their relationship upon
32
the following reasoning:
Support and Property Rights of The Putative Spouse, 24 HAST. LJ. 331 (1973);
Comment, The Putative Marriage Doctrine in Louisiana, 12 LOYOLA L. REV. (New

Orleans) 89 (1965); Comment, Right of a De Facto Wife to Obtain a Share of Jointly
Accumulated Property, 2 WILLAMETTE L.

207 (1962); Comment, Rights of the

Putative andMeretriciousSpouse in California, 50 CAL. L. REV. 866 (1962).
29.

.31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), noted in 24 WASH. L. REy. 164 (1949).

The plaintiff, Harvey Creasman, had lived meretriciously with Caroline Paul for a
period of seven years until her death. Mr. Creasman was the breadwinner, but he
left the management of their financial affairs to her. After her death, he sought to
be adjudged the owner of real estate purchased with his funds. Title was placed in
Mrs. Paul's name. The court held she was the owner.
30. 3lWn.2dat352, 196P.2dat838.
31.. 39Wn.2d558,263P.2d 1044(1951).
32. 39 Wn. 2d at 569, 236 P.2d at 1051. Other possibilities include application of
trust principles or an analysis.on the basis of a quasi-marital partnership.
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that the authority and jurisdiction of the court to divide

the property accumulated during such a relationship is in consequence
of the court's inherent equity power, and not because of the divorce
statute. It is likewise our view that the court is not limited, under an
equal partnership concept, to an even division of the property accumulated, but that the innocent party may be awarded such proportion

of the property accumulated as would under all the circumstances be
just and equitable.
Mrs. Poole was held to be owner of a half interest in the personal
property and was allowed $5,000 for her interest in the tavern, apparently an evaluation of a half interest.
Equitable division of the accumulated property between the parties
to the psuedo-marital relationship reflects the fact that in effect the
innocent party is a tenant in common in such property with the other
party, but this fact does not necessarily establish the size of the parties'
respective shares. In other ordinary situations of multiple party acquisitions, a tenancy in common results when property is acquired
with multiple contributions, and "courts will presume they intended to
share the property in proportion to the amount contributed, where it
can be traced, otherwise they share it equally." 3 3 This presumption
could furnish a controlling analogy but it is not clear that it will or
should. Under the cases, when the innocent party has directly contributed to the acquisition of the property before the court, apparently a
precise measurement of the amount of the contribution is not required
in order to conclude that the innocent party should be awarded at
34
least one half.
Special difficulty arises, however, where the contribution of the
innocent party is indirect, e.g., where one party has merely "run
the home" and has not directly furnished the consideration for the
asset. That such indirect contributions as "running the home" must be
weighed in making the property division is recognized in Knoll v.
35
Knoll:
33. West v. Knowles, 50 Wn. 2d 311 at 313, 311 P.2d 689 at 691 (1957), citing
Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wn. 2d 627, 305 P.2d 805 (1957).
34. See In re Brenchley's Estate, 96 Wash. 223, 164 P. 913 (1917) (woman
kept boarders at a lodging house, and was a nurse and midwife; her earnings contributed to payment of purchase obligations); Powers v. Powers, 117 Wash. 248, 200 P.
1080 (1921) (proceeds from sale of her property furnished part of funds to buy
property awarded to her).
35.
104 Wash. 110, 115, 176 P. 22, 24 (1918). The case was returned to the

Community Property
So long as the parties lived together as husband and wife, both labored
in their respective fields, and the property acquired during this time
was the result of their joint efforts.
The weight to be accorded such a contribution, however, is unclear; is
it an equal "contribution," as it would be under the community prop36
erty rules for married persons?
It seems reasonable to start with the assumption that a proper division of the accumulated property would give the innocent party a half
interest without particular regard to the nature of the "contribution."
The final equitable division, however, will also reflect consideration of
each party's future needs and continuing ability for self-support. For
example, in Buckley v. Buckley,37 where the man had deserted his
wife and cohabited with another woman, and thus could hardly be
considered the innocent party in the pseudo-marital relationship, the
38
court said:
Bearing in mind that appellant Buckley accumulated this property,
and that he is now sixty-six years old, in feeble health, requiring support, medical attendance, and nursing, we cannot say that the disposition of the property, as made by the trial court, was erroneous, inequitable, or unjust. [He received 2 of all real property accumulated
during the relationship. Each of the two women received /.]
The infirm, needy innocent party should not fare less well. There is,
however, no certainty about the factors to be considered or the weight
to be given them in the court's equitable division of the property.
B.

The MeretriciousRelationship

In contrast to an innocent relationship in which at least one party
possesses a good faith belief that a valid marriage exists, a meretricious relationship exists when both parties cohabit with knowledge
that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.3 9 Regarding mertrial court, which had refused to rule on property rights, to permit the defendant to
be heard on question of proper disposition of the property.
36. See note 8 supra.

37.

50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079 (1908).

38. 50 Wash. at 223, 96 P. at 1083.
39. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 56; H. CLARK, LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 52-54
(1968); Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50

CAL. L. REv. 886, 873 (1962). If one was innocent, but the other not, protection in
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etricious relationships, the court declared, in Creasmanv. Boyle:40
. . . [P3roperty acquired by a man and woman not married to each

other, but living together as husband and wife, is not community property; and, in the absence of some trust relation, belongs to the one in
whose name the legal title to the property stands.
The court further stated what has become identified as the Creasman
41
presumption:
We think that, under these circumstances and in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be presumed as a matter of law that
the parties intended to dispose of the property exactly as they did dispose of it.
Application of the Creasmanpresumption that ownership lies in the
acquiring or title-holding party thus prevents division of the property
accumulated during the relationship, often an inequitable result. In a
number of cases, the Creasman presumption has been successfully
rebutted or held not to arise.
In Poole v. Schricte42 the court concluded that Mrs. Poole should
prevail even if she were not innocent, but rather engaged in a meretricious relationship with Mr. Schricte. The court held that since the evidence established a joint venture in the tavern, if not a partnership,
she was entitled to at least a one-half interest therein in as much as
both parties participated in the acquisition of property in a business
sense and not in a husband-wife sense. The Creasman presumption
43
was overcome by this evidence of a joint venture:
Her [Mrs. Poole's] rights do not stem from cohabitation or the meretricious relationship, but from the fact that the proceeds from the
beauty shop she operated clearly constituted a larger portion of the
Crosley account [from which the purchase price of the tavern was
taken] than did Mr. Schrichte's earnings as a railroad switchman.
the other's acquisitions was afforded the innocent one but not vice versa. DEFUNIAK &
VAUGHN § 56 at 97. For a provocative discussion of recent developments in the meretricious relationship generally, see 48 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1973).
40. 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
41. Id. at 356, 196 P.2d at 841. The court concluded the couple intended Mrs.
Paul to possess and own the property since title was taken in her name. Chief Justice
Mallery, in dissent, argued that it was obvious from the record that the couple intended
to enjoy and possess the property in common.
42. 39Wn. 2d 558,263 P.2d 1044(1951).
43. Id. at 564, 263 P.2d at 1048-49.
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The court further said that their "social relationships, legal, or illegal,
moral or immoral, are not material.""
A few years later in West v. Knowles,4 5 the court again found evidence rebutting the Creasmanpresumption when at trial the parties to
the meretricious relationship traced to the sources of their acquisitions. The trial court ruled such tracing was sufficient to overcome the
46
Creasman presumption. On appeal the court affirmed and said:
The Court was correct in tracing the property in the instant case, because both parties testified in extenso regarding their properties. None
of the property ever lost its character as separate property, notwithstanding the commingling thereof, the resulting confusion, and the difficulty of separating it. No presumptions arise as to property which can
be traced to one or the other. It belongs to the original owner in the
absence of an overt gift or contract regarding it. Property acquired
with contributions from both parties is held as tenants in common, and
courts will presume they intended to share the property, in proportion
to the amount contributed, where it can be traced, otherwise they
share it equally.
In a special concurring opinion to West v. Knowles, Judge Finley
urged that the division of property between parties to meretricious
relationships should be governed not by abstract doctrines such as the
Creasman presumption, but by the principle of a fair and equitable
47
distribution:
A fair and equitable distribution of property does not imply an accounting operation with the precision and delicacy of a surgeon's
scalpel. It merely connotes a reasonable and rough approximation and
appraisal of earnings and other factors, and a division of property that
will in a general way be reasonable, fair, and equitable by the standards of just, tolerant, and understanding individuals.
The difference between the Creasman approach and Judge Finley's
8
approach was reflected eight years later in Humphries v. Riveland.4
In Humphries, the surviving party of a 13-year meretricious relation44. Id. at 565, 236 P.2d at 1049. See also Hynes v. Hynes, 28 Wn. 2d 660, 184
P.2d 68 (1947), in which title was placed in both names, pursuant to an agreement
that both would own.
45. 50 Wn. 2d 311, 311 P.2d 689 (1957).
46. Id. at 313, 311 P.2d at 691 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 321, 311 P.2d at 695 (Finley, J., concurring).
48. 67 Wn. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965), noted in 41 WASH. L. Rav. 578 (1966).

741

Washington Law Review

Vol. 49: 729, 1974

ship sought to establish a half interest in property acquired during the
relationship. Denying recovery, the trial court ruled that the survivor
had not overcome the Creasman presumption since she could not
show a contractual arrangement between herself and the decedent or
trace to any tangible asset, but could only trace to her labor. The trial
judge concluded that her labor contributions had been gratuitous. The
court affirmed in a five-to-four decision. Judge Finley dissented, again
emphasizing that the only effect of the meretricious nature of a relationship should be to preclude application of community property
law, not to foreclose attempts to arrive at a fair and reasonable divi49
sion of property accumulated during the relationship.
The Creasman presumption has had its primary force in controversies involving the survivor of the relationship, probably because, as
the court noted in Poole v. Schrichte,5 0 the dead man's statute51 has
impeded presentation of testimony to rebut the presumption. When
both parties are alive at the time of the controversy, however, the
Creasman presumption has been rebutted and the respective interests
of the parties protected through proof of a resulting trust,52 joint venture, 53 tenancy in common,5 4 or individual ownership. 55 The control
of the presumption thus has been frequently avoided, suggesting its
eventual demise.
More direct doubts concerning the continued validity of the
Creasman presumption were expressed in a recent case, In re Estate
of Thornton.5 6 Thornton's Estate involved active participation by
Lucy Antoine, the survivor of a meretricious relationship, in the development of a cattle-raising and farming enterprise to which the dece49. Id. at 398, 407 P.2d at 979 (Finley, J., dissenting). Three other judges dissented
stating that even if there should not be an equal division of the property in an ownership sense, the court should nevertheless recognize and protect the contribution the
woman had made to the value of the property standing in the decedent's name.
50. 39 Wn. 2d at 562-63, 263 P.2d at 1048.
51. WASH. Rev. CODE § 5.60.030 (1963). If the assets in controversy have been
acquired through "business" activity, the possibility of showing the survivor's participation in that activity minimizes the likelihood that the dead man's statute will preclude establishing an ownership interest in the survivor.
52. Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951).
53. Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044(1951).
54. Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wn. 2d 627, 305 P.2d 805 (1957); Hynes v. Hynes, 28
Wn. 2d 660, 184 P.2d 68 (1947).
55. West v. Knowles, 50Wn. 2d 311, 311 P.2d 689 (1957).
56. 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972), noted in 48 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1973).
See also Comment, The Meretricious Relationship in Washington: A Survivor's Interest
in Common Property, 9 WILLAMETTE L. J. 102 (1973).
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dent Roy Thornton had held title. All the assets in the decedent's estate were traceable to the profits of the enterprise. The court held that
upon this proof Ms. Antoine had made a prima facie case of an implied partnership, thus again avoiding the control of the Creasman
presumption. The holding in Thornton's Estate is an application (or
perhaps a slight extension) of the reasoning in Poole v. Schrichte, in
which the court found a joint venture of the parties, 57 but forceful
dictum in the case suggests the probability that the application of the
58
Creasman presumption in the future will be greatly restricted.
Judge Finley stated for the court that, in addition to an implied
partnership, Ms. Antoine might assert "the existence of a relatively
long-term, stable meretricious relationship in which the partners appear to hold themselves out as husband and wife, '59 arid, that from
such a relationship in itself, might claim the right to a half-share in
their accumulations similar to that of a legal wife. Judge Finley noted,
however, that this argument would run afoul of the holding in the
60
Creasman case. Judge Finley added:
We are dubious about the continuing validity of this legal presumption
or fiction, accepted and applied in Creasman v. Boyle. We have disclaimed, and continue to disclaim, any opinion or intended reflection
on the moral status of a couple living in a meretricious
relationship ....
The court examined cases involving full testimony by the nontitled
party to a meretricious relationship and noted that in each case the
court had found the Creasman presumption rebutted by the evidence;
hence, "[i] t would appear that the presumption is of questionable
validity . . . ,, 1 However, since the plaintiffs claim in Thornton's
62
Estate was based on an implied partnership, the court stated:

57. Joint adventure-"a limited partnership,-not limited in the statutory sense as
to the liability of the partners, but as to itsscope and duration." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
73 (4th ed. 1951). The contribution in Thornton's Estate appears to be labor, either
only or primarily; in Poole there was direct monetary contribution as well as labor.
58. Five judges concurred in the opinion; the chief justice and two other judges
concurred in the result.
59. 81 Wn. 2d at 75, 499 P.2d at 866. The court stated that Ms. Antoine might
also base her claim upon a contract to make a will. Id.
60. 81 Wn. 2d at 77, 499 P.2d at 866.
61. 81 Wn. 2d at 78, 499 P.2d at 867. The court added that the presumption might
be unconstitutional under-the analysis of Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
62. 81 Wn. 2d at 78-79, 499 P.2d at 867.
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Therefore, in the absence of an appropriate record from the trial court
and without the aid of argument on appeal, we do not decide whether
the presumption of Creasman remains valid. Arguably, Creasman
should be over-ruled and its archaic presumption invalidated.
C.

Meretriciousand Innocent RelationshipsAfter Thornton's Estate

After Thornton's Estate there may well be three types of property
division resulting from innocent and meretricious relationships: (1)
The innocent relationship where refined protection of the equities
will be afforded; (2) the meretricious relationship intended to be a
stable, continuing "family type" arrangement where the parties will
qualify for a rough, equitable share in the other's acquisitions; and (3)
the short term meretricious relationship not intended to be a stable,
continuing relationship where the Creasman presumption will retain
vitality.
Where the parties have engaged in a casual relationship, e.g., where
they meet on Thursday nights, lack of intention to establish a longterm meretricious relationship easily may be inferred. In these kinds
of relationships, neither party can reasonably expect to share in the
other's acquisitions, nor have the joint efforts of the parties contributed to the property accumulations of either, and thus it would simply
be unfair for the court to divest the titled party of ownership. Hence,
it is reasonable to assume that the court will continue to apply the
Creasman presumption to the short term meretricious relationship.
Assuming the Creasman presumption will not be applied in future
cases to the "family-type" meretricious relationship, as suggested in
Thornton's Estate, on what basis will the nontitled party be able to assert a share in the other's acquisitions? The Thornton's Estate dictum
that the existence of a relatively long-term, stable meretricious relationship in itself may support a claim in the other's acquisitions implies that where the parties intend that both contribute to the success
of the common enterprise, they should share accordingly in the
common acquisitions; the analogy to the joint contribution reasoning
in community property acquisitions is patent. This joint contribution
inference should also be permissible when it can be shown that the
two intended a "long and stable relationship" which did not materialize by reason of the "early" death of one. In these situations, either
direct (e.g., monetary) contribution to a particular acquisition or indirect (e.g., labor in the home) contribution to acquisitions should result
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in a division of property acquired during the relationship.
On this analysis, the results in both the Creasman and the Walberg
v. Mattson63 cases, for example, would be different. Chief Justice
Mallery, dissenting in Creasman, thought the record clearly indicated
64
the parties "intended to enjoy and possess the property in common",
and disagreed with the majority's conclusion that resulting trust principles should be applied. In the Walberg case, the man put title to a
home in the woman's name; the court concluded that the man should
retain the entire interest in the home on the reasoning that she held on
a resulting trust for him. The dissent in Walberg65 believed resulting
trust principles had been misapplied, pointing out that the plaintiff
66
had testified he bought the house as a home for them and her family.
The Walberg and Creasman factual situation would, under the suggested Thornton's Estate analysis, result in a division of the property
because of the intention to establish a long and stable relationship.
The question remains, however, whether the court will distinguish
between long and stable meretricious relationships and innocent relationships in the division of property. Application of more refined distinctions in equity for the innocent relationship is suggested by Judge
Finley's concurring opinion in West v. Knowles.67 However, the joint
contribution reasoning inherent in the Thornton's Estate dictum, suggesting that the location of title will not be controlling as to the equities, and the court's continuing statements that the morality of the
parties is not material 68 might mean that property will be divided
between the parties in these meretricious relationships upon the same
69
equitable. reasoning applied to innocent relationships.
III.
A.

CHARACTER OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
Statutory Scheme and Basic Presumptions

As noted previously in the introduction, the statutory scheme controlling the character of ownership of property acquired by either or
63.
64.

38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951).
31 Wn. 2d at 362, 196 P.2d at 843 (emphasis added)

65.

Schwellenbach, CJ.

66.

A probable "permanent" relationship was contemplated. He testified he "didn't

want to shack around." 38 Wn. 2d at 810, 232 P.2d at 828.
67.

50Wn. 2d at 315, 311 P.2d at 692, (Finley, J., concurring).

68. See note 44 supra and Thornton's Estate, 81 Wn. 2d at 77, 499 P.2d at 867.
69. If one party in the relationship is innocent, and the other is not, a refined distinction in the equities to protect the innocent party might be warranted.
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both spouses has remained unchanged since territorial days. "Property
and pecuniary rights" owned by either spouse at marriage, thereafter
lucratively acquired, and the rents, issues and profits thereof constitute
separate property of that spouse.7 0 All assets otherwise acquired after
marriage by either or both spouses are community property.7 1 In
ascertaining whether assets fall within the separate or community property section of the statutes, the Washington court frequently has emphasized the rule that the facts existing at the time of acquisition control: "the status of property . . . becomes fixed as of the date of its
purchase or acquisition, and that status, when once fixed, retains its
character until changed by agreement of the parties or operation of
72
law."
The fundamental premise of the community property system is that
both spouses contribute to property acquisitions in a joint effort
to promote the welfare of the relationship.7 3 Hence, an asset onerously74 acquired during marriage is presumptively community property whereas one lucratively 75 acquired ordinarily is not. The Washington court's preference for community property is clear, however,
and this preference permeates the court's basic statutory analysisproperty acquired by a spouse is community property unless the trans76
action falls within a separate property section.
1.

The basic presumption

In Yesler v. Hochstettler,7 7 the Washington court stated the basic
presumption that an asset acquired during marriage is presumed to be
70. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010&.020(1963)
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1973). The extensive changes in this
section in 1972 affect management and disposition but not the character of ownership
of community property.
72. In re Binge's Estate, 5 Wn. 2d 446, 484, 105 P.2d 689, 705 (1940). In re
Madsen's Estate, 48 Wn. 2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956).
73. Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wn. 2d 844, 852, 190 P.2d 575. 578 (1948).
74. Acquisition by labor or industry or other valuable consideration. DEFUNIAK &
VAUGHN

§ 62.

75. Lucrative acquisition by gift, succession, inheritance or other nonvaluable
means. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 62. Gift, inheritance, devise and bequest involve
lucrative (donative) acquisitions which usually are not but may be community
property. Id.
76. See, e.g., In re Slocum's Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 P. 204 (1915); In re
Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 150 P.2d 595 (1944); Stephens v. Nelson. 37 Wn. 2d
28, 221 P.2d 520 (1950).
77. 4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398 (1892). In the Yesler case land was acquired by
ordinary deeds expressing a valuable consideration. The court held that if proof against
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community property and, if the transaction indicates a valuable consideration was paid, the presumption can be overcome only by clear
and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a
separate property section. If nothing indicates the circumstances of an
acquisition during marriage or whether a valuable consideration was
paid, the basic presumption may not be so strong, but practically
speaking, at least a recited valuable consideration can be shown in
most instances. Even if one cannot be shown, the Yesler proposition
that the basic presumption can be weighed against and will control
over doubtful proof that the transaction falls within the separate property section probably means that to prevail the separate property proponent's proof must be persuasive, not merely plausible.
Application of the basic presumption that assets acquired during
marriage are community property assumes the existence of the marital
relationship at the time of acquisition, and, if that assumption is challenged, the fact of marriage must be established. 78 Probably in most
contested situations the relationship is shown by testimony or documentary evidence of marriage prior to the time of acquisition, but circumstantial evidence can be sufficient.7 9 Of course, if the acquirer was
unmarried, the character of the asset at the time of acquisition is necessarily separate.
A presumption that an asset possessed by a married person is community property may arise even though the particular time of acquisition has not been established. 80 This presumption may be a reflection
of the commingling and tracing rules hereafter discussed which tend
to induce the conclusion that an asset in dispute is community property. This presumption is unlikely to arise, or to have much strength,
however, until the marital relationship has existed for a substantial
8
period of time. '

the presumptive community character left the matter in doubt, the presumption con-

trolled. This principle was applied in Woodland Lumber Co. v. Link, 16 Wash. 72, 47
P. 222 (1896).
78. Chase v. Carney, 199 Wash. 99, 90 P.2d 286 (1939).
79. Proffv. Maley, 14 Wn. 2d 287, 128 P.2d 330(1942).
80. State ex rel. Marshall v. Superior Court, 119 Wash. 631, 206 P. 362 (1922)
(presumption of community property character of all assets possessed by married men

supports finding they were insolvent as regards separate liability).
8 1.

See, e.g., In re Jolly's Estate, 196 Cal. 547, 238 P. 353 (1925); Riddle v. Riddle,

62 S.W. 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901). The longer the marital relationship has continued
the greater the likelihood that the time of acquisition was after marriage or that
commingling has made a source asset community property.
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Rebutting the basic presumption

The basic presumption of the community character of a postnuptial
acquisition can be rebutted by evidence putting the acquisition transaction into a separate property section (e.g., gift, bequest); it can also
be rebutted by showing, through tracing, that the asset used to acquire
the one in question was separate property. As the court has said,
"[s] eparate property continues to be separate property through all of
its changes and transitions so long as it can be clearly traced and identified ...."8Z Mere assertion that the acquisition was by use of separate
funds does not overcome the basic presumption, however; rather,
there must be clear tracing of the separate funds into the asset in controversy. 83 Placing the title in the name of one of the spouses neither
controls nor has any particular significance in determining the character of ownership; therefore, it is of little use in rebutting the Yesler
presumption. 84 If community funds are used to purchase property by
the husband with title taken in the wife's name, he intending that she
own separately, it may be necessary, and certainly it is safer, that he
85
also execute a quit claim deed to her.
Tracing to the character of the funds used to purchase the asset in
question often is necessary to establish its character. If the acquisition
funds were the earnings of a spouse, that normally would be the end
of the search-the source asset would have been identified and since
earnings of spouses while living together are community property, the

82. In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944).
83. Berol v. Berol, 37 Wn. 2d 380, 223 P.2d 1055 (1950); Hamlin v. Merlino,
44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954). Nor does the husband's testimony of acquisition by gift rebut the presumption, when the deed recites valuable consideration. Abel
v. Abel, 47 Wn. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 724 (1955).
84. Merrit v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517, 520, 285 P. 442, 444 (1930). The matter
was neatly stated:
Under our somewhat perplexing statutes relating to the acquisition of property,
title to real property taken in the name of one of the spouses may be the separate
property of the spouse taking the title, the separate property of the other spouse.
or the community property of both of the spouses, owing to the source from
which the fund is derived which is used in paying the purchase price of the
property.
85. The court indicated the statute of frauds applied, in In re Parker's Estate, 115
Wash. 57, 196 P. 632 (1921). The author believes this is unsound because it jumps
over the problem of the character of the acquisition. The use of the quitclaim deed
is important to change or raise the presumption of change to separate ownership.
In re Carmack's Estate, 133 Wash. 324, 233 P. 942 (1925).
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acquired asset would be a community asset.8 6 However, if the acquisition funds were acquired by sale of an asset, analysis of the ownership
character of that asset would be necessary, and so on, until either a
source in a spouse's earnings or within the separate property section is
identified; only the latter source will rebut the basic presumption.
B.

Acquisition by Gift

An acquisition by one spouse by gift, or otherwise within the separate property section, will apparently, but not necessarily, be separate
property. The substance rather than the form of the transaction will
control so that an acquisition which appears to be lucrative can be
found to be onerous. Thus in Andrews v. Andrews 87 the court concluded that a devise to the husband, had it been made, would have
been in performance of a contract to devise in return for services to
the decedent, and thus an onerous acquisition of community property
in which the wife would have an interest. The intention of the transferor is probably determinative of whether an acquisition which in
form fits within the separate property section is in fact lucrative; if a
donation is not intended, the acquisition falls within the language of
the community property section,8 8 even though it might be difficult to
conclude the acquisition was "onerous." 8 9
A special problem arises where a gift is not to one, but to both of
the spouses. In substance the community property statutes establish
permissible types of property ownership rather than solely specifying
particular means by which community property may be acquired. 90
86. It is sometimes helpful to think of a spouse's productive or earning capacity
as the basic community property asset; this approach would present a two-step--tracing
to earnings, then to earning capacity-rather than a one-step tracing, but of course
with the same result.
87.
88.

116 Wash. 513, 199 P. 981 (1921).
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1973).

89. See In re Gold's Estate, 170 Cal. 621, 151 P. 12 (1915); United States v.
Elfer, 246 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1957). deFuniak & Vaughn criticize the sweeping
inclusion within the community property section as a failure to recognize that the
system contemplates onerous acquisition through industry, labor or talent of the
spouse(s), DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN §§ 62, 76. The statutory language does support the
inclusion: "Property not acquired ... as prescribed in [the separate property sections]
acquired after marriage by either [spouse or both] is community property." WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1973).
90. In Stockstill v. Bart, 47 F. 231 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 1891), the federal court
concluded the Washington statutes had the latter effect. The Washington court rejected
this view in In re Salvini's Estate, 65 Wn. 2d 442, 397 P.2d 811 (1964).
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Thus, despite the language of the separate property sections, which
could be interpreted to mean that a gift to both spouses necessarily
creates a separate property ownership in each, the court in In re Salvini's Estate9 1 held that such a gift creates community property in the
donee spouses.
However, the sweep of the concluding statement in Salvini's Estate
that "[a] gift to a husband and wife is a gift to the community under
our statutes," 92 needs clarification. This statement may announce a
flat rule that when the donees are husband and wife the asset acquired
is necessarily community property; but preferably the statement
should be considered as the expression of a presumption which will
control in the absence of proof of a different intention in the donor.
The donor, if he so intends, should be permitted to create in his donees some recognized form of common law (separate property)
co-ownership. Although in Salvini's Estate both spouses were named
as grantees and were in fact identified as "husband and wife," the
presumption of a gift to the community should arise even though the
transfer instrument does not indicate the marital relationship of the
donees. Avoiding a flat rule and permitting a presumption of community property character to arise would recognize "the policy of the
law . . . in favor of community property,

' 93

but still permit the in-

tention of the parties to control.
Another gift transaction should be mentioned. When one spouse
uses separateproperty to acquire an asset, title to which is taken in the
name of the other spouse, there is under Washington law a rebuttable
94
presumption of gift.
Acquisition While Living Separate and Apart: Marriages That
are No Longer Accompanied by Community Relationships

C.

As previously discussed, the existence of the marital relationship is
91. 65 Wn. 2d 442, 397 P.2d 811 (1964). The Spanish law is the same. DEFUNIAK
& VAUGHN § 69.
92. 65 Wn. 2d at 448, 397 P.2d at 814.
93. In re Salvini's Estate, 65 Wn. 2d at 448, 397 P.2d at 814, quoting Volz v.
Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 383, 194 P. 409, 410(1920).
94. Scott v. Currie, 7 Wn. 2d 301, 109 P.2d 526 (1941) (H bought with separate
funds, took title in W's name; presumption not rebutted, she owned as her separate
estate); Plath v. Mullins, 87 Wash. 403, 151 P. 811 (1915) (presumption of gift by
wife not overcome); Denny v. Schwabacher, 54 Wash. 689, 104 P. 137 (1909) (presumption of gift by W found rebutted; H held under resulting trust for W).
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prerequisite to a finding that an acquisition is community property,
but even an onerous acquisition during the marital relationship, while
ordinarily presumed to be community property, may be found tobe
the separate property of the acquirer by reason of the "living separate
and apart" provisions of R.C.W. § 26.16.140. 95 Prior to the 1972
amendments, that section provided only that the wife's earnings and
accumulations while living separate and apart were her separate
property 6 However, the case law had developed the requirement
that a community relationship-as distinguished from merely a marital relationship 9 7 -exist between the husband and wife to establish
his onerous acquisitions to be community property. The principal case
enunciating this proposition is Togliatti v. Robertson98 in which savings bonds acquired by the husband, after a long separation during
which neither spouse relied on the efforts of the other, were found to
be his separate property. The court's conclusion was reached on the
dual bases that (1) neither spouse had contributed to the acquisitions
of the other, contrary to the fundamental theory of community property, and that (2) a separate property agreement could be inferred
from their conduct during the long and permanent separation.9 9 The
Togliatti rules apply only to a "defunct marriage" and not merely to a
physical separation of the spouses, however, as the court explained in
Rustad v. Rustad, 0 0 which held that acquisitions by the husband
during the long separation of the spouses by reason of the wife's con"finement in a mental institution outside of Washington were community property. 0 1

95.

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (Supp. 1973) states:

When a husband and wife are living separate and apart, their respective earnings
and accumulations shall be the separate property of each. The earnings and accu-

mulations of minor children shall be the separate property of the spouse who has
their custody or, if no custody award has been made, then the separate property
of the spouse with whom said children are living
96. Plus, of course, those of minor children living with her.
97. Existence of the marital relationship depends upon the legal requirements for
marriage. Existence of the community relationship depends upon facts in addition to
the marriage.
98. 29 Wn. 2d 844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948).
99. The first rationale was applied in In re Armstrong's Estate, 33 Wn. 2d 118,
204 P.2d 500 (1949); and the second in In re Janssen's Estate, 56 Wn. 2d 150, 351
P.2d 510 (1960).
100. 61 Wn. 2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963). See also Schneider v. Biberger, 76
Wash. 504, 136 P. 701 (1913).
101. Mere physical separation similarly does not terminate the "family" relation-

ship necessary to the three-way liability of the family expense statute, WASH. REV. CODE

751

Washington Law Review

Vol. 49: 729, 1974

Whether the inclusion of the husband in the 1972 amendments to
R.C.W. § 26.16.140 is essentially a codification of the Togliatti rules
or whether it effects a change from them to a different pattern previously limited to the wife's acquisitions is uncertain. Unquestionably
both spouses should have identical positions not only by reason of the
new phraseology of the section but also because of the thrust of the
1972 amendments for equality between them. 02 The problem, however, is to identify that position.
Nothing in earlier Washington cases establishes the content of the
"living separate" language of the pre-1972 statute, but "living separate and apart" in the amended version obviously should have the
same meaning. In Kerr v. Cochran10 3 the defendant wife testified she
was living separate and apart from her husband; the court said mere
10 4
separation would not dissolve the community, and that:
[t] he statute merely states that the earnings of the wife are her separate property while she is living separate and apart from her husband.
It has no effect on the status of property acquired prior to the separation, nor does it dissolve the marital community. The statute operates
while the spouses are living separate and apart, and is effective regardless of whether there has been a dissolution of the community.
It is unclear whether the court in that case made the distinction between continued existence of a marital relationship and termination of
a "community relationship" as we have used that term above. 10 5
The preferable analysis of "living separate and apart" is that the
statute contemplates a permanent separation, which may be estab-

§ 26.16.205 (Supp. 1973). See, e.g., Russell v. Graumann, 40 Wash. 667, 82 P. 998
(1905) (husband worked in Spokane for three years prior to his death there while
wife continued to reside in Pennsylvania). Contrast Yates v. Dohring, 24 Wn. 2d 877,
168 P.2d 404 (1946).
102. See Cross, 1972 Amendments to the Washington Community Property Law,
26 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 9 (April. 1972).
103. 65Wn.2d211,396P.2d642(1964).
104. Id. at 225, 396 P.2d at 650 (emphasis added). This last sentence does indicate
mere separation brings the statute into play even though there is not a "defunct marriage." Note, however, the proposition is not essential to the holding of no community
liability. Similarly, the statement in Rustad v. Rustad that the spouses were living
separate and apart (she being confined in an out-of-state mental hospital) does not
compel a determination that mere physical separation, even though long continued,
brings the statute into operation.
105. The holding in the case, however, is that the plaintiff in the tort action had
failed to prove that defendant .wife had incurred any community liability on any possible theory.
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lished by factual patterns such as those existing in the Togliatti line of
"defunct marriage" cases. Permanent separation, in essence, exists
when both spouses no longer have the will to continue a "community
relationship." A deserted spouse who desires that the relationship continue despite desertion or abandonment by the other-a frustration of
the deserted spouse's community expectations-should remain protected by the community property rules and should be able to assert
an interest in the deserting spouse's after-acquired property, but in no
event should the deserting spouse be able to assert an interest in the
deserted spouse's after-acquired property. 10 6 This approach accords
with the Spanish rules.1 07 There is also support for this approach both
in the rule that the husband loses his managing power upon his abandonment of the wife,10 8 and in the inference in Hicks v. Hicks'0 9 that
the deserting husband's acquisitions subsequent to separation but
prior to his divorce are community property to be divided between
him and his former wife. When the deserted spouse accepts the futility
of hope for restoration of a normal relationship, the marriage should
be considered "defunct" or the separation permanent so that the
statute applies." 0 Finding the statute applicable when the deserted
spouse accepts, or perhaps just acquiesces, in the separation seems to
be in philosophical harmony with the recently enacted Dissolution
Act;"' to dissolve a marriage the Act does not require affirmative
concurrence in the other spouse's allegation that the marriage is "irretrievably broken," but only that the spouse does not deny the allegation. A decree of seprate maintenance likewise should invoke the
12
statute."
106. This analysis is more fully explored in Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community PropertyLaw-1972 Statutory Changes,48 WASH. L. REV. 527,531-33

(1973).
107. *DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 57. The problem not having been resolved in Washington, the Spanish law should be persuasive. See In re Salvini's Estate, 65 Wn. 2d
442, 397 P.2d 811 (1964). See also G. McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 299 (2d ed.
1925).
108. Wampler v. Beinert, 125 Wash. 494, 216 P. 855 (1923).
109. 69 Wash. 627, 125 P. 945 (1912).
110. This should be established by the deserting spouse and not be merely a mat-

ter of elapsed time. Compare Johnson v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 3 Wn. 2d 257,
100 P.2d 382 (1940) (separation for two years without attempt to enforce support

obligation is abandonment; wife abandoned for one year or less is ineligible for
benefits under the workman's compensation statute).
111.
112.

REV. CODE § 26.09.030(1) (Supp. 1973).
This is so even though the limited purpose of the action for separate mainWASH.

tenance does not permit the decree to fix the character of property held or which may
be acquired in the future. Cohn v. Cohn, 4 Wn. 2d 322, 103 P.2d 366 (1940).
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Acquisitionsfrom the Federal Government
If a particular asset is acquired from the federal government, fed-

eral law may intervene and control, by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause of the Federal Constitution, 1 3 effecting a result contrary to
that dictated by ordinary community property rules. If the source of

the acquisition is community property funds or the labor of a spouse,
the ordinary rule would establish the community character of the asset, and the dispositive and succession rights to the asset would be
controlled by local law.
In the early federal homestead cases, federal law controlled with

whom the federal government would deal,114 but when a patent was
issued the nature of the ownership of the land was determined by local
law.1 1 5 However, in Wissner v. Wissner the United States Supreme
Court held that federal law controlled the effectiveness of the bene-

ficiary designation of national service life insurance even though the
result was contrary to state community property law.'

Estate117

16

In In re Allen's

the Washington court held that ownership in United States

savings bonds was determined by state community property law; the

applicable federal regulations, in the Washington court's view, were
a matter of administrative convenience only and did not control substantive rights in the bonds. The United States Supreme Court 18 subsequently rejected the position of the Washington court in Allen's
Estate and held that federal law governs substantive rights of power of

113. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
114. G. McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 547-49, 555-57 (2d ed. 1925). explained the result on the basis of a federally created right of survivorship.
115. McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905); Buchser v. Buchser, 231 U.S. 157
(1913). See generally Evans, Community Property in Public Lands, 9 CAL. L. REV.
267(1921).
116. 338 U.S. 655 (1950). A particularly interesting reaction to this holding is
Davis, The Case of the Missing Community Property, 5 Sw. L.J. 1(1951).
117. 54Wn. 2d 616,343 P.2d 867(1959).
118. The cases are Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (Texas law) and Yiatchos
v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964). The latter reversed the Washington court's holding,
In re Yiatchos' Estate, 60 Wn. 2d 179, 373 P.2d 125 (1962), as to the husband's
half interest and remanded for further clarification of the Washington law on the
wife's interest in community property. The court concluded it was uncertain whether
the wife's vested half interest in community property applied to all community property in the aggregate or inhered in each item. The item theory of community property
ownership is reflected in the holdings discussed infra on transfers and availability to
reach of creditors. There was no direct holding as regards death succession prior to
In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 494 P.2d 238 (1972), in which the court of
appeals concluded the item theory was applicable there also.
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disposition of United States savings bonds. The Supreme Court's interference in Yiatchos v. Yiatchos"1 9 with local rules also reversed the
state burden of proof in gift transactions by holding that to successfully
attack the husband's disposition of the bonds the wife must show she
had not concurred in his donative transfer. The local rule, on the other
hand, puts the burden on the proponent of a "separate" property
20
claim when the wife has not participated in the gift.1
E.

Time of Acquisition: Mortgage, Life Insurance and
Installment Acquisitions

The ownership character of an asset is determined "at the time of
acquisition" and, except in the federal homestead cases, the previous
discussion essentially assumes that the acquisition transaction was either instantaneous or that it posed no problems in identifying the time
of acquisition. Unfortunately, in situations in which the full economic
value of an asset is not acquired until payment of a series of installments, determination of the time of acquisition, and the resulting
character of an asset, may be difficult. In two common patterns of
acquisition the court has developed clear rules: acquisition of legal
title by means of mortgage financing, and acquisition of a life insurance policy (or proceeds of one). The rules are not clear, however, for
acquisition through payments on an installment contract where legal
title is not obtained until the payments are completed.
1.

Mortgages

In a mortgage financing situation, where the buyer acquires title at
the outset in exchange for a cash payment and an obligation to pay
the remainder of the purchase price, the fractional share of the ownership represented by the cash payment will be owned as the cash was
owned,121 and the character of the balance will be determined by the
character of the credit pledged to secure the funds to pay the seller, or

119. 376 U.S. 306(1964).
120. See Part IV, Management and Voluntary Disposition, infra for discussion of
the transfer power.
121. Ownership of the cash is determined by application of the source doctrine,
i.e., by tracing to the original source.
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to secure payment to him. 122 It does not matter that funds of a different character are subsequently used to pay the obligation;123 the
character of the asset is determined by the character of the cash and
of the obligation at the time legal title and ownership is obtained. In
three factual situations, however, difficulty arises in ascertaining as
between husband and wife the character of the obligation.
If legal title is secured by partial payment without any personal obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price, e.g., taking title
subject to a mortgage, the basic community or separate property presumptions will apply, clearly as to that fraction then paid for, but the
effect of payment for the fraction represented by the unassumed mortgage debt with funds not having the same character as the presump4
tion is unclear.12
If the security given for the obligation is the asset acquired and the
credit's character is uncertain, it may be difficult to avoid a result
based upon the basic community property presumption. In Walker v.
Fowler125 the court held the wife owned a quarter of the land in question separately because she had used her separate funds to pay that
portion of the purchase price, but the balance was owned as community property because there was nothing to overcome a presumption that it was acquired by use of community credit. 126 If the asset
acquired is income producing and in fact produces the funds to discharge the acquisition obligation, it is arguable that the character of
122. See, e.g., In re Dougherty's Estate, 27 Wn. 2d 11, 176 P.2d 335 (1947). See
Part VI, Involuntary Disposition, infra for further discussion of the character of
obligation question. There has long been a presumption that the husband's contract
obligation is community in character. See Bryant v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 13 Wash.
692, 43 P. 931 (1896); Oregon Improvement Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wash. 710, 30 P.
1058 (1892). Under the 1972 changes a similar presumption should apply to the
wife's obligation. An obligation by assuming an existing mortgage should be similarly
treated.
123. In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919).
124. In re Finn's Estate involved payment of the unassumed mortgage debt with
community funds which, as the court said, supported the presumption of the community character of that share (Dawson tract). However, in Merkel v. Merkel, 39
Wn. 2d 102, 234 P. 2d 857 (1951), land conveyed to the husband prior to his marriage, subject to a mortgage, was held to be his separate property though the mortgage
debt was discharged with community funds. The community interest was protected by
an equitable lien but was not an ownership share. See text accompanying notes
212-46 infra for discussion of the equitable lien right.
125. 155 Wash. 631, 285 P. 649(1930).
126. Even though part of the debt was subsequently paid by use of the wife's
separate funds, the community creditor was able to reach the three-quarters community
property ownership. Both spouses were bound on the note and mortgage. Note that
under the 1972 changes the act of either spouse (or both) will be-presumptively
community in character.
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the funds used to make the initial payment ought to control the character of the obligation and hence the ownership as between the
spouses. There is some support for this argument in the proposition
that similar funds, if available, are presumed to have been used to pay
127
similar obligations, e.g., separate funds pay separate obligations.
As between the husband and wife, the controlling character of the
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price is not necessarily
determined by the extent to which the creditor could enforce payment.
The obligation may be separate primarily because one of the spouses
provided his or her separate property as security even though it could
be enforced against either spouse or the community property. For
example, in In re Finn's Estate, 128 the wife's obligation, secured by a
mortgage on other separate property of the wife, involved her separate
credit and was the character-controlling obligation even though the
husband (and thereby presumptively the community) was also bound
by his signature on the note, the husband apparently signing at the insistence of the creditor.1 29 As between the spouses a primarysecondary debtor's relationship may be established which is relevant
to the determination of the character of the credit used in acquisition,
without necessarily creating a principal-surety relationship affecting
the creditor.
Since knowledgeable creditors are unlikely to accept a transaction
which clearly creates only a separate liability, attempting to characterize a transaction by the recitals in the documents thus may be impractical, and the spouses may have to fix the transaction's character
by independent, contemporary interspousal documents if the separate
character as between them is to be unequivocally established.
2.

Life insurancepolicies

The rules with reference to ownership of life insurance policies and
their proceeds are clear and involve only tracing to determine the
127.

See, e.g., Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 352, 115 P. 731, 735 (1911). The argu-

ment is obviously circular: the character of the credit is determined by the character
of the security given which is determined by the character of the credit by which the
asset (used as security) is acquired. This may mean that the presumption of community credit must prevail when there are no other available facts to consider.
128. See note 123 supra(Drew tract).
129. See also Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934), in
which under similar borrowing conditions community liability was enforced by the
creditor.
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character of the funds used to pay the premiums. Ownership of the
policy or its proceeds will be separate property or community property in proportion to the percentage of the total premiums which have
been paid with separate or community funds.1 30 Although an argument can be made that the source premiums, which lead to the apportionment or prorating of the ownership, ought to be considered with
respect to the nature of the policy (e.g., endowment, ordinary life,
group-term, etc.),13 1 the court has not done so and the process of apportionment of the ownership is the same for all policies.
The insurance, i.e., the contract right reflected in the policy itself, is
an asset, not a mere expectancy,1 3 2 and is the immediate source of
proceeds payable on death of the insured. If there is a partial or total
community property ownership of the policy and the noninsured
spouse dies, the decedent's community property interest is necessarily
owned by the decedent's successors, with the consequent possibility of
liability for the death succession tax. 1 33 Of course subsequent
premium payments will reduce the "community" percentage of the
ownership.1 34 As an asset the policy needs to be taken into account
1 35
in divorce-related property arrangements.
3.

Installment contracts

The rules are unclear in acquisitions of assets by performance of an
installment purchase contract. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the

130. Wilson v. Wilson, 35 Wn. 2d 364, 212 P.2d 1022 (1949); Small v. Bartyzel,
27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947).
131. See Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn. 2d at 185, 177 P.2d at 395 (Mallery, CJ.,
dissenting).
132. In re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938).
133. In re Leuthold's Estate, 52 Wn. 2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958). The value at
death is held to be the cash surrender value. For federal tax purposes the value is the
interpolated terminal reserve plus the unearned part of the last premium paid. Treas.
Reg. § 20,203 1-8 (1963). Absence of cash surrender value is irrelevant on the question of ownership and succession rights in the contract right reflected in the policy
itself.
134. Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir., 1967).
135. See, e.g., 31 WASH. L. REV. 146 (1956).
In the author's opinion, an undesirable application of the insurance rule was made
in Chase v. Chase, 74 Wn. 2d 253, 444 P.2d 145 (1968), wherein, under the employer's multiple insurance protection plan, payment was made to the husband for a
disability occurring after permanent separation and commencement of divorce but
before the decree; the court held that the insurance was undisposed of community
property and therefore equally owned by the former spouses. Such protection is pe-
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problems were the same for real property and personal property acquisitions. There are now additional problems in real property purchases which will be discussed later.
The basic rule, that the ownership will be determined at the time of
acquisition, is reiterated in this type of case, but the difficulty is in
fixing the time of acquisition. There are two possibilities as to time of
acquisition: (a) when the contract obligation arises (the mortgage
rule), or (b) partial acquisition as each payment is made with final
136
shares determined by an apportionment (the life insurance rule). If
funds of the same character are used to make all payments, the ownership of the asset will, by ordinary tracing rules, be the same as that
of the acquiring funds. 137 Problems arise, however, when funds of a
different character are used for part of the payments. Funds of a
different character might be used even though the whole acquisition

culiarly designed to meet future needs, is essentially "instantaneously" available by
reason of current employment and not acquired over a time span. It should be
"divided" if at all on an alimony analysis.
136. A third possibilty would be to determine ownership when legal title is transferred in performance of the seller's obligation. Under this possibility the ownership
character would be controlled by the marital status at the time legal title is acquired.
This result is wholly unsatisfactory and totally ignores the source doctrine, but remains
as a slight possibilty because of the holding in In re Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678,
233 P. 293 (1925), that land conveyed to a widower was his separate property even
though the contract to buy had been made while he was married. The result was that
his children by his deceased wife had no ownership share despite payment of a quarter
of the price with community funds. The children were protected by a right to reimbursement in the amount of one half of the payment made with community funds. The
particular result followed from a strange proposition then extant in the Washington
cases that the purchaser of land under an executory, forfeitable contract had no title
or interest, legal or equitable. Obviously if nothing had been acquired by the time of
the mother's death there was nothing for her children to inherit; but as later recognized
in Norman v. Levenhagen, 142 Wash. 372, 253 P. 113 (1927), a contract right had
been acquired and was property, the community or separate character of which would
be determined by the usual rules. See, e.g., Farrow v. Ostrom, 16 Wn. 2d 547, 133
P.2d 974 (1943), and Meltzer v. Wendell-West, 7 Wn. App. 90, 497 P.2d 1348 (1972).
When the contract purchaser's right has been involved the court has held it to be
community property when acquired during marriage, i.e., the contract obligation to
buy has been created by the purchaser's signing the contract, even though some separate
funds were used in part payment. Farrow v. Ostrom, supra. Similarly, the court held
land deeded to the husband after separation but before divorce was entirely community property even though he had completed the purchase by payment of the balance of the contract price after the separation with his separate funds. Half of his
excess (separate property) contributions were charged as a lien against her half. Fritch
v. Fritch, 53 Wn. 2d 496, 335 P.2d 43 (1959).
The author knows of no case in which the contract was made prior to marriage and
final payments were made after marriage with community funds.
137. There is a presumption that, if both separate and community funds are available, payment of an obligation was made from the proper fund, Guye v. Guye, 63
Wash. 340, 115 P. 731 (1911); In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919).
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process occurs during marriage,138 but they are more likely to be used
when the process overlaps the time of marriage or dissolution of the
marital relationship by death or divorce, so that necessarily some
payments have been made with separate property funds.
McKay insisted that an asset conveyed after marriage in fulfillment
of an antenuptial contract was necessarily separate property. 139
Application of the source doctrine (tracing to the obligation incurred
in the antenuptial transaction) also would establish, as in the mortgage cases, the separate character of the legal title ultimately acquired in fulfillment of an antenuptial contract. This approach was
40
nicely stated in In re Binge's Estate:'
Property acquired through contractual obligation, as between husband
and wife and all others claiming under them, has its origin and is acquired as of the date when the obligation becomes binding, and not as
of the time when the money is paid or the thing is delivered or conveyed. The fruit of the obligation is legally acquired as of the date
when the obligation becomes binding.
This statement would appear to have settled the matter in favor of the
mortgage rule, except that the court on the following page of the case
stated that if the payments after marriage had been from community
funds,' 4 ' "to the extent of [payment from separate funds] the tract
would be separate property of the husband, and the balance [paid
with community funds] would represent the interest of the community
in that section of land."' 42 This, of course, is the life insurance rule.
The "interest of the community" might refer to the right of reimbursement (equitable lien), but it appears to refer to a share of ownership.
The above statement quoted from Binge's Estate supporting the

138. Although the likelihood may be small because of the basic presumptions
of community character of the acts, and the possibility or even probability that commingling will have eliminated the potential separate property character of some funds
used. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 499 P.2d 231 (1972).

139. G. McKAY. COMMUNITY PROPERTY ch. 31 (2d ed. 1925), criticizing the contrary holding in In re Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678, 233 P. 293 (1925), and citing
two federal homestead cases in support, Forker v. Henry, 21 Wash. 235, 57 P. 811
(1899), and Rogers v. Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co., 48 Wash. 19, 92 P. 774
(1907).
140. 5 Wn. 2d 446, 484, 105 P.2d 689, 705 (1940).
141. They were found to have been made with separate funds of the purchaserhusband.
142. 5 Wn. 2d at 485, 105 P.2d at 706.
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mortgage rule was quoted by the court in In re Dougherty's Estate. 4 3
There, however, without any explanation, the court then concluded
that certain personal property was owned as separate and community
property proportionately to the antenuptial payments by the purchaser-wife and the postnuptial payments with community funds.
Thus, the Washington court appears to be stating the mortgage rule,
but applying the life insurance rule. There has not been any identifiable, different rule to be applied to real property acquisitions than is
applied to personal property acquisitions. 4 4 .
The confusion from the statement of the mortgage rule in Binge's
Estate and the application of the life insurance rule in Dougherty's
Estate might be resolved by the conclusion reached in a subsequent
case, Fritch v. Fritch.14 5 There, the land was held to have been community property undisposed of by the divorce decree and therefore
held by the former spouses as equal tenants in common. The contract
to buy was made while the spouses were married but final payments
were made by the husband from his separate funds. 4 6 While title was
conveyed before the divorce, the status of the spouses had fallen into
the "defunct marriage" situation within the Togliatti rule,' 47 although
no point is made in Fritch of that situation. The reasoning and result
in Fritch should be applicable, by analogy, to fulfillment payments
made with separate funds by a former spouse after divorce (or death
of the other). Given this reasoning, Fritch is contrary to In re,Kuhn's
Estate148 and is an application of the mortgage rule quoted above
from Binge's Estate. The variant result in Dougherty's Estate can be
rationalized on the basis of an agreement between the spouses that a
proportionate share of the ownership should be community property. 14 9 Application of the rule stated in Binge's Estate would give
143.
144.

27Wn.2dll, 176P.2d335(1947).
The new 1972 rule pertaining to real property purchase, discussed infra,

does not affect this problem.
145. 53 Wn. 2d 496, 335 P.2d 43 (1959).
146. As regards ownership of an asset acquired through installment contract
payments, the sequence of successive payments by separate and community funds
should be unimportant.
147. Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wn. 2d 844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948), discussed in

text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.

148. 132 Wash. 678,233 P. 293 (1925).
149. The possibility of fixing the character of ownership by agreement is recognized by the Dougherty court, 27 Wn. 2d at 19, 22-24, 176 P.2d at 339, 341-42.
See also Part V, Transactions and Agreements Between Spouses, infra; DEFUNIAK &
VAUGHN § 64.
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the same significance to the initial obligation and payment whether
the sequence was separate-community or vice versa; only the character of the initial obligation and not the character of subsequent payments is significant. 150
The author thus believes it is desirable that there be clear adoption
of the mortgage rule in installment acquisitions: the ownership character of an asset acquired in performance of a contractual purchase
obligation should be the same as the character of the initial obligation.
This rule has the attractiveness of certainty and would permit similar
resolution of ownership questions in credit acquisitions, rather than
variations based on the particular sort of credit transactions involved.
When a different result, i.e., an apportionment of ownership, is desired by the spouses, present rules permit them to change the character by agreement. 151 No more flexibility is needed even though there
152
may be a rationale for automatic apportionment in some situations.
If necessary, payments from funds not owned by the original obligor(s) can be adequately protected through the "equitable lien" ap153
proach.
Total consistency would require that other acquisitions by installment payments be owned according to the character of the initial
payment or obligation, a rule which would require that a life insurance policy acquired before marriage be separate property even
154
though later premiums had been paid with community funds.
Obviously, the Washington life insurance rule to the contrary is too
well established to expect a change merely for the sake of consistency;
besides, the author believes a change is not necessary because there is
a rationale supporting different treatment of the life insurance asset.
The court in Binge's Estate stated "the fruit of the obligation is legally
55
acquired as of the date when the obligation becomes binding."'
Acquisitions through mortgage-type arrangements or installment
150. Adoption of this rule would uphold the principle that "the right of the
spouses in their separate property is as sacred as is the right in their community
property."
151. See Part V, Transactions and Agreements Between Spouses, infra, for further discussion of inter-spousal agreements.
152. See the suggested rationale in 35 WASh. L. REV. 286 (1960).
153. See section Il1-I infra.
154. This is apparently the rule, for example, in Texas where there is a community right to be reimbursed for the premiums so paid. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN

§ 64.
155.
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purchase contracts involve obligations which can be enforced, perhaps even specifically enforced, by the obligee; whereas in the life
insurance situation the insurer cannot compel the insured to pay
15 6
premiums.
A workable rule, then, is -that an asset acquired through a transaction requiringthe payment of installments over a period of time has
the ownership character of the initial obligation and the "time of acquisition" is when the initial obligation is incurred, regardless of when
title actually passed. By ascertaining the character of ownership on
the basis of the character of the initial obligation, this rule would put
the risk of subsequent fluctuation in value on the original obligor(s)
who, presumably, contemplated that risk. In contrast, an asset preserved by or having its source in periodic payments which cannot be
compelled (directly or indirectly) by the payee is owned in separate
and community proportions according to the character of the funds
used to make the "voluntary" payments.157 Such a rule will also accommodate the problems appearing in connection with an asset of
increasing importance-pension and retirement income rights. 5 8

156. This distinction was previously suggested by the author, noting that the
cases do not purport to make it the rationale for the different results. Cross, The
Community Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. REV. 640, 651-52 (1955).

157. Another situation of possible mixed-separate community ownership can
be resolved by this approach: An encumbered asset or a contract purchaser's interest
is devised to one spouse. The devisee is not obligated to pay, remove the encumbrance or pay out the contract, nor is the testator's estate. WASH. REV. CODE §
11.12.070 (Supp. 1973); In re McNulta's Estate, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389 (1932);
In re Cloniger's Estate, 8 Wn.2d 348, 112 P.2d 139 (1941). The suggested rule would
apportion the ownership between the separate estate (by devise, WASH. REv. CODE §§
26.16.010 & .020 (1963)) in the fraction of the then net equity and the estate
from which the subsequent payments were made. If the devised asset produced
the income to pay out, the whole should be separate property, but to the extent
that the community estate of the devisee and spouse paid there should be a community property ownership share.
158. Such a rule will not accommodate the federal homestead cases in which an
entryman was not required to complete the performance, and the antenuptial entry
ripening into legal title (ownership) during marriage created separate property,
and entry during marriage with title acquired by final proof after marriage also created separate property. The rules are stated in Teynor v. Heible, 74 Wash. 222, 133
P. 1 (1913). The latter situation is explicable on the basis of supremacy of federal
law dictating who could acquire, thereby creating a special federal succession to the
whole right. McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905); see G. MCKAY, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 88 547-49, 555-57 (2d ed. 1925).

A title, defective for some reason, but cured by adverse possession, can fit within
such a rule on the analysis of relation back making the time of acquisition of the
defective title the relevant time. It will not accommodate a title based only on adverse possession if that title is flatly concluded to be acquired when the statute of
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Pension and retirement plans

Analysis of the character of pension and retirement income rights is
complicated by the wide variation in retirement income programs,
concepts of "vesting" which affect the time of "acquisition" of rights,
mixed separate and community labor sources, and valuation questions. 159
If it is not certain that the employed person will have a right to retirement income, it is possible to label his relationship to the retirement program as a mere expectancy to which community property
concepts cannot be applied. It seems preferrable to the author to reject an expectancy analysis and to determine the community or separate character of the anticipated retirement income on the basis of
community property rules, recognizing however that there may be
difficult problems of valuation which necessarily must affect the solution of any ownership question that may arise. The Washington court
likewise has concluded that an employee possesses a vested right and
160
not a mere expectancy in such programs, regardless of their form.
Divorce (dissolution) is a common arena in which such complications surface. If division of the present value of the "asset" is the only
method by which to eliminate the complications, the valuation difficulty may be insurmountable, or at least undesirable, because of the
uncertainty as to whether and how much income finally will be received. If the economic consequences of a long relationship with a retirement program can be reflected in a contingent award of alimony,
limitations has run. Ownership of such a title could be apportioned; if it is not, the
result should be treated as exceptional. See also DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 65 and
McKAY, supra note 79, §§ 585-99.
159. Helpful articles are Hughes, Community-Property Aspects of Profit-Sharing
and Pension Plans in Texas--Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines
for the Future, 44 TEX. L. REV. 860 (1966); Kent, Pension Funds and Problems under
California Community Property Laws, 2 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1950); Comment, 37
S. CAL. L. REV. 594 (1964).
160. DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741, 743, 491 P.2d 249, 251 (1971).
The Washington court has concluded that there is a vested right and not a mere expectancy (emphasis in original):
I . . it is now firmly established in this jurisdiction that retirement provisions
are in the nature of deferred compensation; and, as such, the employee has a
vested right in the system which cannot be altered to his detriment, whether such
system be a public plan, Bakenhus v. Seattle, 48 Wn.2d 695, 296 P.2d 536
(1956); a private, employee contributory plan negotiated through the collective
bargaining process, Dorward v. ILWU-PMA Pension Plan, 75 Wn.2d 478, 452
P.2d 258 (1969); or a voluntary, noncontributory (employer financed) plan,
Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 77 Wn.2d 911. 468 P.2d 666 (1970).
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much of this valuation difficulty can be eliminated. 161 Adjusting alimony to reflect the amount of retirement income being received may
162
also ameliorate valuation difficulties.
The separate or community character of retirement income and of
the inchoate right to future retirement income is affected not only by
the non-marital or marital quality of the labor by which it is secured,
but also by domicile in a common-law or community property law
state while the labor was performed. However, the ownership of deferred compensation ought to be the same as it would have been had it
not been deferred, e.g., income and associated deferred compensation
earned in a common law state should be the separate property of the
acquiring spouse. If there is a time element involved including unmarried and married periods in either fixing the amount of the retirement
income or qualifying to receive the income, the ownership of the
income should be apportioned in accordance with the "insurance"
3
rule. 6 '
When the employed spouse dies, the valuation problems are usually
resolved and the funds can be apportioned according to the above
rules. Upon the death of the non-employed spouse, however, problems
of succession 164 and valuation, complicated by the uncertainty of
receipt of future income and the length of time of such receipt,
16 5
will arise. '
The federal supremacy doctrine might complicate these problems
even further if the retirement income is based on federal employment. 6 6 Military pensions are affected by provisions of the federal

161. See Hughes, supra note 159, 44TEx.L. REv.at 881.
162. Edwards v. Edwards, 74 Wn. 2d 286, 444 P.2d 703 (1968).
163. The analogy is applied in DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741, 491
P.2d 249 (1971).
164. These might be controlled by the contractual provisions of the system.

165. Consider In re Leuthold's Estate, 52 Wn. 2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958),
involving a life insurance policy upon the death of the noninsured spouse.
166.

See Note, Military Retirement Benefits as Community Property-Busby v.

Busby [457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970)], 25 Sw. L.J. 340 (1971). The argument has
been made that a federal characterization should be made as in Wissner v. Wissner,
338 U.S. 655 (1950); Goldberg, Is Armed Services Retired Pay Really Community

Property?, 48 CAL. B. J. 12 (1973). The possibility was not treated as determinative
in House v. House (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., June 13, 1972) and Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W. 2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). The United States Supreme Court refused to review the state court decisions. 409 U.S. 1118 (1973); 409 U.S. 1028
(1972).
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statutes, and thus the Washington court of appeals in two cases concluded that they cannot be divided as property, because of federal
characterization as nonvested property rights, but should be taken into
consideration in fixing the amount of alimony. 67 The Washington
Supreme Court reversed, however, characterizing military pension
168
income as property to be divided and not as a basis to adjust alimony.
F.

Acquisition of Real Property

The 1972 amendments added a new paragraph to the basic community property statute changing the rules for acquisition of real
property.' 69 Previously the husband as manager acting alone could
contract to buy community real property, even though the wife might
disagree, 70 but joinder by both husband and wife was required to
transfer or encumber community real property.' 7 ' The 1972 amendments now require the joinder of both husband and wife to buy as
well as to sell community real property. One problem which arises
from the amendments is whether some sort of participation by the
other spouse in a purchase transaction short of actual signing will
constitute "joining" sufficient to establish the community character of
the asset acquired. Such participation has been the rule in the transfer
72
and encumbrance cases under comparably proscriptive language,
and the author believes that the analysis developed in these situations
for transfers should be used in interpreting the new restrictive language for purchases. The statute does not preclude acquisition by either spouse of separate real property; hence a problem of practical
importance to the seller will be whether a contract with only one
spouse will be treated as a community property acquisition by the
buyer with corresponding community liability, or rather as a separate

167. Roach v. Roach, 72 Wn. 2d 144, 432 P.2d 579 (1967); Payne v. Payne, 7
Wn. App. 338, 498 P.2d 882 (1972).
168. Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 574, 512 P.2d 726 (1973).
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(4) (Supp. 1973): "Neither spouse shall
purchase or contract to purchase community real property without the other spouse
joining in the transaction of purchase or in the execution of the contract to purchase."
170. Baker v. Murrey, 78 Wash. 241, 138 P. 890 (1914).
171. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.040(1963).
172. See discussion in Part IV, Management and Voluntary Disposition, infra.
The new language of the statute on transfer should not change the analysis. WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (Supp. 1973).
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property acquisition with separate liability. The possibilities and
suggestions for solution have been explored previously. 173
G. Tracing and Commingling
The basic presumption that an asset acquired during marriage is
community property can be overcome through use of the source doc74
trine, that is, by tracing to a separate property origin or source.
Sometimes the process is reversed chronologically and the attempt is
to show that an admittedly separate property asset has maintained its
separate character despite mutations and is the source of the present
asset.' 75 If the links of the chain back to, or forward from, a separate
property source can be clearly established, there will be separate property ownership of the disputed asset. However, if the character of one
of the links is confused or uncertain, the basic community property
presumption, in the form of the commingling doctrine or rule, breaks
the chain. When this break occurs the uncertain link will be found to
be community in character and to be the origin or source with respect
to any subsequent change in form: "[w] here separate funds have been
so commingled with community funds that it is no longer possible to
distinguish or apportion them, all of the commingled fund, or the
property acquired thereby, is community property."' 1 6 As this author
has previously stated, the commingling doctrine is simply another
form of the basic presumption that an asset on hand during marriage

173. Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law--1972
Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. Rav. 527, 534-37 (1973).
174. It has previously been pointed out that the proof (i.e., the tracing) must be

clear and convincing. See, e.g., Yesler v. Hochstetetter, 4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398 (1892).
The burden of proof rests upon the proponent of the separate property claim. See,
e.g., In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944).
175. The burden is on the proponent, similarly, to prove by clear and satisfactory
evidence that the separate property asset in its changes in form has become the
disputed asset (or is its product under the rents, issues and profits category). See In re
Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 150 P.2d 595 (1944).
The separate property source may be from individual ownership in a noncommunity property state, Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 P. (1907).
176. In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944). However, if the community property contribution can be shown to be inconsiderable ascompared with the separate property contribution, the "commingling" will not make
the whole community property.
Undoubtedly the doubts as to proportions of contributions would be resolved
against the separate claim, in accordance with the preference given community
property by the basic presumptions.
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is community property; tracing is simply a method of asserting the
177
clear evidence required to overcome the community presumption.
1.

Community labor on separate assets

The commingling doctrine is applicable if income is comprised of
both community property and separate property ingredients. Such a
pattern frequently occurs when separate property is managed by a
spouse to produce income. The fruits of a spouse's personal efforts are
community property, 178 but, by statute, 179 rents, issues and profits of
separate property are separate property. Thus, if a spouse produces
income by working with a separate asset, the resulting income will be
partly community and partly separate unless the asset can be established to be sterile, i.e., nonproductive.
If the income is not consumed and is allowed merely to accumulate, the size of the respective separate and community parts in the
accumulation could be identified and determined by some formula,
such as the relationship of interest return on the given separate investment to reasonable pay for the stated amount of community labor. 180
Such a formula should allow the possibility of proving that the income
from the separate asset or the community labor had in fact produced
a larger share than the formula would indicate. Periodic accounting,
such as for income tax purposes, must focus on this sort of approach.
However, the more common problem between the spouses (or their
successors) is likely to be determining respective shares in an accumulation of income remaining after current consumption or use of part
of the income. Ordinarily the inquiry must consist of two steps: (1)
determination of what part of the current income is fairly to be allocated to the separate and to the community "accounts" and (2) determination of how much and from which account the current income
has been expended, permitting the remaining balances of the separate
and community property accounts to be established. The second step
usually will not be solved by application of any formula, but there are
177. Cross, supra note 156, 15 LA. L. REV. at 652-56.
178. As suggested in note 86 supra, the income-producing capacity of a spouse
is, in effect, community property.
179. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010 .020(1963).
180. Possible formulas or approaches are identified and discussed in King. The
Challenge ofApportionment, 37 WASH. L. REV. 483 (1962).
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rules which assist in making the determination. A particularly important rule is that if funds of both kinds are available, the appropriate
fund will be presumed to have been used to discharge an obligation or
to pay an expense,' 81 i.e., separate funds to discharge separate obligations and community funds to discharge community obligations. The
normal running expenses of the marriage (including family expenses)
are to be charged principally to community property income. Thus it
can easily develop that all of the community income has been currently consumed so that the accumulation can be identified as entirely
separate. 182 If the purposes for which income expenditures were made
can be identified, and the extent of consumption of income for community and separate purposes thereby established, it should be possible to determine the character of the remaining unexpended income.
It is probable, however, that the use made of withdrawn and consumed income cannot be determined in the absence of some adequate
record keeping or initial separation of the income into its component
parts. 183 This probability was stated by the court in Hamlin v. Mer4
lino:18
. . . it is clear that, where the separate property in question is real
estate or an unincorporatedbusiness with which personal services ostensibly belonging to the community have been combined, the rule is
that all the income or increase will be considered as community property in the absence of a contemporaneous segregation of the income
between the community and the separate estates. Salisbury v. Meeker,
152 Wash. 146, 277 Pac. 276; In re Witte's Estate 21 Wn. 2d 112,
150 P.2d 595.

181. See, e.g., cases cited in note 137 supra; In re Estate of Kruse,
342, 324 P.2d 1088 (1958).
182. Concluded in Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d
erroneously found in Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 499 P.2d
See also State ex rel Van Moss v. Sailors,, 180 Wash. 269, 39 P.2d

52 Wn. 2d
125 (1954);
231 (1972).
397 (1934).

Such exhaustion of community property might cause near disaster in a death succession situation; in dissolution the power to allocate separate property minimizes
the danger of "disaster" for the nonowning spouse.
183. Factually this is the circumstance, for instance, in Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn.
App. 394, 499 P.2d 231 (1972), in which the court stated the "rule" requiring
contemporaneous segregation (quoted supra in the text), then concluded there had
been no adequate tracing to separate sources and added, "Furthermore, because of

'the absence of a contemporaneous segregation of the income' . . . [the particular
assets must be deemed to have been acquired with community income]." Id. at 402,
499 P.2d at 237.
184. 44 Wn. 2d 851, 858-59, 272 P.2d 125, 129 (1954).

769

Washington Law Review

Vol. 49: 729, 1974

On the other hand, where, as in the instant case, the husband at
the time of marriage owned all or substantially all of the stock of a
corporation somewhat different principles are applicable. In such
cases, where a salary is paid to the husband by the corporation, it is
reasoned that the community is thereby compensated for his services,
and that any dividends paid or any enhanced value of the stock resulting from profits reinvested in the corporation are separate property.
The court in Hamlin thus suggests that contemporaneous segregation is a sine qua non to avoid commingling. However, contemporaneous segregation of community and separate income should not be
required to avoid a conclusion that all of the income is community
property because of commingling. As an observation of what happened in previous cases this rule is generally accurate and as a prediction of a result it is likely to be highly reliable, but contemporaneous
segregation should not be required! To do so, it seems to the author,
unreasonably and unnecessarily deprives the separate owner of property; community property is adequately protected by the difficulty of
overcoming the basic presumption.
Furthermore, in the two cases cited by the court in the above quotation from Hamlin v. Merlino, commingling resulted from an inability to segregate; thus the Hamlin court was not compelled by precedent to adopt a rule requiring contemporaneous segregation. In Salisbury, an antenuptial tort liability was sought to be enforced against
funds paid to the tortfeasor husband for work performed during the
marriage. The husband at marriage had assets used in his roofing
business, consisting of shovels, brooms, wheelbarrows, office furniture,
etc., valued at $500. The business itself, as the court said, did not
have the potential power to produce rents, issues or profit and thus
essentially all income was the result of the personal efforts of the
spouses. Even if it were conceded that part of the money was the
earnings of his established separate business, the court continued, the
funds were beyond the reach of the separate creditor because there
was no way to segregate the earnings of his separate business from
the earnings of his community labor. The Salisbury court relied on
In re Buchanan's Estate18 5 in which the original investment of separate funds was small and a large increase in value of the property
185.
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was due principally to personal efforts of the husband; the whole was
held to be community property, even though the asset was in fact
shares in a corporation largely run by the husband as if it had been a
partnership enterprise. 186 In ,the other case referred to in the quotation from Hamlin v. Merlino above, Witte's Estate, the court concluded that the attempt to trace farm income to "rents" (the landlord's share) rather than labor (the tenant's share) did not meet the
required standard of a clear showing of the separate "rents" share;
therefore, all of the accumulation had to be community property by
reason of the commingling-not because of the absence of a contem18 7
poraneous segregation:
. . . since it is now impossible [not impermissible] to disentangle,
separate, or apportion the component parts of the mass and thereby
designate how much is separate property and how much is community
property, it must all ...now be considered as community property.
The necessity for a contemporaneous segregation of separate and
community income has been reiterated in two subsequent cases, In re
Smith's Estate8 8 and Pollock v. Pollock.18 9 However in both cases the
holding turned on the conclusion that the commingling of funds was
so complete that there was no possibility of apportionment to the
respective sources. In the Pollock case the facts also indicate that
business and personal expenditures, including household expenditures, were rather indiscriminately made from the particular accounts.
2.

Commingling of separateassets with community assets

Commingling can, of course, totally submerge the separate property income ingredient of the commingled mass of separate and community income not only in situations involving a spouse's operation of
a separately owned business but also in the ordinary management of

186. Further, the determination (in Salisbury) that commingled funds in a bank
account are community property was supported by quotation from Jacobs v. Hoitt,
119 Wash. 283, 205 P. 414 (1922), in which, however, the principal holding is that

an unincorporated bakery business established before marriage was owned in frac-

tions, 8114 separate and 6114 community, even though there had been no direct, con-

temporaneous segregation whatever of the income from operation of the business.
187.
188.
189.

21 Wn. 2d at 128, 150 P.2d at 602.
73 Wn. 2d 629, 440 P.2d 179 (1968).
7 Wn. App. 394, 499 P.2d 231(1972).
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separate assets. 190 Further, it is possible that the separate property
asset itself, as distinguished from its income, can be submerged by
commingling. 1 9 ' Such a result has been reached even where the
commingled separate assets were shares in a corporation, 192 though
this result would be unlikely if at least minimal corporate records were
kept.' 9 3 The usual problem, however, involves commingling of income rather than the asset, and although the whole of the incremental
increase in value and all income from the separate asset may be found
to be community as a result of the commingling, the original value or
amount of separate property may still exist in the unsegregated total. 1 94 But separate property will not continue to exist if during the
1 95
commingling process all value of separate property is dissipated.
3.

Commingling and the time of acquisition

The rule that the ownership character of an asset is determined at
the time of its acquisition may create special problems in the commingling context. If, for example, there has been mixing of separate
and community funds in a single bank account, it may still be possible
to show the respective amounts deposited in the account, and to show
that the use made of withdrawals was separate or community in identified amounts. This type of identification should be sufficient to avoid
a commingling conclusion as to the account itself, but when an asset is
acquired with funds from the bank account it will nonetheless be necessary to show the character of the respective parts of the account at
the time the particular asset was acquired to rebut the presumption
that the asset is community property. For instance, to establish that

190. The Pollock case, id., is an illustration.
191. In re Allen's Estate, 54 Wn. 2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959). involving a stock
brokerage account, is an illustration.
192. In re Buchanan's Estate, 89 Wash. 172, 154 P. 129(1916).
193. Cf. In re Dewey's Estate, 13 Wn. 2d 220, 124 P.2d 805 (1942). Payment
of family operating expenses by the separately-owned corporation (in effect,
ignoring the corporate form) does not necessarily involve submergence of the separate property by commingling. Cf. State ex rel. Van Moss v. Sailors, 180 Wash. 269.
39 P.2d 397 (1934).
194. Holm v. Holm, 27 Wn. 2d 456, 178 P.2d 725 (1947). The net assets of the
business apparently steadily increased during the marriage.
195. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Garrison, 13 Wn. 2d 170, 124 P.2d 939 (1942).
The business at one time had only community funds acquired through borrowing
by the husband, i.e., in the separate property sense the business could be said to
have reached a negative position and nothing restored it to a positive position.
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the separate property part of the account was used to make the acquisition, it will not be sufficient merely to show that the total community
expenditures for the operating expenses of the family exceeded the
total of the salary or wage income of the spouses during the entire existence of the mixed fund account and contend that hence the community expense must have consumed the community contribution. To
avoid the community property presumption and establish the separate
character of the acquired asset, the separate claimant must show the
dissipation of all community funds in the account at the time the asset
in question was acquired, 19 6 or clearly establish that the separate
funds then in the account were used. 197 It should be noted that the
allocation to community property income for the spouse's labor in all
of these cases must be reasonable and ordinarily is measured by the
amount which would be paid for comparable services, 198 although
special circumstances may require a greater allocation. 199
H.

FortuitousAcquisitions

1.

Recovery of damagesfor injury to the spouse

The Washington court has treated the fortuitous acquisition of
damages for personal injury inflicted by a third party tortfeasor as
community property on the basis that it cannot fit within the separate
2 00
property sections, and therefore must be community property.
While such damages cannot be said to be lucrative, for lack of any
donative intent in the payor, neither can they be said to be onerous
because they do not depend upon the labor or skill of the spouse.
Although damages for lost wages (harm to earning capacity, a
community asset) and medical expenses incurred (probably paid with
community funds) are readily classified as community property, dam-

196.

In substance this is the analysis in Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 499

P.2d 231 (1972), in which the court rejected the argument that community prop-

erty income had been consumed in paying family expenses. The analysis in See v.
See, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d 776 (1966) is particularly helpful.
197. See Mix v. Mix,Cal. App. 3d.
, 112 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1974).
198. See Friedlander v. Friedlander, 58 Wn. 2d 288, 362 P.2d 352 (1961); In re
Hebert's Estate, 169 Wash. 402, 14 P.2d 6 (1932).
199. In re Buchanan's Estate, 89 Wash. 172, 154 P. 129 (1916).
200. See, e.g., Clark v. Beggs, 138 Wash. 62, 244 P. 121 (1926). The basic -case
is Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28 P. 1021 (1892).
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ages for a spouse's pain and suffering 20 ' would more appropriately be
classified as separate property because the noninjured spouse could
hardly be said to have a property interest in the injured spouse which
necessitates sharing in the recovery. Whether this discrete characterization of the damages will displace the Washington court's blanket
community property classification is a question raised by the holding

of a recent case.
In Freehe v. Freehe2 0 2 the court concluded that interspousal im-

munity is not the law in Washington, inherently assuming the wife to
be separately liable in an action by the husband for injury suffered
from operation of her separate property farm tractor, and stated that
damages should be awarded to the husband in three parts: (1) Special

damages to reimburse for out-of-pocket community expenses from the
injury; (2) general damages for loss of future earnings, which would
have been community property, in the amount of one-half, as his sep-

arate property; and (3) general damages in full for pain and suffering,
etc., as his separate property. The court reasoned that this result, i.e.,

classifying the recovery for pain and suffering as separate property,
precluded an indirect benefit to the tortfeasor spouse through sharing

in a community property recovery. As the court specifically noted in
Freehe, however, that case dealt with an interspousal tort suit and not
with the community property nature of a recovery from a third party
tortfeasor. Nevertheless, that the wife was separately liable in Freehe

is not necessary to the conclusion that a recovery for pain and suffering is separate property; thus, the same rule may be extended to
203
third party tortfeasor suits.
201. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 82. The separate character can be found on the
basis that the right invaded (to be secure in one's person) either is not "property"
at all and therefore not within the community property system as an onerous acquisition, or if property, was owned by the person prior to marriage and therefore is
separate.
202. 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). The author's views are more extensively
stated in Wash. St. Bar Ass'n, CLE Seminar on Dissolution of Marriage and Family
Law Practice 273-91 (1974).
203. California has vacillated from the position of the community character of the
cause of action, Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949), to 1957
statutory characterization as separate, to 1968 repeal of the 1957 Act thereby again
making it community; however, the 1968 Act eliminated the bar of contributory
negligence of the plaintiff's spouse. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5112 (West 1970). The recovery from the other spouse was made separate, id.§ 5109. See CAL. REV. COMM'N,
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 1389-1402 (1966-67); 1969 CAL. LAW. 349;
H. VERRAL & A. SAMMIS, CASES ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 211-15 (2d

ed. 1971).
The variant positions of the states are identified in DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 86.
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The court could have applied the traditional rule in Freehe that
recovery for pain and suffering is community, although such a recovery perhaps would have benefited the wrongdoer wife. Nonetheless, basic community property rules dictate that the character of an
asset (here the recovery) depends upon how it is acquired, rather than
from whom it is acquired. 204 This basic principal would indicate that
the fortuitous circumstance of the wife being separately liable in
Freehe should not dictate the character of the recovery.
Prior to the 1972 amendments, the husband as manager of the
community property was held to be the only necessary party plaintiff
in a tort action, and in the case of divorce was owner of an undivided
half of the undisposed community cause of action and therefore a
necessary party in an action for injury to the wife, even after divorce.20 5 After the 1972 amendments equalizing the managing power
of the spouses, the injured spouse, whether husband or wife, is the
only necessary party plaintiff. 206 Doctrines of contributory negligence
and imputation of negligence between spouses have also confounded
the problems of tort actions by the spouses. 207 Previously the husband's contributory negligence barred an action for the wife's injury.2 08
These rules have been changed by R.C.W.§ 4.22.020 which adopts
the rule of comparative negligence in Washington and apparently
eliminates the imputation of negligence between spouses. 2 09
2.

Recovery of damagesfor injury to property

While the basic asset in the recovery of damages is the cause of action for the harm done, whether to the person or property of the
spouse, 2 10 tracing to the source asset is obviously appropriate in the
case of injury to property. Upon recovery there is, in effect, an involuntary exchange with the cause of action and the character of the subsequent recovery determined by tracing to the character of the dam204.

This is true except perhaps in acquisitions from the federal government and

in some gift situations.
205. Schneider v. Biberger, 76 Wash. 504, 136 P. 701 (1913).
206. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.030 (Supp. 1973).
207. See, e.g., Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn. 2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959); 35 WASH. L.
REV. 249 (1960).
1208. Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire R.R., 107 Wash. 678, 182 P. 630 (1919).
209. See, 49 WASH. L. REV. 705 (1974); Editor's Notes, 28 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 4

(1974).
210.

Clark v. Beggs, 138 Wash. 62, 244 P. 121 (1926).
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aged property; thus, if the damaged property is separate property, so
too is the recovery, 2 11 and if community property, of course, the recovery is community.
Right to Reimbursement: The Equitable Lien

I.

The community or separate property character of an asset becomes
fixed at the time of acquisition, but subsequent to acquisition, assets of
a different character may be used to make payments in connection
with the transaction or to contribute to the quality or enhance the
value of the asset. 2 12 Such contributions may give rise to an equitable
lien in favor of the contributing "fund" and thereby provide a protection to the contributor without creating in the contributor a share or
fraction of ownership in the asset. Analysis of these problems should
focus upon the following questions: (1) What is the nature of the right
protected? (2) Under what circumstances will it arise? (3) How is it
valued? (4) When and by whom may it be asserted?
The nature of the right protected

1.

Although the right is commonly referred to as an "equitable lien,"
the author believes that the better analysis postulates that the contributor has a right to reimbursement 21 3 protected by an equitable lien.
Under usual analyses a lien arises to assure performance of an obligation or duty, or payment of a debt.21 4 For the right to arise, therefore,
the creating transaction must in effect involve a loan.
Circumstancesunder which the right will arise

2.

The right to reimbursement is undoubtedly predicated upon equitable considerations. Thus, the facts surrounding the contribution
must be evaluated to determine where the equities lie and whether the
211.
212.

DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 86.
Whether the multiple character of assets devoted to the transaction control

the character of the asset is discussed supra, particularly in
stallment acquisition cases. See text accompanying notes 121-68
213. This is the basic Spanish law view, DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN
214. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1072, 1073 (4th ed. 1951).

the mortgage and insupra.
§ 373.

Compare the analysis
in Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours--Separate Title and Community Funds, 44 WASH.

L. REV. 379 (1969).
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right to reimbursement will arise. In the usual case, money of a character different from the improved asset has been expended to discharge an obligation 21 5 or to build or improve a structure,2 16 but the
contribution may also take the form of labor of the spouse 1 7 which is
in effect a community property contribution. Any one of the funds,
separate-wife, separate-husband, or community property, could be the
source of the contribution to enhance the asset held in any one of the
2 18
other two categories.
The typical factual situation giving rise to a right of reimbursement
has involved the use of community property funds by the husband to
improve his separately owned real estate. Use of community funds by
the managing spouse to improve his or her own separate property presents the clearest case for recognizing the right. Such use of funds does
not change the ownership of the improved asset,2 19 and if no protection were given to the community property position, the transaction
would amount to a fraud on the community property position and the
other spouse.
If the managing spouse uses community property to improve his or
her separate property, there is a probability that reimbursement will
be due and the community right protected through an equitable lien.
On the other hand, if the manager uses his or her separate property to
improve community property or the other's separate property, the
likelihood that reimbursement will be due is smaller. The determination in both of these cases depends upon the circumstances, including
expectations, at the time of the contribution; 220 the right to reimbursement is created then, if at all.

215.

E.g., payment of contract installments, mortgage principal and interest,

taxes, maintenance expenses, see cases cited in note 229 infra.
216. E.g., Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941); In re Hart's Estate, 149 Wash. 600, 271 P.2d 886 (1928); Jones v. Davis, 15 Wn. 2d 567, 131
P.2d 433 (1942).
217. Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 P. 130 (1904); In re Estate of Trierweiler,
5 Wn. App. 17, 486 P.2d 314 (1971). See also In re Pugh's Estate, 18 Wn. 2d 501,
139 P.2d 698 (1943).
218. The lien was found for the wife's separate contribution to the husband's
separate properties in In re Trierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17, 486 P.2d 314 (1971). See
generally DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 73.
219. See, e.g., Leroux v. Knoll, 28 Wn. 2d 964, 184 P.2d 564 (1947); Legg v.
Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 P. 130 (1904); Merritt v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517, 285
P. 442 (1930).
220. Although the reimbursement might later be found to have been made,
see note 232 infra.
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When the managing spouse uses community funds to improve the
other spouse's separate property, the possibility of a gift exists so that
the right to reimbursement may never arise. 22 ' The circumstances surrounding such use of the community property by the manager must
be examined to determine the intention of the contributing spouse. It
may be clear that the husband intended a gift, particularly when a
home is built upon the wife's separate real property, 222 but his expectation that he would inherit the home can be sufficient to establish the
absence of a donative intent.22 3 On the other hand, if the contribution
can reasonably be viewed as a business investment or as supporting
the operation of a business, it is unlikely that a gift of the community
property funds will be found.2 24 The community property preference
and the difficulty of overcoming the basic community property presumption in cases involving a direct gift of an asset to a spouse2 25 also
suggest that a community property "interest" is likely to remain in
such contributions.2 26 While the traditional problem has been the
husband's use of community funds to improve the wife's separate
property, the use of community funds by the wife to improve the separate real property of the husband should pose identical problems
under the equal managing power she now has by reason of the 1972
amendments.
If separate property is contributed to improve either the community
property or the other spouse's separate property, the claim of the contributor to a right to reimbursement is probably weaker. If the separate property contribution is to community property, the preference
with which community property is treated militates against any right
in the contributor. Further, in this case as well as where separate
property is contributed to the other spouse's separate property, there is

221. There is some suggestion that a gift is presumed, though probably not from
the mere fact of such use of the funds. Consider Sackman v. Thomas, 24 Wash. 660,
64 P. 819 (1901).
222. In re Hart's Estate, 149 Wash. 600, 271 P. 886 (1928).
223. In re Hickman's Estate, 41 Wn. 2d 519, 250 P.2d 524 (1952).
224. In re Carmack's Estate, 133 Wash. 374, 233 P. 942 (1925), as explained
in In re Hart's Estate, 149 Wash. 600, 271 P. 886 (1928); In re Estate of Trierweiler,
5 Wn. App. 17, 486 P.2d 314 (1971), regarding community contribution to the
husband's separate asset used in business.
225. E.g., In re Slocum's Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 P. 204 (1915).
226. The "interest" is not an ownership share, however. See explanation in W. T.
Rawleigh Co. v. McLeod, 151 Wash. 221, 224, 225, 275 P. 701, 702 (1929), of
the use of the term in In re Carmack's Estate, 133 Wash. 374, 233 P. 942 (1925).
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a probability that the contribution is a gift; the presumption of a gift
when one spouse purchases property with separate funds taking title
in the other spouse's name furnishes a close analogy. 22 7 Although the
contribution is not a title-acquiring transaction, the rule that title to
the benefited property is not changed by the contribution228 in effect
shifts the title of the separate property contribution, when it is used
for the improvement or payment of the obligation relating to the other
spouse's separate property, or their community property, to the owner
of the benefited property. 229 Rebutting this. presumption of gift involves measuring the facts of the contribution transaction and should
be similar to showing the absence of a donative intent when community property is used to improve the other spouse's separate property.
Even in situations other than gifts, the right to reimbursement may
not arise because the contributor may have realized some current benefit by using the asset.2 30 In addition, if the improved asset is income
producing, the claim of contribution may fail by reason of the presumption that the proper fund (the income from the asset) has been
used to make the improvement,2 31 and also because of the possibility
that use of subsequent income from the asset has in substance effected
repayment so that there is no longer an equity existing for the con23 2
tributor.
3.

The value of the right

When money has been contributed, the amount advanced has been
the measure of the right,2 33 without particular attention being given to
227. See cases cited in note 94 supra.
228. See cases cited in note 219 supra.
229. Payments on a mortgage obligation can give rise to the equitable lien, Merkel
v. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951); so also payments on a purchase
contract, Farrow v. Ostrom, 16 Wn. 2d 547, 133 P.2d 974 (1943); Fritch v. Fritch,
53 Wn. 2d 496, 335 P.2d 43 (1959).
230. Cf. treatment of interest, tax and upkeep payments as being "no more than
reasonable rental for the use of the land." Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d at 116, 234
P.2d at 864.
231. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 137 & 181 supra.
232. This probably was the factual situation in In re Woodburn's Estate, 190 Wash.
141, 66 P.2d 1138 (1937); spouses moved onto unimproved, undeveloped land separately owned and made it productive. Income therefrom during the marriage
exceeded all expenses relating to the land and with other income was devoted to
normal family expenses and investments,' conceded to be community property.
Held: no equitable lien for the community improvement.
233. See cases cited in notes 218 & 229 supra; Jones v. Davis, 15 Wn. 2d 567,
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the possibility that the use of the money may not have increased the
value of the asset by the amount advanced. 234 If the contribution is
labor, arguably the value of the right should be determined by calculating what would be reasonable wages, but it could be fixed as the
incremental increase in value of the thing on which the labor is bestowed. Choosing between the alternatives may be facilitated by considering for whom the protection is sought and the possible results had
the contribution been directed to some other purpose. Thus, if a
spouse expends community funds in connection with his or her separate property, the claim for the community estate should be the full
expenditure, both because the other spouse's interest in those funds
would otherwise be depleted without consent and because the funds
could be used to secure a full return by almost any other use. A comparable argument can be made if the contribution is labor, i.e., the
reasonable value of the labor should be the measure. However, if one
spouse works on or expends community funds on the other spouse's
separate property, without intending a gift, only the increased value
should be the measure, because the contributing spouse hardly needs
to be protected against an unintended use of the community asset, and
there would be a danger that a contrary result could involve giving a
power to one spouse to "improve the other out" of his (or her) sepa235
rate property.
In addition, it is conceivable that the reimbursement amount should
be augmented by an interest factor, although consideration of all the
equities probably would indicate that the "contributor" has received
some benefit through the use of the improved asset which could offset
any argument for such an addition to the recovery. 23 6

131 P.2d 433 (1942). However, in Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172
(1941), the community contributed $2,500 to build a home, but the lien was fixed by
the trial court at $2,000. There is nothing in the opinions or the briefs to explain the
difference.
234. If the money is used to pay an obligation, e.g., taxes, or mortgage note
installment, there would be that much increase in net value, but if the money is
used to make physical improvements or repairs, the market value would not necessarily be enhanced equally.
235. An analogy may be drawn to the partition of property that is subject to a
co-ownership. In such a partition proceeding a co-owner may not demand an allocation before a division of sale proceeds of more than the amount his improvements
increased the sale price. In short, the rules of equity control. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 6.18 n.15 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); 4A R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

604, 614 (1973).
236. Professor Bartke cautions that if separate property is improved with community funds, increased benefit may be realized as community property if rents, issues
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4.

When and by whom may the right be asserted

Obviously, the right to reimbursement is most likely to be asserted
when the asset is liquidated or when there is the general settling of
"accounts" of the respective spouse's estates; but the right of reimbursement should not be lost merely by dissipation of the asset, or
because the contribution was consumed.2 37 Between the spouses, the
problems have typically arisen when one dies so that there is a settling
or ordering of the accounts of their respective estates and interests in
connection with the estate administration. 238 They also can arise in
identifying community and separate property interests preliminary to
2 39
a division in divorce.
As between themselves, the husband or wife can assert the right or
waive it, assuming no equities between them require a different result,
but the assertion of the right by or against creditors presents a more
complicated problem. In Conley v. Moe 240 the Washington Supreme
Court, in a five-four decision, concluded that the trustee in bankruptcy could assert the community equitable lien against the husband's improved separate realty. The dissent contended that since the
wife was not asserting any need for such protection of her community
position, there was no right which a creditor could reach. There was
nothing in the facts of the case to show persuasively that the contributions were intended as gifts of community property to the husband
separately, and the argument against finding an equitable lien essentially goes to the effectiveness of relinquishing the right to reimbursement rather than to its creation. As against the creditor, the nature of
the original (creating) transaction or the later (relinquishing) transaction ought to be resolved in the creditor's favor unless his opponent(s)
241
can show the good faith quality of the contrary position. The statute
and profits of the separate property constitute community property or if the improved
asset is used for community purposes. However, where rents, issues and profits are
separate property (as in Washington) or the improved asset is not used for community purposes, the contrary result is reached. Bartke, supra note 214, 44 WASH.
L. REv.at 385-86.
237. See, e.g., In re Trierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17, 486 P.2d 314(1971).
238. Most of the cases cited previously involve estate administration. Here reimbursement, without any necessity of equitable lien analysis, would normally be made.
239. E.g., Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951).
240. 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172(1941).
241. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.210 (1963) states:
In every case where any question arises as to the good faith of any transaction
between husband and wife, whether a transaction between them directly or by
intervention of a third person or persons, the burden of proof shall be upon
the party asserting the good faith.
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supports such a proposition and would protect against the spouses'
taking the position currently most advantageous even though that position did not accord with the basic facts of the transaction. It is also
possible that the transaction (creating or relinquishing) could amount
242
to a gift in fraud of existing creditors.
In Farrow v. Ostrom243 reimbursement to the wife for separate

funds applied toward the purchase of community property was
granted priority over the claim of the community creditor, although
an earlier case had apparently reached a contrary result. 244 Two other
cases suggest the possibility that the "equitable lien" could come
ahead of creditors, 245 although the secured creditor may be protected
by the recording act. 246 The court concluded in Leroux v. Knoll 247
that there was no need to protect the claim against a contract purchaser because the equitable lien could be satisfied out of the proceeds
the seller received.
IV.

MANAGEMENT AND VOLUNTARY DISPOSITION

The rules controlling management and voluntary disposition of
community property, largely settled over the years, have been
changed by the 1972 amendments; now, each spouse alone may act
2 48
effectively, whereas previously only the husband possessed the power.
The 1972 amendments also specify new situations in which the
joint action of the spouses is required 2 49 and add a puzzling paragraph
concerning community businesses, 2 50 discussed briefly below.
The bulk of the Washington cases dealing with management and
disposition issues antedate the 1972 amendments. These cases, however, remain authoritative and important after the 1972 amendments
equalizing the management power between the spouses for two rea-

242. DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 174.
243. 16 Wn. 2d 547, 133 P.2d 974 (1943).
244. Walker v. Fowler, 155 Wash. 631, 285 P. 649 (1930). Despite the urging by
the dissent in Walker, the possibility was not even discussed by the majority.
245. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. McLeod, 151 Wash. 221, 275 P. 700 (1929); Iredell
v. Iredell, 49 Wn. 2d 627, 305 P.2d 805 (1957).
246. Federal Land Bank v. Schidleman, 193 Wash. 435, 75 P.2d 1010 (1938).
247. 28 Wn. 2d 964, 184 P.2d 565 (1947).
248. Ch. 108, § 3 [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 246, amending WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.16.030 (1963).
249.

WASH. REV. CODE

250.

Id.
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sons: (1) The analysis defining the ambit of the management and
transfer power then held exclusively by the husband is now generally
applicable to both spouses; and (2) transactions consummated prior
to the 1972 amendments may be governed by the law existing at that
time.
Inter Vivos Transfers:Joinder Requirements

A.

The statute 5 1 has long required joint action of the spouses to sell,
convey, or encumber community real estate. The 1972 amendments
added a joint action requirement in four new situations: (1) To purchase or contract to purchase community real property; 25 2 (2) to sell,
convey or encumber community household goods, furnishings or appliances; 253 (3) to acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or encumber community business assets where both spouses participate in the management of the business; 2 54 and (4) to give community property, 255 although this requirement had been judicially established prior to the
1972 amendments. The discussion here will focus upon the transfer of
community real estate, although it should be noted that the analysis
developed to satisfy the statutory joint action requirement in the real
estate context may find application in the other joint action areas.
1.

Classificationas real or personalproperty

Whether the community property asset involved in a particular
transaction is to be classified as real property so that joint action of
the spouses is required, or as personal property (other than household
goods, etc.) so that action of either alone is sufficient is determined by
the rules ordinarily applied in other legal contexts. Accordingly, it has
been held that joint action is necessary to convey or contract to sell a
257 or lease, 2 58
fee estate in.land,2 56 encumber the estate by mortgage
251.
(1963).

Id. § 26.16.030(3). The prior provision to the same effect was § 26.16.040

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
Perkins,

See section 111-F supra.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (Supp. 1973).
See section IV-B-2 infra.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (Supp. 1973).
Colpe v. Lindblom, 57 Wash. 106, 106 P. 634 (1910).
Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937).
Bowman v. Hardgrove, 200 Wash. 78, 93 P.2d 303 (1939); Kaufman v.
114 Wash. 40, 194 P. 802 (1921).
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or create an easement or profit.2 59 A community property leasehold,
however, is personal property, and it has been held that the husband
0
can transfer it without the wife's participation. 26
The difference between the effectiveness of the transfer and the
character of the asset acquired by the transfer should be noted. The
leasing of community real estate requires joint action because it is either a conveyance of or creates an encumbrance on real estate, but the
leasehold acquired is personal property. In contrast, although the
granting of an easement or profit similarly encumbers the community
real estate, it creates a real property interest in the transferee. 2 6 '
The community property interest of the vendor, after creation of a
contract purchaser's interest, has recently been held to be personal
property. 262 The purchaser's interest should, therefore, be real property2 63 and either an assignment of that interest to a third person or its
release to the vendor should require joint action by the spouses. The
extent to which the vendors' interest in the real estate can be modified
by one spouse acting alone, however, is unclear. As a personal property asset, it can be managed by either spouse, and modification
might be merely management so far as community property principles 264
are concerned. If so, the effectiveness of the act would depend
upon contract principles beyond the scope of this discussion.2 65
Should the court require some kind of joint action,2 66 practical resolution of the problem could lie in finding a presumption of the other
spouse's approval or concurrence, as has been done in a reformation
case.

267

259. Bakke v. Columbia Valley Lumber Co., Inc., 49 Wn. 2d 165, 298 P.2d 849
(1956); Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Bloom, 135 Wash. 195, 237 P. 295 (1925).
260. Gabrielson v. Swinburne, 184 Wash. 242, 51 P.2d 368 (1935); Tibbals v.
Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, 39 P. 102 (1895).
261. This interest probably can be transferred only by joint action of the spouses,

despite the difference in the statutory language of the management statute-real
property-and the transfer statute-real estate. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3)
(Supp. 1974): "(3) Neither spouse shall sell, convey, or encumber the community
real property without the other spouse joining in the execution of the deed or other
instrument by which the real estate is sold, conveyed, or encumbered and such deed
or other instrument must be acknowledged by both spouses." Ross v. Howard, 31
Wash. 393, 72 P. 74(1903).
262. Meltzer v. Wendell-West, 7 Wn. App. 90, 497 P.2d 1348 (1972).
263. Cf. Eckley v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 30 Wn. 2d 96, 190 P.2d 718 (1948).
264. It is at least suggested that the husband's act of modifying the contract terms
was effective in In re Horse Heaven Irrigation Dist., 19 Wn. 2d 89 at 95, 141 P.2d
400 at 403 (1943).
265. For example, could the spouse of the contracting party effectively act?
266. As personal property, its disposition should not require joint action.
267. Keierleber v. Botting, 77 Wn. 2d 711, 466 P.2d 141 (1970).
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There is some indication that the husband (and after the 1972
amendments, the wife) acting alone could put someone in possession
of community real property as a periodic tenant,2 6 8 suggesting that a
management rather than a transfer power had been exercised. Under
the 1972 amendments, the tenant could be confronted with a dilemma
if the other spouse disagreed and gave notice of the termination of the
periodic tenancy. A tenant at will could face similar problems.
The substance of a transaction may support the conclusion that it
does not fall within the statutory requirement of joinder. The court
has reasonably held that the legal title held by a trustee can be transferred without joinder of the trustee's spouse, the trustee having no
beneficial interest in the subject matter of the transfer. 2 69 This reasoning also might be applied to a fulfillment deed by a vendor of land,
particularly if the vendor's interest had been previously transferred to
another, but it would be safer to insist that both spouses execute any
fulfillment deed of land formerly owned as community real property.
The court also has held that some transactions-assignment for the
benefit of creditors 27 0 and the abandonment of oyster lands2 71 -do not
constitute conveyances within the meaning of the statute and hence do
not require joinder. A quitclaim deed from a contract purchaser to his
vendor (technically a conveyance by release) might involve a comparable situation if it is really the recognition of the loss of a right by
forfeiture. Prior to the extension of management power to the wife,
the husband alone could have forfeited the community property interest in a forfeitable executory contract of purchase by defaulting
on payments permitting the vendor to declare the forfeiture. 27 2 Now,
however, either spouse can make the payments in the community interest and avoid accrual of the right to forfeit.
2.

Community realty: the joinder requirement

Although the present statute 273 requires the real estate transfer instrument to be executed by both spouses, the court has held under the
268.
269.
270.
271.

Cf. Ryan v. Lambert, 49 Wash. 649, 96 P. 232 (1908).
Leslie v. Midgate Center, Inc., 72 Wn. 2d 977, 436 P.2d 201 (1967).
Thygesen v. Neufelder, 9 Wash. 455, 37 P. 672 (1894).
Halvorsen v. Pacific County, 22 Wn. 2d 532, 156 P.2d 907, 158 A.L.R. 555

(1945).
272. But not if done to defraud the wife. Jarrett v. Arnerich, 44 Wn. 2d 55, 265
P.2d 282 (1954).
273. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (Supp. 1973).
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previous statute 274 (when only the husband had managing power) that

an instrument executed only by the husband was effective to create
the intended rights in the transferee if it could be shown that the wife
had authorized the husband to act,2 7 5 estopped herself to deny the
effectiveness of the act, 2 76 or ratified the act.27 7 The substance of the

joint action requirement is that effectiveness depends upon "participation" by both spouses, and the statutory requirement of joinder in
execution of the instrument is only one means of participation. Thus,
the failure to meet the statutory standard does not make the husband's
(now the spouse's) 278 act void but merely voidable. In addition to
becoming bound by "participation," the spouse will become bound on
the contract if he or she joins as plaintiff to compel the purchase. 27 9
The court has concluded essentially that the requirement of joinder
is for the protection of the wife (now the non-joining spouse) and
cannot be affirmatively asserted by the transferee. Rather, the transferee must first request joinder and be refused before he can withdraw
from the transaction. 28 0 As suggested in Part III supra, comparable
analysis ought to be given to "participation" by the non-signing spouse
under the new provision 2 81 requiring joint action of the spouses to
acquire community real property.
A new provision added in 1972282 may create a situation in which
one spouse, acting alone and without participation of the other
spouse, can transfer community real estate: if only one spouse participates in the management of a community business, that spouse alone
may transfer the assets of the business (including real estate) without
the consent of the other spouse. The dimensions of this possibility are
obscure and are discussed briefly in Section IV-B infra.
As noted in Section 111-A supra, the location of the paper title between the spouses does not necessarily establish the location of owner274. Id. § 26.16.040 (1963).
275. Whiting v. Johnson, 64 Wn. 2d 135, 390 P.2d 985 (1964); Konnerup v.
Frandsen, 8 Wash. 551, 36 P. 493 (1894).
276. E.g., Campbell v. Webber, 29 Wn. 2d 516, 188 P.2d 130(1947).
277. E.g., In re Horse Heaven Irrigation Dist., 19 Wn. 2d 89, 141 P.2d 400 (1943).
278. The equal management power of each spouse should mean the initial formal
act of the wife can be effective if the husband "participates."
279. Tombari v. Griepp, 55 Wn. 2d 771,350 P.2d 452(1962).
280. See, e.g., Stabbert v. Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 39 Wn. 2d 789, 238
P.2d 1212 (195 1); Colcord v. Leddy, 4 Wash. 791, 31 P. 320 (1890).
281. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(4) (Supp. 1973).
282. Id. § 26.16.030(6).
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ship, nor its character. Consequently, the appearance of an adequate
title in just one spouse in the land records, when in fact the title is
held as community property, may mislead a prospective purchaser by
suggesting that he may obtain good title by obtaining a conveyance
from only that spouse. An 1891 statute283 is designed to protect a
bona fide purchaser from such a record title holder unless the other
spouse has recorded a claim of interest in the real estate. However, the
difficulty of establishing the position of bona fide purchaser against a
community property claim is great, 284 arguably excessive, and practically speaking the statute is a dead letter. Title examiners assume a
person who appears to be the sole owner of real estate is married and
that the real estate is community property.
3.

Joinderthrough agency

Prior to the 1972 amendments, the court had held that the husband
could make the wife an agent to conduct community affairs or trans28 5
actions either directly or indirectly through estoppel or ratification.
In ordinary situations, there now will be no need to find that one
spouse has been made an agent by the other because both spouses
have equal management powers. However, when joint action is required, agency reasoning may be a route to finding the necessary "participation" by both spouses. An intended agency can be established by
means of a power of attorney granted by one spouse to the other, as
2 86
provided by statute.
4.

Emergency powers

In Marston v. Rue 2 87 the wife, who at that time possessed no management power, was held to have an emergency power to act to protect and preserve community property and to transfer perishable personal property to avoid loss while the husband was unavailable. Such
acts now would clearly be within her statutory power as co-manager
283. Id. §§ 26.16.095, .100&.110 (1963).
284. See, e.g., Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937).
285. Lucci v. Lucci, 2 Wn. 2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940); Wallace v. Thomas, 193
Wash. 582, 76 P.2d 1032 (1938); Short v. Dolling, 178 Wash. 467, 35 P.2d 82 (1934).
286. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.090 (1963).
287. 92 Wash. 129, 159 P. I1I (1916).
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and would not call for analysis on the basis of emergency. However,
where joint action is required to act, there may still be some occasion
to premise the effectiveness of the "other" spouse's sole act on an
emergency power. The serious absence 88 or the total incompetence 289
of a spouse could present situations in which there should be found an
emergency power of one to act for the other 9 0 or both, although the
"perishable" nature of the asset involved, upon which the emergency
power in Marston was premised, probably no longer will be a factor.
B.

Inter Vivos Management and Transfer Powers of
Spouses Acting Alone

Each spouse acting alone, in the best interests of the community
property in a business sense, may now manage and transfer community personal property, with the exception of household goods, fur293
292
nishings or appliances, 2 9 1 assets of community businesses, and gifts.
In those situations in which one spouse may effectively act alone,
the disagreement of the other as to the wisdom of the transaction is
immaterial. Under the pre-1972 decisions, when the husband exercised his discretion in the community interest as he saw it, the wife
was without power to frustrate his acts; 294 good faith rather than good
judgment was the rule. Similarly, the wife's acts should now be
equally effective under the 1972 amendments despite the husband's
disagreement.
Because in ordinary personal property transactions each spouse
may now act alone, there obviously can be competing transferees,
288. Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 133, 159 P. 111, 113 (1916).
289. Foster v. Williams, 4 Wn. App. 659, 484 P.2d 438 (1971).
290. The particular example is the new statutory requirement that the injured
spouse or the employed spouse is the necessary party in the actions for personal injury,
and for compensation for services, respectively. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.030 (Supp.
1973).
291. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (Supp. 1973).
292. Id. § 26.16.030(6).
293. Id. § 26.16.030(2).
294. See, e.g., Hanley v. Most, 9 Wn. 2d 429, 115 P.2d 933 (1941): Husband
put enough corporate shares in voting trust to give his business associate voting-and
managing-control of corporation which previously was in husband's control; wife's
challenge unsuccessful. Bellingham Motors Corp. v. Lindberg, 126 Wash. 684, 219 P.
19 (1923): Husband contracted to buy a truck despite wife's belief (known to seller)
that the transaction was unwise; she was right but community liability was found
nonetheless. If either spouse could contest the judgment of the other, as a practical
matter joint participation by the spouses would always be necessary before a third
party could safely transact business with the community.
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each relying on the act of a different spouse; these problems do not
appear to be any different than those involved in competing transfers
by partners or competing transfers to more than one transferee in
other contexts, and will not be analyzed in this discussion.
1.

Management of community personalproperty:
requirementof a business purpose

As previously mentioned, the basic rule is that the manager must
2 95
act in the best interests of the community property in a business sense.
While this rule has been traditionally applicable to the husband
alone as a community manager, the wife must exercise the equal management powers conferred upon her by the 1972 amendments in a
like manner. Essentially, this judicial doctrine originated to preclude
the unilateral gift of community property; 296 inter vivos gifts of community property are void ab initio and in toto without the consent of
both spouses. 2 97 While it has been argued that a community purpose,
or at least a permissible disposition of community property, should be
found when a child or parent is benefited by the gift, the court has
298
held to the contrary.
The 1972 amendments have merely codified the judicial rule that

both spouses must consent to gifts of community property.299 Thus,
295. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 110 (1933).
The statute, however, indicates that the managing power over the community property
is similar to that over separate property. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1973).
Before the 1972 changes, the husband's power was similarly stated in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.16.030 (1963) (personalty), but § 26.16.040 (1963) (realty) stated that he had
management power over community realty but joint action was required for transfers.
296. The proposition is the basis of the holding in Sun Life Assurance Co. v.
Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933), which overruled Stevens v. Naches
State Bank, 136 Wash. 137, 238 P. 918 (1925), wherein the court reasoned that the
husband's act of pledging a certificate of deposit as security for their son's debt would
have been approved by the wife in all probability.
297. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937);
In re Yiatchos' Estate, 60 Wn. 2d 179, 373 P.2d 125 (1962). Since the gift serves no
business purpose, it is not within the manager's power and cannot be fully effective;
it cannot be partially effective without causing the impermissible division of community property. See Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892). Spouses own
an undivided one-half interest in each community item--the so called "item" theory.
In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 494 P.2d 238 (1972).
298. See Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933);
Stevens v. Naches State Bank, 136 Wash. 137, 238 P. 918 (1925); Occidental Lite Ins.
Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 492 et seq., 74 P.2d 27, 34 et seq. (1937) (Beals, J.,
dissenting).
299. WASH. REV.CODE § 26.16.030(2) (Supp. 1973).
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case law prior to the 1972 amendments, in which the Washington
court nullified life insurance and United States savings bonds beneficiary designations, remains authoritative. The gift reasoning employed
in these cases also indicates the result to be reached in some joint
bank account problems.
a. Life insurance and United States savings bonds. The court in
Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Powers3° ° held that the insured
spouse cannot designate the beneficiary of a life insurance policy purchased with community funds (a community asset) without the consent of the other spouse. The court treated the inter vivos act of
naming a beneficiary as a gift of a vested property right, even though
the insured retained the right to change the beneficiary designation.
Since the designation was made without the consent of the other
spouse, the court held it was an unauthorized inter vivos gift and void
ab initio and in toto.
The reasoning in Powers, however, has been undermined by two
subsequent decisions: In re Towey's Estate30 1 and Wilson v. Wilson.30 2
In Towey's Estate the court recognized that a total disability to
change the designation of the other spouse as beneficiary would in effect put present ownership of the policy in the named beneficiary
spouse, obviously an unsatisfactory result. Thus, the court upheld a
change of beneficiary from the wife to the executor of the insured
husband without the wife's consent, creating an exception to the
Powers rule. The half interest of the wife in the proceeds traceable to
the community property policy continued, but the husband was able
to dispose of his half of the proceeds payable to his executor by will.
In Wilson, the court held that the insurance contract would control,
i.e., the beneficiary designation would be given effect, up to the point
where it interfered with the community property position, at which
point the contract must yield. Hence, the designation of the widow as
the beneficiary of three-fourths of the policy was fully effective in that
case, and the designation of the insured's sister as beneficiary of
one-fourth was effective to the extent of his separate property interest
in the policy, which was one-fifth. The balance of five percent was not
disposed of by the policy, and went to the widow as representative of
300.
301.
302.
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192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937).
22Wn. 2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945).
35 Wn. 2d 364, 212 P.2d 1022 (1949).
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the community estate, not as beneficiary. The widow in Wilson had
argued, in effect, that the designation of herself as beneficiary of
three-fourths was without her consent,3 03 therefore void, and the
304
three-fourths should fall as community property into the estate.
Her argument was sound under the Powers reasoning.
In Powers the newly designated beneficiaries, the insured's mother
and secretary, argued that their designation be given effect as a testamentary act. The court rejected the argument because the requisite
formalities of a testamentary gift had not been complied with. However, it is clear that the disposition of insurance proceeds at the death
of the insured is quasi-testamentary. Under traditional property analysis, the interest of the beneficiary of a policy in which the insured reserved the right to change the beneficiary is a mere expectancy while
the insured is alive, and not a vested property right. 305 Hence, there
is nothing given until the proceeds become available upon the death of
the insured spouse, and the gift is necessarily quasi-testamentary.
Assuredly, to permit the insured spouse to designate a third party as
owner of all proceeds of a community property insurance policy
would interfere with the half ownership of the surviving spouse in the
proceeds based on his or her half ownership in the source asset. But at
the death of one spouse, any asset, original or derivative, is necessarily
no longer community property, and each half can reasonably be sub3 06
ject to individual manipulation through beneficiary designation
without invasion of the rights in the other half. The surviving spouse
can be protected by limiting the dispositive effect of the instrument to
one-half of the asset, even though the phraseology does not speak only

303. A donee can frustrate an attempt to give. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 50 (2d ed. 1955).

304. An original designation of a third person as beneficiary, rather than a change

from the spouse, is ineffective as an attempt to give under Powers. See, e.g., National
Bank of Commerce v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 40 Wn. 2d 790, 246 P.2d 843 (1952);
California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Jarman, 29 Wn. 2d 98, 185 P.2d 494 (1947).

The proceeds fall into the estate for administration rather than going to the surviving
spouse directly.
305. See, e.g., Schade v. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 125 Wash. 200, 215 P. 521

(1923). This and other cases were distinguished in Powers as involving change of beneficiary or transfer of the policy for a proper consideration.
306. The full manipulative power of the insured over the policy is recognized in
other situations. See, e.g., surrender of policy for cash, Page v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,
12 Wn. 2d 101, 120 P.2d 527 (1942); pledge to creditor, Seattle Ass'n. of Credit Men

v. Bank of California, 177 Wash. 130,30 P.2d 972 (1934).
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of a half share. 307 This is the result in California, both before and
after the 1927 statutory declaration that the wife has a present vested
half interest in community property, although the Powers court distinguished the California cases on the basis of the wife's interest being
3 08
merely an expectancy there.
Thus, the reasoning in Powers that the inter vivos act of naming a
beneficiary is an unauthorized gift, and therefore a complete nullity, is
vulnerable. Doubt as to whether Washington will continue to apply
the Powers reasoning was squarely raised by the four-to-four split on
the issue in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Brock.30 9 However, the reasoning applied by the court in the United States saving bonds cases
supports the continued vitality of the Powers rule.
In the savings bonds cases, the Washington court has reaffirmed the
Powers reasoning. The court in In re Allen's Estate310 rejected the
surviving husband's argument that the United States savings bonds
purchased with community funds were his separate property because
of the federal regulations vesting complete ownership in the registered
owner (the husband) and ordered them inventoried as community
property in the wife's estate. To hold otherwise, said the court, would
permit "a designing spouse [to] at once transform community property into separate property by the purchase of United States
bonds." 31 ' Subsequently, in In re Yiatchos' Estate,31 2 the Washington
court held that bonds purchased by the husband in his name with
community funds and which were payable on his death to his brother
307. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(l) (Supp. 1973), limiting testamentary power to half, and the preference for finding no purpose to exceed the limit in the
will situations posing election problems, discussed infra. In many beneficiary designation
situations it seems probable that the insured's spouse has agreed, or at least would not
disagree if the question were put. A provision in the insurance code creates a presumption of consent when the beneficiary is a child, parent, brother or sister of either spouse.
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.440(2) (1963). The presumption is rebuttable, National Bank
of Commerce v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 40 Wn. 2d 790, 246 P.2d 843 (1952). It applies even though the naming preceded marriage. Miller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co..
81 Wn. 2d 302, 501 P.2d 1063 (1972). The Powers reasoning could be abandoned
without giving more than "half effect" to the beneficiary designation with the surviving
spouse taking the other half.
308. The particular point is identified in a very useful Comment, Life Insurance
Proceeds as Community Property, 13 WASH. L. REV. 321 (1938).
309. 41 Wn. 2d 369, 249 P.2d 383 (1952).
310. 54 Wn. 2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959).
311. 54 Wn. 2d at 619, 343 P.2d at 869. The Treasury regulations indicate only the
registered owner will be recognized. The bonds were registered in the husband's name
with the wife as beneficiary.
312. 60Wn. 2d 179. 373 P.2d 125(1962).
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were within the rule of Allen's Estate.3 13 Therefore, the designation of
his brother as beneficiary without the consent of the wife was ineffective ab initio and in toto so that the husband's will controlled disposition of his half interest in the bonds and the wife owned the second
half as surviving spouse, a result consistent with the Powers rule. The
3 14
United States Supreme Court reversed by invoking federal law,
holding that the brother as beneficiary owned the husband's half interest, and that he also should get the wife's half unless she could show
the absence of her consent to such use of the funds. The Supreme
Court concluded that until the husband's death there had been no interference with the wife's community property position-community
property funds had merely been converted into community property
bonds-thereby flatly rejecting the Powers reasoning which the Washington court had applied. The Washington savings bonds cases, similar to the life insurance cases, thus may be criticized not for establishing the rule that unilateral gifts of community property are void ab
initio and in toto, but for applying that rule in quasi-testamentary
situations.
b. Joint tenancy: bank accounts. As noted in the preceding section, the Powers reasoning may still survive in situations unaffected by
federal rules. Thus, the question arises whether there will be an effect
on the rights of the surviving spouse if one spouse puts community
funds into a multiple party bank account with third parties and then
dies. If the account is held in joint tenancy (with a right of survivorship), arguably there has been an act designed to create a present
share of ownership in the co-depositor, and, to the extent this ownership constitutes a gift, the transfer would be beyond the power of the
spouse acting alone. But suppose the account created only a right of
survivorship without immediate substantive rights. Would this not be
the pattern of the Powers case?
In Munson v. Haye31 5 the court concluded that any presumption of
the joint tenancy character of an account in the names of both spouses

313.

In effect, this is an application of the Powers rule-the husband cannot give

the community property to himself and thereby make it his separate property. The
court also held the Washington statutes stating ownership rested in a surviving bene-

ficiary or co-owner, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 11.04.230 & .240 (1963), do not authorize
the husband to convert the bonds into his separate property.
314.
315.

Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
29 Wn. 2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948).
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was rebutted by proof that the funds put into the account were community property fu nds, there being nothing more to show an intention
of the spouses to change the ownership character of the asset. Since
the community character of the funds in the account continued, the
wife's withdrawal of funds from the account and their deposit in a
similar account in her name and Mrs. Haye's name was an ineffective
gift of community property. In In re Webb's Estate,3 16 the court indicated that the joint bank account contract between the husband and
his half-brother would be given effect until it interfered with community property rights. Since the bachelor half-brother had died, survivorship in favor of the husband could not interfere with community
property rights and took effect against other heirs of the decedent.
The reasoning in Powers and in Wilson v. Wilson,3 17 to which the
court referred, would indicate that had the husband died, the halfbrother would not be able to claim any part of the account traceable
to community funds, and, thus, his survivorship "right" would have
no value.
Outside the joint bank account area, the attempt by one spouse to
convert community property into a joint tenancy with a third party
without the consent of the other spouse will probably fail by reason of
the statutory requirement that both spouses join in the writing creating
a joint tenancy with community property 318 (unless "participation"
might be sufficient).
Community business assets

2.

Management or transfer of community business property (including
real estate) involves unique problems because of the 1972 addition to
the basic community property statute of a new paragraph which pro3 19
vides:
Neither spouse shall acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or encumber the
assets, including real estate, or the goodwill of a business where both
spouses participate in its management without the consent of the

316.
317.

49 Wn. 2d 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956).
35 Wn. 2d 364, 212 P.2d 1022(1949).

318.

WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1963); See In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App.

464, 481, 494 P.2d 238, 248 (1972).
319. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(6) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
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other: Provided,that where only one spouse participatesin such management the participating spouse may, in the ordinary course of such

business, acquire, purchase sell, convey or encumber the assets, including real estate, or the goodwill of the business without the consent
of the nonparticipating spouse.
This provision creates two exceptions to the general rule that either
spouse may now manage and transfer community personalty: (1)
When both spouses participate in the business, their joint action is
required to transfer community business personalty (and realty); and
(2) when only one spouse participates in the business, that spouse
acting alone may transfer community business personalty (and realty).
Three principal questions arise, however, in considering this provision: (1) Under what circumstances do "both spouses participate
in . . . management" of the community business? (2) What suffices

as "consent" of the other spouse? (3) What are the acts within "the
ordinary course" of the business?
It seems probable that an incorporated business will not be within
the new provision.3 20 The "sole proprietorship" poses the greatest potential difficulty as to participation by both spouses, because such incidental supportive activity as "keeping the books" may be enough to
constitute "participation" and require consent of the "sole proprietor's" spouse. As suggested elsewhere, 32 1 if such minimal involvement
is sufficient to constitute "participation," some sort of implied consent
to the acts of the principal manager of the business will be necessary
to avoid serious practical complications in the conduct of a business.
Even if both spouses actively manage the business, implications of
authority of each will be necessary to consummate most transactions,
i.e., those not clearly of an extraordinary character. Although the protection the required consent provides against total sale of the business
may be desirable, and perhaps all the protection necessary, the lan-

320.

If all, or almost all, shares of a corporation are owned by the spouses, it

would not be surprising to conclude that the paragraph applied if in the operation of
the business the corporate form was largely ignored. Situations in which such a result
might be reached are illustrated by State ex rel. Van Moss v. Sailors, 180 Wash. 269,
39 P.2d 397 (1934) and In re Buchanan's Estate, 89 Wash. 172, 154 P. 129 (1916).
321. Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-1972
Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REv. 527, 537-41 (1973). The problems raised in the

text are more fully discussed in this article.
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guage of the paragraph is too detailed to limit its application to total
sale, and the scope of interference with less extensive transactions
cannot now be predicted.
3.

Litigation

The 1972 amendments have changed the rules involving litigat32
2 Previously the husband as community manager was a necessary party to any community property litigation. After the 1972
amendments equalizing management power, as a general proposition
either spouse can sue or be sued in a community property matter. At
least presumptively, proceeds or liabilities flowing from such a suit
would be community in character. If only one spouse is named as a
defendant and a community liability is sought, it is probable that the
equal managing power of each spouse will support intervention by the
323
other spouse.
Several exceptions exist, however, to the general proposition that
either spouse may now sue or be sued in a community property sense.
In two situations, one spouse is the necessary party: (1) the injured
spouse is the necessary party in an action to recover for personal injuries 3 24 and (2) the employed spouse is the necessary party in an action
to recover for compensation for services rendered. 325 In addition, if a
voluntary act of conveyance would be effective only if both spouses
participated, e.g., a transfer of community realty, 32 6 both would have
to be joined.

ion.

4.

Management power while living separate and apart

If the spouses have permanently separated, under the analysis in
section III-C supra, so that future acquisitions will be separately owned,

322. The author has identified the changes somewhat more fully in Cross, Equality
for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-1972 Statutory Changes, 48
WASH. L. REv. 527. 545-46 (1973).
323. See discussion in note 322 supra.
324. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.030(1) (Supp. 1973).
325. Id. § 4.08.030(2).
326. In addition to the real property controversies, the transfer or encumbrance of
community household goods, furnishings or appliances now fall within this proposition.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (Supp. 1973).
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there may nonetheless remain community property to be managed32 7mere separation does not affect the community character of existing
assets. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the court recognized the necessity
of a continuing managing power in the husband, but cautioned that a
third person (e.g., a creditor) may not be able to deal with the husband with impunity, for there may be situations in which known facts
would suggest that the managing power was being abused. 328 With
each spouse now having equal managing power, the potential difficulties are compounded; the author has discussed some possibilities elsewhere, 329 and has suggested that the power be restricted to the reasonable necessities of the situation.
C.

TestamentaryPowers

1.

Intestate succession and testamentarypowers in general

As of this writing, upon the intestate death of a spouse, the half interest of the survivor in the community property continues, 33 0 and the
decedent's half interest is inherited one-half by the survivor, and
one-half by issue or parent(s), or totally by the survivor if there be neither issue nor parent surviving the decedent. 331 Thus, in typical situations, the surviving spouse will become a tenant in common, holding a
three-fourths share of the whole of the community property, with the
issue or parent(s) of the deceased spouse holding a one-fourth
share. 33 2 The recent revisions to the intestate succession statute, which
take effect October 1, 1974, now provide that all of the decedent's
333
share of community property passes to the surviving spouse.

327.

Cf. Cohn v. Cohn, 4 Wn. 2d 322, 103 P.2d 366 (1940).

328. Dizard & Getty v. Damson, 63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964 (1964).
329. Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law--1972
Statutory Changes,48 WASH. L. REv. 527, 543-44 (1973).
330. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.070 (Supp. 1973).
331. Id.§ 11.04.015.
332. The law before enactmenit of the 1965 Probate Code, which became effective
July 1, 1967, put all property in the surviving spouse unless issue survived the decedent

in which case all of decedents half went to the issue. Thus, either the surviving spouse
had all of the former community property or was tenant in common, having a half
share, with their or decedent's children (or grandchildren, etc.) and at least the survivor's step children (etc.), but not as tenant in common with a mother- or father-inlaw. The state bar committee had proposed that intestate succession put all of decedent's half in the survivor; this is clearly the preferable result.
333. Ch. 117, § 7 [1974] Wash. Laws, 3d Ex. Sess.
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Each spouse has testamentary power over one-half of the community property, 334 but no more. 33 5 Indirectly, however, one spouse
could dispose of both halves of the community property in particular
assets, 336 or of the whole estate, by putting the survivor to an election. 33 7 In effect, by putting the survivor to an election the decedent
proposes to dispose of the survivor's interest in community property
and offers in exchange to the survivor some interest or asset of the
decedent's. 338 The crucial question, however, is under what circumstances the surviving spouse will be put to an election. The court of
33 9
appeals has stated the rule as follows:
To create the necessity for a widow's election upon the husband's
death, there must appear on the face of the husband's will a clear and
unmistakable intention to dispose of property which is not in fact his
own and which was not within his power of disposition. Herrick v.
Miller, 69 Wash. 456, 125 P. 974 (1912); Andrews v. Kelleher, 124
Wash. 517, 214 P. 1056 (1923); Collins v. Collins, 152 Wash. 499,
278 P. 186 (1929). It has been determined that it is immaterial
whether the testator knew the property he purported to dispose of in
his will was not within his power of disposition, or whether he erroneously believed it to be, because, in either case, if the intention to
dispose of it specifically appears, the necessity for an election exists.
Andrews v. Kelleher, supra. See In re Estate of Cooper, 32 Wn. 2d
444, 202 P.2d 439 (1949).
2.

The community property agreement
Although negatively stated, a statute 340 authorizes the husband and

334. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.070 (Supp. 1973).
335. Id. § 26.16.030(1).
336. The item theory of ownership can come into play here. In re Estate of Patton,
6 Wn. App. 464, 494 P.2d 238 (1972).
337. See generally Comment, The Widow's Election as an Estate Planning Device
in Washington, 43 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1967). For the decedent to succeed, of course,
the survivor has to make the election.
338. Contrast the election problem in common law states where typically the
widow could elect to take a dower interest (or some statutory substitute) in her husband's estate or take part of his estate under the terms of his will, i.e., a choice between
how and on what basis she took some of his estate, not an exchange of some of her
estate for some of his. In re Cooper's Estate, 32 Wn. 2d 444, 202 P.2d 439 (1949)
involved facts which could have been, but were not, analyzed on the basis of the common law election with probably a change in the result reached.
339. In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 477-78, 494 P.2d 238, 246 (1972).
340. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1963). "Nothing contained in any . . . law
of this state, shall prevent the husband and wife from entering into any agreement
[whatever]."
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wife to enter into an agreement "concerning the status or disposition
of the whole or any portion of the community property, then owned
by them or afterwards to be acquired, to take effect upon the death of
either." The statute requires the agreement to be executed in deed
form, provides that it may be "altered or amended" in the same manner, and specifies that it shall not derogate from the rights of creditors.

3 41

Many community property agreements actually executed, which
the author calls "three-pronged," go beyond the disposition of the
deceased spouse's community property as contemplated by the statute
(the third prong) by including, as two more prongs, provisions to convert existing separate property into community property (the first
prong) and to establish that future acquisitions by either spouse shall
be community property even though such an acquisition would otherwise be separate property (the second prong). These first two "prongs"
are discussed in Part V infra; the present discussion refers only to a
"statutory community property agreement" rather than the broader
"three-pronged" agreement and assumes that only community property, however it may come about, is the subject matter of the agreement.
As a dispositive instrument, the agreement takes effect at death, as
provided by the statute, and prevails against the will of the decedent. 34 2 The inter vivos effect of the agreement is controlled by normal
contract principles, and while it deprives the spouse who dies first (but
not the surviving spouse3 43 ) of the power to make an effective inconsistent will, it does not modify the rules concerning management or
344
transfer of community property during the lifetime of both spouses.
One spouse acting alone cannot revoke the agreement, 345 and even
341. Valuable discussions are in Buckley, The Community Property Agreement
Statute, 25 WASH. L. REV. 165 (1950); Brachtenbach, Community Property Agreements-Many Questions, Few Answers, 37 WASH. L. REV. 469 (1962).
342. In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947).

343. Although what property interest the survivor has in former community property can be affected by the agreement which, therefore, indirectly may affect the survivor's testamentary power.
344. E.g., power to convey to a trustee, Hesseltine v. First Methodist Church, 23
Wn. 2d 315, 161 P.2d 157 (1945).
345. In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947) (surviving husband
had become incompetent; wife's will, apparently designed to accomplish plans the
spouses had, ineffective); In re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wn. 2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961);
In re Estate of Lyman, 7 Wn. App. 945, 503 P.2d 1127 (1972), aff'd and opinion
adopted, 82 Wn. 2d 693, 512 P.2d 1093 (1973) (wife commenced divorce action, ask-

ing court to fix rights in community property; husband then made will inconsistent with
survivorship provision in agreement; wife took as survivor by force of agreement).
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inconsistent acts by both will not nullify the agreement unless there
346
can be found a mutuality of purpose to terminate the agreement.
Although a will cannot prevail against the community property
agreement disposition, it is not uncommon for spouses, on advice of
counsel, to execute both wills and a community property agreement at
the same time, probably with two purposes in mind: First, to increase
the likelihood that a common plan for ultimate disposition by the survivor will come into operation; 347 and second, to avoid the consequence that the community property agreement could not operate for
lack of an identified survivor,3 48 in the event of simultaneous death of
both. Of course, a more complicated scheme in the agreement could
accomplish both purposes directly.
As a conveyance, the agreement transfers title at the death of one
spouse, and if real property is included in the affected assets, the
agreement should be recorded to establish the necessary link in the
record title. Recordation is not otherwise necessary to the effectiveness of the agreement, although it may be useful to preserve evidence
of the existence of the agreement.
Although the statute is clear that a proper writing is necessary to
alter or amend the agreement, it is unclear whether total elimination
of the agreement can be effected by only a writing. The analysis in
both the Wittman and Lyman cases 3 49 indicates that adequate mu-

tuality of purpose of both spouses may be shown without a writing.
However, the concern expressed by the court in Wittman about the
stability of recorded titles 350 leaves the matter in doubt, at least as

346. In re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wn. 2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961).
347. Note why the wife executed a will; it was argued the agreement was rescinded
by reason of his incompetence and her act of making the will, In re Browns Estate.
29 Wn. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947). The decedent could not be certain the survivor
would not change the will, of course.
348. Cf. In re Clise's Estates, 64 Wn. 2d 320, 391 P.2d 547 (1964). Apparently.
at times, spouses execute both wills and a community property agreement with a purpose that the survivor can destroy the agreement executed by the decedent that is less
advantageous. The risk of not succeeding merely by physically destroying the agreement is patent.
349. See note 345 supra.
350. Even if mutual repudiation may, under certain circumstances not here present.
constitute a rescission, we are not prepared to subject the statutory community
property agreement, which serves as a recorded conveyance of property to the
surviving spouse, to the cloud of uncertainty such a rule would cast upon the
record and, hence, the title to the property.
58 Wn. 2d at 845, 365 P.2d at 20.
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regards a possible bona fide purchaser from the surviving spouse who
claims under the agreement.
The usual agreement provides simply that the survivor of the
spouses shall take all community property35 1 without identifying the
property particularly. 35 2 However, the statutory language is broad
enough to permit agreements affecting only certain assets rather than
all, and also to permit dispositions other than solely to the survivor.353 It is the author's belief that complete flexibility in dispositive
schemes 354 is available and that multiple agreements, each affecting
some particular assets but not others, could be executed. By the latter
route, spouses could provide for survivorship, for example, with respect
to particular assets and at the same time clearly preserve their com355
munity property character until one of them died.
In many situations, a survivorship disposition by a community
property agreement is too simple, causing complications which could
be avoided by testamentary dispositions tailored to the particular situation of the spouses. The following factors need to be considered in
deciding whether to use the simple survivorship agreement: Availability of the nonclaim, the award-in-lieu of homestead, and the family
allowance statutes of the probate code; out-of-state acceptability of
the device;3 56 irrevocability of the agreement; valuation of assets at
death for capital gains tax purposes; and value of determinations in-

351.
352.

See, e.g., suggested form in WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.120 at 489 (1961).
See In re Estate of Verbeek, 2 Wn. App. 144, 467 P.2d 178 (1970) in which the

court concluded certain property was treated as being community property and, therefore, subject to the agreement, even though it was not described in any way.
353. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1963). The statute provides that the agreement may affect "the status or disposition of the whole or any portion of the community property"; this language does not require disposition to surviving spouse.
354. See In re Dunn's Estate, 31 Wn. 2d 512, 197 P.2d 606 (1948), in which life

use and remainders over were set up by an agreement in a form adequate for the statutory community property agreement and a joint will. Compare Raab v. Wallerich, 46
Wn. 2d 375, 383, 282 P.2d 271, 275 (1955).
355. An alternative approach would be conversion from community property to

joint tenancy ownership, but the inseverability of community property would be lost in
joint tenancy (either voluntary or involuntary severance of the half of either spouse)
and the certainty that the survivor would take all would also be lost. Such inconsisten-

cies in the incidents of these two types of ownership indicate the illogic, and undesirability, of "community property in joint tenancy form," a hybrid out of California
largely occasioned by the absence of dispositive power in the divorce court over separate (i.e., here, joint tenancy) property. See Griffith, Community Property in Joint
Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1961); Griffith, Joint Tenancy and Community

Property,37 WASH. L. REV. 30 (1962).
356. See5WASH. ST.B. NEws33(1961).
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herent in the final decree in probate as to ownership and character of
particular assets. Transfer of corporate shares by means of the agreement is facilitated by a 1965 statute,3 57 but no statute of general coverage exists. Particularly in larger estates, straight survivorship might
be costly in terms of death taxes, but there may be an escape from the
worst of such consequences through a recently enacted disclaimer
statute, 3 58 the existence of which might also warrant the execution of
a will inconsistent with the dispositive scheme of the agreement.
3.

Simultaneous death

If the dispositive scheme, however set up, contemplates that a
spouse will survive, the simultaneous death of both obviously will
frustrate it. Washington has enacted the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act 359 which generally provides that if there is no sufficient evidence
that the spouses have died other than simultaneously, and if the
spouses have not provided to the contrary, each spouse's property
shall devolve as if he or she survived the other. 360 The Act also provides that in the event of simultaneous death of the insured and beneficiary of an insurance policy, the proceeds of the policy shall be distributed as if the insured survived. 36 ' The Washington court's application of this insurance provision warrants comment.
In re Saunders' Estates362 involved the simultaneous death of both
spouses, each of whom had life insurance policies in which the other
spouse was the only beneficiary. 363 The court held that the insurance

357.
358.

WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.226 (1963), reference § 23A.08.325 (1963).
Ch. 148 [1973] Wash. Laws 435.

359.

WASH. REV. CODE ch. 11.05 (1963).

360. Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority
of death, and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise
than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had
survived, except as provided otherwise in this chapter.
Id. § 11.05.010 (1963).
361. Where the insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or accident insurance have died, and there is no sufficient evidence that they have died otherwise
than simultaneously the proceeds of the policy shall be distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary.
Id. § 11.05.040 (1963).
362. 51Wn. 2d 274, 317 P.2d 528(1957).
363. Some policies provided that the proceeds should go to the executor, etc. of the
insured, if the beneficiary was not living at the insured's death. This should not affect
the ultimate result.
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provisions of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act controlled so that
the asset to be distributed continued to be proceeds of the respective
policies falling within the particular section of that Act by which the
insured is determined to be the survivor,3 64 rather than the section
which controlled with respect to assets generally, in which the owner
of the asset is determined to be the survivor.3 65 The court reasoned
that the wife had a vested interest in half of the proceeds of the policy
on the husband's life which went to her personal representatives, and
then to the husband as her heir under the general inheritance statute3 66 rather than to her collateral heirs. The result, after applying the
same reasoning to the policies on the wife's life, was that all proceeds
of policies on the husband's life went to his collateral heirs and all on
her life to her collateral heirs. Unfortunately, there was more insurance on his life than on hers. This authority was followed and the
same result was reached in In re Clise's Estates.3 67 The result seems to
the author to be unsatisfactory, involving an unfortunate concentration on the word proceeds in the statute, and in the latter case overoverlooking the reasoning of an intervening case, In re Leuthold's
Estate.3 68
It seems unlikely that either spouse would wish the collateral heirs
of the other to have a larger share of the property of both spouses, if it
is to go at once to collateral heirs, that is, if the other spouse is not at
least initially to own the whole in a meaningful, substantial sense. In
addition, the framework of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is
designed primarily for situations in which an individual owner dies
simultaneously with a potential successor in ownership,3 69 and in the
only section which clearly involves deaths of two co-owners,3 7 0 each is
deemed to be the survivor as to a half interest. This reasoning militates against the results reached in Saunders Estates and Clises Estates.
The court in Saunders' Estates reasoned that half of the proceeds of
the policy in which the husband was the insured went to the wife's
364.

See note 361 supra.

365.
366.
367.
368.

See note 360 supra.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (Supp. 1973).
64 Wn. 2d 320, 391 P.2d 547 (1964).
52 Wn. 2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958).

369.

Note the reference in Saunders' Estates to Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,

9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. § 5, recommending amendment in community property states.

370. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.05.030 (1963)-simultaneous deaths ofjoint tenants.
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personal representatives, but this can be so only if the wife, before her
death, had the right to the proceeds, and the payment in fulfillment of
the duty to deliver proceeds to the owner of them was merely made
after her death. However, if the beneficiary wife predeceased the insured husband, there were then no proceeds which she could own,
because proceeds do not exist until the insured dies. While it has been
convenient to refer to the beneficiary spouse's community interest in a
life insurance relationship as existing in the proceeds, 3 7 1 in fact the
community property interest is in the policy, not the proceeds. Successors of the beneficiary spouse's estate eventually get part of the proceeds upon death of the insured because of their ownership of the
source asset, i.e., the policy.
Under this analysis, and that in Leuthold's Estate, if the beneficiary
spouse died first, as the Act stipulates if both the insured and beneficiary die simultaneously, there necessarily is included in the beneficiary's estate a half ownership in the policy, and his or her successors
as half-owners of the policy should own half of the proceeds by reason
of ownership of the source asset, i.e., the policy. Ownership in this
source asset should pass under the provisions of the Act governing the
disposition of assets generally, under which neither spouse is deemed
the intestate successor of the other, rather than by focusing upon proceeds. This analysis would place half of the proceeds of all community
property life insurance policies in the successors of each spouse, and
accord with what the author thinks would be the probable wish of
each spouse.
V.

TRANSACTIONS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
SPOUSES

The statutes bestow full power on either spouse to deal with the
other concerning separate property 372 or community property interests,3 73 and to give power of attorney to the other or to a third person
371. See cases discussed in Part III supra, concerning life insurance policy ownership questions.
372. Either may act alone with respect to his or her separate property as fully and
to the same extent as if unmarried. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010 (1963) (husband).
26.16.020 (1963) (wife).
373. Id. §§ 26.16.050 (either may convey the community interest in real
property to the other, thereby making it the grantee's separate property), 26.16.150
(1963) (every married person has "right and liberty to acquire, hold, enjoy and dispose of every species of property, and to sue or be sued as if he or she were unmarried").
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to deal with separate or community property interests.37 4 Civil disabilities unique to the wife have been abolished,3 7 5 and she may contract
37 6
and incur liabilities to the same extent as if she were unmarried.
A.

Agreements Between the Spouses

Transactions between the spouses affecting their property may assume the form the author calls "three pronged" community property
agreements-the first "prong" of such agreements converts each
spouse's existing separate property into community property, the
second "prong" provides that each spouse's future acquisitions which
otherwise may be separate property shall be community property, and
the third "prong" disposes of their community property upon the
death of one of the spouses.3 77 Of course, the spouses may effect the
reverse of the first two "prongs" and provide by "separate property
agreement" that their existing property and the future acquisitions of
each which otherwise would be community property shall be the separate property of the acquiring spouse. The favor with which community property is viewed, however, imposes a higher standard of proof
to establish the existence of separate property agreements than community property agreements.
A question of good faith may arise in a transaction between
spouses. 37 8 When good faith is challenged, the burden of proof is on
the party asserting the good faith.37 9 The question, however, cannot
be raised by subsequent creditors, i.e., those whose interests do not
exist at the time of the transaction between the spouses, particularly in
light of the statute authorizing direct conveyances between the spouses
which protects only "existing equity in favor of creditors of the grantor.,"380

374.

Id. §§ 26.16.060, .070, .080, .090. Both also can give power of attorney

to a third person concerning community property.

375.
376.
377.

Id. § 26.16.160.
Id. § 26.16.170.
This third "prong" is the statutory community property agreement and is dis-

cussed in Part IV supra.
378. See, e.g., as to community property, Benham v. Hawkins, 82 Wash. 390, 144
P. 532 (1914); as to separate property, Davison v. Hewitt, 6 Wn. 2d 131, 106 P.2d 733

(1940). Burden of proof falls on the grantee spouse as against the grantor's creditor
under § 26.16.210 (1963).
379. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.210 (1963).

380. Id. § 26.16.050. See also Smith v. Weed, 75 Wash. 452, 134 P. 1070 (1913).
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Transfers of presently-owned property

As provided by statute, 381 a deed of the community interest in real
property from one spouse to the other will make that property separately owned by the grantee spouse "unless there is clear and con382
vincing evidence that such was not the intention of the parties."
Although there is no statute specifically authorizing the reverse transaction, the court in Volz v. Zang383 established that the spouse(s) may
change separate property into community property if the transaction
is in proper form and the spouse(s) so intend. 384 In Volz both spouses
executed an instrument, in accordance with deed requirements, which
clearly expressed the intent and purpose that their separate property
become community property. After the wife's death, her mother
claimed that certain real estate was separate property; the husband
contended that it had been changed into community property by the
agreement. In holding for the husband, the court noted the policy of
the law in favor of community property, that separate property could
be changed into community property by commingling or estoppel,
and concluded if that be so, then "[separate property] should
be allowed to change [into community property] when the parties
intend such a change to take place and evidence this intention by a
conveyance, conforming in all essentials to the requirements of the
'38 5
law affecting the transfer of real property.
Changing the character of property from community to separate or
vice versa is essentially a transfer or conveyance, and the proper form
of the transaction depends upon the applicability of the statute of
frauds. If a chattel is involved, ordinarily an oral transfer is enoughthe cases dealing with gifts of chattels are illustrative and no question
is presented there of the necessity of a writing. Obviously, if real property is the subject of the transfer, an acknowledged writing is required
by the deed statute. 386 Unfortunately, the matter is somewhat con381. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.050 (1963).
382. In re Monighan's Estate, 198 Wash. 253, 255, 88 P.2d 403, 404 (1939).
383. 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409(1920).
384. A wife's conveyance to her husband of an undivided half interest in her separate property does not create a community property holding but rather a tenancy in
common between them. Powers v. Munson, 74 Wash. 234, 133 P. 453 (1913).
385. 113 Wash. at 384, 194 P. at 411.
386. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 64.04.010, .020 (1963). The statutory community property agreement of § 26.16.120 must be executed as deeds are. In re Estate of Verbeek, 2 Wn. App. 144, 467 P.2d 178 (1970), involved the question of the effect of
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fused by the assertion in Rogers v. Joughin,3 87 unsupported by citation of any authority, that "the character of property cannot be
changed from that of separate property to community property, or
38 8
community to separate by the oral agreement of the spouses alone.
The cotirt in Leroux v. Knoll mentioned the same general proposition, 389 citing Rogers v. Joughin, and properly concluded that the wife's
separate real property had not been converted into community property in that case. However, the sounder statement, recognizing that
oral agreements may be sufficient in particular circumstances, was
390
made by the court in State ex rel Van Moss v. Sailors:
It is undoubtedly true that husband and wife may, by proper agreement or conveyance, change their separate property into community
property and their community property into separate property.
2.

Agreements affectingfuture acquisitions

The agreement between the spouses may provide that in addition to
existing property, all future acquisitions by either spouse (which
would otherwise be separate property) shall be their community property; 391 the result of such an agreement is that neither spouse will have
any separate property while both live.3 92 Perhaps the most dramatic
illustration of such an agreement and of the favor with which commu-

such an agreement to cover separate property not described but, as the court concluded, intended by the spouses to be the subject matter of the agreement. The lack of
description was immaterial on the statute of frauds question for the agreement, just as
it was, arguably, in Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409 (1920). The assertion
by the spouses in the agreement that there was community property, which could
have referred only to land, which was in fact separate property, was held to show an
intention that it be disposed of as (in effect be converted to) community property.
387. 152 Wash. 448, 277 P. 988 (1929).
388. Id. at 456, 277 P. at 991. The court in Rogers found the agreement to be ineffective by reason of the statute of frauds relating to contracts in contemplation or
consideration of marriage (WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.010(3) (1963)) and no agreement to change separate property to community property was considered by the court.
389. 28 Wn. 2d 964, 968, 184 P. 2d 564, 566(1947).
390. 180 Wash. 269, 274, 39 P.2d 397, 399 (1934) (emphasis added).
391. See, e.g., the agreements of In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125
(1947), and In re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wn. 2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961).
392. On this reasoning, what would have been a separately owned judgment from
the wife's action for the tort of criminal conversation with her husband was held to
have become community property and therefore reachable in enforcement of a community debt owing to the tort judgment debtor in Merriman v. Curl, 8 Wn. App. 894,
509 P.2d 765 (1973).
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nity property is viewed is Neeley v. Lockton. 39 3 The court in Neeley
concluded that the conversion of separate property to community
property by execution of a "three-pronged" community property survivorship agreement prevailed over an inconsistent designation of
beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of a pension trust. The majority
in Neeley held that the expectation of the spouses that the agreement
fixed the rights of both of them in all property, free of any overlooked
contrary schemes, should be protected in promotion of the policy of
community property law.
It should be noted, however, that agreements making all future
acquisitions community property could be phrased to operate only at
the time of death so that all assets would then be transferred as "community property," whether or not otherwise separate property, but the
inter vivos character of the assets would remain unaffected. Volz v.
Zang and Neeley v. Lockton reveal the court's desire to give effect to
the intention of the spouses, and, therefore, the particular language of
th; agreement will be important. As to future acquisitions, the following differences in phraseology should result in different conclu3 94
sions about the inter vivos effect of the agreement:
It is agreed, that upon the death of either of them such property as
they now own or may hereafter acquire from any source whatsoever,
shall be considered as community property and shall, upon such death
immediately become the sole property of the survivor of them.
This language should not affect the inter vivos character of a subsequent acquisition of separate property, permitting such acquisitions to
be managed and transferred as separate property until death. With
395
this language compare the following:
All property, whether real or personal, now or hereafter standing in
the name of either party hereto, or in the names of both, or in which
either or both of us now or hereafter shall have any interest, is hereby

393. 63 Wn. 2d 929, 389 P.2d 909 (1964). The decedent had designated his second
wife as beneficiary of the company pension plan and after marriage to his third wife
joined her in execution of the "three-pronged" community property agreement. The
disputed proceeds were the product of his half of the community property accruals during the first two marriages, and the accruals from his employment between his respective divorces and subsequent marriages.
394. In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn. 2d 20 at 24, 185 P.2d 125 at 128 (1947) (emphasis added).
395. In re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wn. 2d 841 at 842, 365 P.2d 17 at 18 (1961).
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constituted and shall be treated for all purposes as the community
property of both of us, and upon the death of either one of us the title
thereto shall vest in the survivor to the exclusion of everyone else.
This language should preclude classification of any subsequent acquisition as separate property.
If after the execution of an agreement providing that their future
acquisitions shall be community property, the spouses live separate
and apart so that their respective subsequent acquisitions in the ab396 it is
sence of the agreement would normally be separate property,
unclear whether the agreement remains effective. The author believes,
however, that the agreement should be held mutually abandoned and
ineffective so that their subsequent acquisitions are separate property.
In re Estate of Lyman39 7 perhaps tends in the opposite direction.
Spouses may agree, as indicated by the above discussion, that their
future acquisitions shall be community property; conversely, spouses
may agree that subsequent acquisitions by either, -which ordinarily
would be community property, shall be the separate property of the
acquirer.3 9 8 Although in Yake v. Pugh399 the court reasoned that the
separate character of the wife's earnings pursuant to a separate property agreement resulted from consummation of the husband's continuing intention to make a gift to her, later cases indicate the separate
character exists immediately and directly upon acquisition of the asset
by force of the agreement. Both the confidential relationship between
spouses and the statutory requirement of proof of good faith in transactions between them require that separate property agreements be
40 0
fair and just.
Characterization of an asset acquired by the efforts of either spouse
as separate property runs counter to fundamental principles and presumptions of community property law, and the rule is well fixed that
clear and convincing evidence is necessary to sustain the contention
that a separate property agreement exists. 40 1 In two fairly recent
396. Discussed in Part III supra.
397. 7 Wn. App. 945, 603 P.2d 1127 (1972).
398. See, e.g., Gage v. Gage, 78 Wash. 262, 138 P. 886 (1914); Dobbins v. Dexter
Horton & Co., 62 Wash. 423, 113 P. 1088 (1911); Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93
Wash. 115, 160 P. 304(1916).
399. 13 Wash. 78, 42 P. 528 (1895).
400. See, e.g., In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934) and
Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954) (antenuptial agreement).
401. State v. Miller, 32 Wn. 2d 149, 201 P.2d 136 (1948).
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cases, Kolmorgan v. Schaller4°2 and Mumm v. Mumm, 40 3 the court
has indicated that in addition to showing the existence of the agreement, there must also be a clear showing that the agreement has been
mutually observed.
In Kolmorgan there was a written agreement 404 which the wife
argued established that her subsequent earnings were her separate
property and thus not reachable by a community creditor. However,
the wife had used her earnings to pay ordinary family expenses. The
court thus concluded that the agreement had not been observed and,
therefore, did not control to prevent the application of the ordinary
community property rules under which her earnings would be community property. While in earlier cases the court had commented on
the spouses' observance of their agreement, no particular point was
made that it was an independent element to establish the effectiveness
of the agreement. Since particular expenditures in Kolmorgan were
made to cover family expenses, which by statute40 5 would be her separate liability in any case, the author is not persuaded that such potentially involuntary payments should indicate a lack of observance of
the separate property agreement, 406 even if continued observance is
necessary for its vitality.
In Mumm the court concluded that the continued commingling of
funds by the spouses after executing a written separate property agreement prevented adequate tracing to individual earnings or separate
property of either party; hence, the disputed assets were found to be
community property. The result in Mumm, however, does not seem
supportable on this reasoning. If the agreement originally took effect,
there would have been only separate property, and the confusion of
the separate property of two persons cannot create community property; while the respective separate property shares of the spouses
might be difficult to establish, certainly there could have been no difficulty in initially identifying earnings of each.
402.

51 Wn. 2d 94, 316 P.2d 11, 67 A.L.R. 2d 704 (1957); noted in 33

WASH.

L.

REV. 112 (1958).

403. 63 Wn. 2d 349, 387 P.2d 547 (1963).
404. The briefs reflect that the agreement may not have done more than divide
existing assets. No point is made of this in the opinion.
405. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (Supp. 1973) (the family expense statute).
406. See 33 WASH. L. REV. 112 (1958); Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218. 220 P.
813 (1923), rejecting argument that separate property agreement made voluntary the
payment of expenses of last illness.
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In addition to the commingling rationale, the court in Mumm also
relied on the fact that "the evidence established that the separate property agreement was not mutually observed by the parties; hence, it did
not change the status of the community property [citing Kolmorgan] .,407 However, the result in Mumm is sound on either one of two
bases without relying on mutual observance as an element to establish
the effectiveness of the agreement: (1) That the written agreement was
never implemented so that there was no way to identify which
then-existing assets were traceable to community earnings or to separate property of either, and consequently the community property
status from the pre-existing commingling just continued; or (2) that
their subsequent disregard of the agreement amounted to an abandonment of it, so that the separateness of property created by the agreement was subsequently lost by commingling with community property
acquired after the abandonment of the agreement. The latter explanation seems factually improbable because the agreement was made on
August 25, 1958, and the action for divorce was started on June 28,
1960. As a result, the time between execution of the agreement and
commencement of the divorce was so short that it would be hard to
show that the agreement had been effective initially, but by subsequent conduct the spouses had abandoned it. The author, therefore,
believes that the correct explanation of the Mumm case is the former
explanation: that despite execution of the formal agreement, the parties failed to implement it. Thus the question of the significance of
lack of mutual observance after initial implementation of the agreement still remains, this point not being necessary to, and therefore left
unresolved by, the decision in either Kolmorgan or Mumm.
In most cases, the separate property agreement has not been put in
writing, and adequate proof of the agreement will be found only if
there is conduct of the spouses from which there can be a strong inference supporting their assertion that they had made such an agreement. In this sense, therefore, mutual observance probably will be essential to establish the existence of the asserted oral agreement. If the
agreement's existence is beyond dispute, however, e.g., because it is in
writing, mutual observance should be significant only as to such questions as abandonment of the agreement or the agreement's operative

407.

63 Wn. 2d at 352, 387 P.2d at 549.
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effect in particular factual situations, but not as an independent element to establish the effectiveness of the agreement.
Do separate property agreements have a different operative effect
depending upon whether the subsequent acquisition is real or personal
property? In Graves v. Graves40 8 the court stated that an oral separate
property agreement affecting real property would be void as contrary
to the basic community property statute and contrary to the requirement that conveyances of real estate be by deed. An oral agreement,
however, should control the character of acquired property whether
that property is real or personal. As previously indicated, if the real
property asset is community property, the statute of frauds prevents
an oral change in its character, but that analysis is irrelevant to the
40 9
question of the character of the asset upon acquisition.
For instance, when the spouses effectively change all assets into
separate property of one or the other, all income from such assets will
be separate property under the statutes, 410 and if the spouses have
agreed that subsequent earnings shall be the separate property of the
acquirer, 4 11 there will be no assets of a community character which
can be the source of a community property acquisition. 41 2 Hence, a
comprehensive separate property agreement may dissolve the community property position.
The separate property agreement will not be given effect to insulate
what otherwise would be community property from the community
4 13 It
creditor whose basic claim existed at the time of the agreement.
will be effective against the subsequent creditor whether he knew of
41 4 or not.4 15
the agreement

408. 48 Wash. 664, 94 P. 481 (1908). In addition to the statement referred to in
the text, the court concluded the facts indicated there was no agreement.
409.
410.

See G. McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 968 (2d ed. 1925).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010,.020 (1963).

411. This can be done. See, e.g., Gage v. Gage, 78 Wash. 262, 138 P. 886 (1914).
412. It might be argued that a credit acquisition would be community property
because the obligation would presumptively be a community debt, but the absence of
existing community property to establish credit in substance should mean the credit.
too, is separate.
413. Marsh v. Fisher, 69 Wash. 570, 125 P. 951 (1912).
414. Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304(1916).
415. Piles v. Bovee, 168 Wash. 538, 12 P.2d 914 (1932). The suggestion in G.
McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 902 (2d ed. 1925), that the agreement would not be

effective against the subsequent creditor if the spouses continued to live together, obviously was not applied; it appears possible, however, that the nonacting spouse claiming insulation by reason of the agreement might have misled the creditor and thereby
be unable to get the protection claimed.
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B.

The Acquiring Transactionand Title: The Possibilityof a Gift

Prior to the 1972 amendments, if community funds were used by
the husband to acquire an asset, title to which was put in the wife's
name, there was inherently some indication that the husband, as manager, intended by placing title in his wife's name to consummate a gift
(either of the funds or the asset) which she would then own as her separate property. However, the basic community property presumption
and the requirement that there be clear proof of a gift impeded the
establishment of a title-changing transaction.416 Where the wife, who
at that time possessed no managing power, acquired an asset with title
placed in her name, she was likely to be treated as a substitute man4 17
ager in a community property acquisition rather than as a donee.
After the 1972 amendments equalizing management power between
the spouses, the acquisition of an asset with community funds by either spouse and placement of title in either the acting spouse's or the
nonacting spouse's name clearly should rest within the basic commu4 18
nity property presumption.
Despite the basic community property presumption and the resulting practical difficulty in establishing a gift from one spouse to the
other, either subsequent to the acquisition transaction or as the inherent character of that transaction, there is one factual pattern in
which comparatively slight evidence may be sufficient to establish
separate ownership in one spouse by gift. In Johnson v. Dar Denne4 19
the question arose whether rings purchased with community funds
were the separate property of the wife or subject to replevin" by the

The provision in the Marriage Dissolution Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070(2)
(Supp. 1973), may support an argument that recording a separate property agreement
is required. The section does not necessitate such a result. Rather, it authorizes recording a separation contract, which with published notice "shall constitute notice to all
persons. . . of the facts contained in the recorded document."
416. The basic analysis, involving three different factual patterns, appears in In re
Slocum's Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 P. 204 (1915). The spouses may desire a life insurance policy to be the separate property of the noninsured spouse to keep the proceeds out of the estate of the insured spouse. The gift problem is likely to be involved.

See, e.g., Kern v. United States, 491 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1974), in which the court
concluded there was adequate proof to make one policy the separate property of the

surviving, noninsured spouse but not another policy.
417.

Cf. Jones v. Duke, 151 Wash. 108, 275 P. 72 (1929). Car acquired with

community funds in her bank account, wife stated in license application to be owner,
county assessed car as owned by wife; held, community property.
418.
419.

See note 416 supra.
161Wash. 496,296P. 1105(1931).
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surviving husband against the wife's donee. In affirming the trial
court's determination that one ring was the separate property of the
42 0
wife, the court said:
In an action such as this, when the rights of creditors are not involved, and as between the husband and wife only, jewelry or articles
of personal adornment, acquired after marriage with community
funds, but worn and used solely by the wife, will be held to be the separate property of the wife by gift from the husband upon comparatively slight evidence.
Thus, two elements appear to be required to establish a gift on this
theory: (1) That the acting spouse has acquired an article peculiarly
appropriate for the use and enjoyment of the other spouse; and (2)
that the other spouse has in fact so used it. The gift character of the
total transaction will still be the ultimate question, 42 ' although after
the 1972 amendments it should be proper to substitute "spouse to
spouse" for the "husband to wife" reasoning of the court in Johnson.
C.

Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common

In addition to changing community property into the separate
property of one spouse, the spouses can convert their community
property ownership into a common law form of co-ownership, either a
joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. Survivorship and other incidents of the joint tenancy are sufficiently different from community
property incidents to indicate that the respective interests of spouses as
joint tenants are separate property. 422 Normally if the spouses agree
not to have community property, an acquisition to which both contributed would apparently be a tenancy in common. 42 3 The automatic
survivorship of a joint tenancy, although not certain to occur, may
have enough appeal to persuade spouses to abandon community property protections by converting to a joint-tenancy holding. The author
does not perceive any particular reason, however, why the spouses

420.
421.
27 Wn.
ruby tie

Id. at 497, 296 P. at 1106.
Note the conclusion as to jewelry of the husband in In re Dougherty's Estate,
2d 11, 176 P.2d 335 (1947); diamond-studded wrist watch given, but not a
clasp or a diamond ring.

422.

Cf. DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 134.

423.

WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.020 (1963).
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would change community property into a separate property tenancy
in common.
By Washington law, a joint tenancy may be created in real or personal property, but only by a written instrument, which may be "from
husband and wife, when holding title as community property, or otherwise, to themselves or to themselves and others, or to one of them
and to another or others . ... ,44 In addition to this general statute,
other statutory provisions relating to "bank"4 2 5 accounts encompass
situations in which community property-joint tenancy problems can
arise.
When the husband and wife are co-depositors (or shareholders) in
an account and have signed the usual signature cards specifying the
agreement between themselves and the institution, there probably will
be no serious problem in proving their concurrence in the arrangement. The nature of the arrangement between the depositors, however, is not necessarily established merely by the right of the survivor
to control the account; the account may be joint, i.e., multiple party,
4 26
without being held in joint tenancy.
Munson v. Haye427 involved the possibility that through the bank
account statutes, creation of a joint account would convbert deposited
community property funds into a separate property-joint tenancy
asset. The applicable statute in Munson provided that two persons
could jointly become "members" of a savings and loan association
and that the survivor could exercise all rights with reference to the
424.

Id. § 64.28.0 10. The attempt to create a joint tenancy between the husband

and a child from community property was frustrated by lack of the necessary writing in In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 494 P.2d 238 (1972).

425. The term "bank" account is used for convenience although two of the statutes
refer to savings and loan associations (WASH. Rav. CODE § 33.20.030 (1963)) and credit
unions (id. § 31.12.140 (1963)), respectively, rather than either mutual savings banks
(id. §§ 32.12.010, .030(3) (1963)) or commercial banks (id. § 30.20.015 (1963))426. Compare Wash. Rev. Code §§ 30.20.010 (1963) (joint deposits) and

30.20.015 (joint deposits with right of survivorship). Under the former provision
the bank could pay the survivor and thereby discharge its liability on the account;
under the latter, the deposits "become the property of such persons as joint tenants
with the right of survivorship," and the making of the deposit is to "be conclusive evidence . . . of the intention of both depositors to vest title . . . in such survivor."

Part of the variety of possible accounts in mutual savings banks is listed in § 32.12.010,
and § 32.12.030(3) sets up the same pattern as that in § 30.20.015. The credit union
statute, § 31.12.140, permits payments to the survivor but does not refer to the depositors as joint tenants. The savings and loan statute formerly was similar but it was
replaced by the express language of joint tenants with right of survivorship in 1945,
see id. § 33.20.030.
427.

29Wn.2d 733, 189 P.2d 464(1948).
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"shares"; but the statute did not (before its amendment in 1945) refer
to the depositors as joint tenants. 42 8 Mrs. Munson withdrew funds
from a savings and loan account carried in the names of both her and
her husband and composed of deposits of community property funds,
and opened a new account with Mrs. Haye to facilitate gifts she (Mrs.
Munson) intended to make. Although expressing doubt as to the
soundness of the contention, the court accepted the argument that
there arose a presumption that the interest of the spouses in the savings and loan account was held in joint tenancy. The court held, however, that the presumption "ceased to exist" when it was shown that
42 9
the funds deposited were community property:
[E] vidence that was clear, certain, and convincing was required to establish that [the spouses] intended to change the status of
community property by giving to either the right to appropriate all or
any part of the account to his or her own use and to divest the other of

all interest in the part so appropriated. In re Slocum's Estate, 83
Wash. 158, 145 Pac. 204. The parties here signed nothing which indicated an intention to create a joint tenancy, and the statute relied upon
makes no reference to joint tenancies.
The court stated that the mutual savings bank statute 430 (which did
refer to "joint tenancy") would give rise to a presumption of a joint
tenancy, but pointed out that even that statute was conclusive as to
the joint tenancy intention only as regards survivorship, and not with
respect to changing the character of inter vivos ownership. The court
noted the 1945 change of the savings and loan statute expressly providing for joint tenancy, and stated, parenthetically, that even had it
been applicable the result would nonetheless be the same. This dictum
poses difficulty.
Two transactions are involved in the formation of an account with
more than one depositor: the transaction between the named depositors, and the transaction between them and the institution. While the
statutes are primarily acquittance statutes for the protection of the institution, as the court indicated in Munson, their effect on the transaction between the depositors should not be ignored. The preference

428. The pre-1945 savings and loan statute was similar to the current credit union
statute, see note 426 supra.
429. 29 Wn. 2d at 743, 189 P.2d at 470.
430. The commercial bank statute is the same. See note 426 supra.
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with which the community property ownership of spouses is viewed
can reasonably be held to require clear proof of an intention to
change community property to joint tenancy ownership when the only
basis for presuming an inter vivos change in character is the statute
permitting the survivor to have full control of the account. 431 On the
other hand, if the inter vivos transaction between the spouses clearly
states that they have become joint tenants, 43 2 it seems reasonable, contrary to the dictum in Munson, to give that effect to the transaction,
unless the contention that no change from community property was
intended is adequately proven. The problems of permitting the parties
to debate the significance of the form of the transaction (unless fraud
or lack of good faith 433 is asserted) support the position that a clear
statement on the signature card that the account is, in joint tenancy
4 34
should preclude its classification as a community property asset.
The statutory requirement 4 35 of a writing to change community
4 36
property into joint tenancy and the reasoning in Munson v. Haye
indicate that if real property acquired by the spouses is intended to be
held in joint tenancy, the transaction ought to be accompanied by
their signatures accepting the joint-tenancy form on the deed or in a
separate writing clearly stating their intention. A similar problem exists with respect to bonds, corporate shares and similar assets. It is not
clear that a standing order to a stock broker to acquire in the name of
the customers as joint tenants should by itself be adequate to convert
an otherwise community acquisition into a joint tenancy acquisition.
The power of spouses to agree that future acquisitions by either be the
separate property of the acquirer4 37 is not entirely analogous to a continuing agreement that future acquisitions by both be other than the
preferred community property ownership. On the other hand, if the
joint tenancy bank account transaction will control the character of

431.

If the statute merely protects the institution the survivor would not necessarily

be owner of the account; even if the statute provides that the survivor is sole owner
it does not necessarily follow that-there was an inter vivos change from community
property. Compare a statutory community property agreement involving survivorship.
432. Cf. Anderson v. Anderson, 80Wn. 2d 496, 495 P.2d 1037 (1972).
433. Consider WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.210 (1963).
434. The problems are reflected in Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy
Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1961) and Griffith, Joint Tenancy and Community Property, 37 WASH. L. REv. 30 (1962).
435. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1963).
436. See note 427 supra.

437.

Discussed in text accompanying notes 398-400.
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ownership of subsequent deposits, as suggested above, the argument
can be made that the authorization to the stock broker should similarly be effective. There are no cases answering these questions.
D.

Divorce (Dissolution)

While transactions which convert all community property to the
separate property of one or the other spouse are possible, such total
conversion is not likely unless the spouses plan dissolution of either
the community relationship 4 38 or the marital relationship. Such a conversion changes titles immediately, 439 but remains subject to the
power of a divorce court to make a different allocation in its decree.
By Washington's new dissolution of marriage statute, the power of the
court to change the disposition made by the spouses has been restricted to situations in which the court finds that "the separation con''440
tract was unfair at the time of its execution.
If the marital relationship between the parties no longer exists by
reason of divorce (dissolution), the prerequisite to community property is gone. Therefore, the former community property, if not
changed from its community status by a transfer while the two were
married and if not allocated by the divorce (dissolution) court, 44 1 will
442 It is
be held by the former spouses as equal tenants in common.
possible that the tenancy-in-common claim of the former spouse may
be barred by collateral estoppel, 443 but if the ownership is not in some
way barred, it can be asserted after the title-holding former spouse
dies. Moreover, the ownership asserted by the surviving former spouse
is unaffected by any probate nonclaim-statute reasoning because the
438. Both a marital and a family relationship can exist without community of
property, e.g., when there is present conversion to separate property and an agreement
that future acquisitions be separate property. See also G. MCKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 897 (2d ed. 1925). Cf.DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN §§ 134, 135, 136. See also Parsons
v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218, 220 P. 813 (1923).
439. In re Garrity's Estate, 22 Wn. 2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945).
440. Ch. 157, § 7(3) [19731 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070(3). See Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49
WASH. L. REv. 375 (1974).
441. It is the duty of the court to allocate property brought before it. Bernier v.
Bernier, 44 Wn. 2d 447, 267 P.2d 1066 (1954).
442. Ambrose v. Moore, 46 Wash. 463, 90 P. 588 (1907).
443. Cf. Witzel v. Tena, 48 Wn. 2d 628, 295 P.2d 1115 (1956); Dean v. Nat'l
Bank of Wash., 57 Wn. 2d 822, 360 P.2d 150 (1961).
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assertion is not a claim against the decedent's estate but rather exercise
444
of an ownership right.
VI.

INVOLUNTARY DISPOSITION

The statute has long provided that "community real estate shall be
subject... to liens of judgments recovered for community debts, and
to sale on execution issued thereon. ' '445 This statutory provision necessitated classifying debts as community, enforceable against community real property, or as separate, and therefore enforceable only
against the separate property of the obligor. Each spouse has power to
incur separate obligations, 446 but in general neither spouse has power
to impose separate liability on the other.447 The important question
usually is whether the act of a spouse creates community liability in
addition to separate liability, since as a practical matter it is likely that
the acting spouse has no separate property out of which a judgment
may be satisfied but only community property interests held with the
nonacting spouse.
The early cases distinguished between enforcement of the husband's
separate debts against community personal property, over which he
then was held to possess greater management power because of the
statutory provision that he had" a like power of disposition as he has
of his separate personal property, '448 and enforcement of his separate
debts against community real property, 449 over which the dispositive
power was joint.45 0 In addition, there was the possibility that debts
referred only to voluntary obligations and that a different rule controlled enforcement of involuntary obligations, such as those imposed
by statute or resulting from tort liability.4 5' Both of these distinctions
were eliminated in Schramm v. Steele,4 52 where the court concluded
444. Olsen v. Roberts, 42 Wn. 2d 862, 259 P.2d 418 (1953); Smith v. McLaren,
58 Wn. 2d 907, 365 P.2d 331 (1961).
445. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.040 (Supp. 1973).

446.
447.

Id.§ 26.16.150 (1963).

Id. §§ 26.16.010, .020, .190, .200 (Supp. 1973). The family expense statute

provides the exception. Id. § 26.16.205.
448. Id. § 26.16.030 prior to the 1972 amendments.
449.
450.

Powell v. Pugh, 13 Wash. 577, 43 P. 879 (1896).
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.040 prior to 1972 amendments. The joint power

statement is now in § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1973).
451.

sent.
452.

See Brotton v. Langert, I Wash. 73, 23 P. 688 (1890), particularly the dis-

97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917).
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that the husband's broader management power over personal property
was not based on greater proprietary rights, but rather on a management agency which could not support enforcement of his separate obligation, whether voluntary or involuntary, against either community
real or personal property. Further, the court long ago concluded that
a separate creditor could not reach his debtor's undivided half interest
in community property, 453 because the resulting ownership of the
nondebtor spouse would fit neither the separate nor the community
property definitions. 454 Thus, basically the entire community property
45 5
interest is protected from separate obligations.
A.

Contractual Obligations

1.

Postnuptialobligations

The contracting spouse of course incurs separate liability 456 by
making the contract, and the important question usually is whether a
community liability also was incurred. The basic presumption that a
debt incurred by either spouse is a community debt, and thus enforceable against the community property, is not lightly rebutted.
a. The basic presumption of a community obligation. The ordinary
debt transaction of the manager will involve the acquisition of an asset, which by the rules previously discussed will be presumptively
community property; correlatively, the debt incurred by the contracting spouse is presumptively community in character. 45 7 Debts
incurred in direct management of community property similarly are
presumptively community debts, and if there is an intent to benefit the
community property position by incurring the debt, it will be enforce458
able against community property.
453. Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892). The request to permit
enforcement of a separate obligation against the husband's half interest in community
property was denied in Aichlmayr v. Lynch, 6 Wn. App. 434, 493 P.2d 1026 (1972).
454. The awkwardness can arise through enforcement of federal liens, discussed
in text accompanying notes 53 1-40 infra.
455. The partial retreat from this position is discussed in text accompanying
notes 522-45 infra.
456. The wife was separately liable as party to the contract, individually, in Short
v. Dolling, 178 Wash. 467, 35 P.2d 82 (1934); George C. Lemcke Co. v. Nordby, 117
Wash. 221, 200 P. 1103 (1921); Conrad v. Mertz, 45 Wash. 119, 87 P. 1118 (1906).
Consider also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.150, .170 (1963); §§ 26.16.190, .200 (Supp.
1973).
457. Oregon Improvement Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wash. 710, 30 P. 1058 (1892).
458. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954).
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Prior to the 1972 amendments, all debts of the husband were presumed to be community debts, 45 9 since he was the manager of the
community property and presumably was acting for the community. 46 0 The wife, lacking management power at that time, did not create
community liability by her ordinary obligatory acts. 461 The husband
could make the wife the agent to conduct community affairs, 462 however, so that community liability would follow, or, by his ratification
or through estoppel, he could be precluded from denying that she created a community obligation.4 63 Such reasoning is, of course, no
longer necessary after the 1972 amendments establishing the wife's
equal management authority; rather, debts incurred by either spouse
now will be presumptively a community debt.
If both spouses join in the contract, both will be separately liable
and usually there will be community liability. 464 The signature of the
other spouse, however, adds nothing to the character of the liabilities,
the only significance of that joinder being to create the second separate liability. This was the explanation by the court in Northern Bank
& Trust Co. v. Graves465 where the wife was found separately liable
when she signed notes executed by her husband.
While most of the problems discussed in this section do not arise
until enforcement of the obligation is sought, and hence are appropriately discussed as involuntary dispositions, several aspects of contrac459.

See, e.g., Bryant v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 13 Wash. 692, 43 P. 931 (1896);

Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn. 2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950); Malotte v. Gorton, 75 Wn. 2d
306, 450 P.2d 820 (1969).

460.

See, e.g., Bierer v. Blurock, 9 Wash. 63, 36 P. 975 (1894); Fies v. Storey, 37

Wn. 2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950); Oregon Improvement Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wash.
710, 30 P. 1058 (1892); Capital Natl Bank v. Johns, 170 Wash. 250, 16 P.2d 452

(1932).
461. Streck v. Taylor, 173 Wash. 367, 23 P.2d 415 (1933).
462. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.060-.090 (1963); Wallace v. Thomas, 193 Wash.
582, 76 P.2d 1032 (1938); Lucci v. Lucci, 2Wn. 2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940).
463. Colagrossi v. Hendrickson, 50 Wn. 2d 266, 310 P.2d 1072 (1957); Hartman
v. Anderson, 49 Wn. 2d 154, 298 P.2d 1103 (1956); Short v. Dolling, 78 Wash. 467,
35 P.2d 82 (1934); Bowers v. Good, 52 Wash. 384, 100 P. 848 (1909).

The harshness of the odd conclusion that no community liability attached to the
husband's employment of a broker to find a buyer of community real estate (Geoghegan v. Dever, 30 Wn. 2d 877, 194 P.2d 397 (1948), because it would in effect encum-

ber the real estate without the necessary participation by the wife, was ameliorated in
Whiting v. Johnson, 64 Wn. 2d 135, 390 P.2d 985 (1964), where she was held to have

authorized his act. The Geoghegan case analysis is, in the author's opinion, unsound
inasmuch as the obligation to pay for the personal service would encumber real estate
only if it were reduced to judgment, in the same way as for any contract debt.
464.
465.

See, e.g., Conrad v. Mertz, 45 Wash. 119, 87 P. 1118 (1906).
79 Wash. 411, 140 P. 328 (1914). See also this point made by Judge Stiles,

quoted in note 476 infra.
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tual obligations are more appropriately discussed in a management
context. Thus, as previously discussed in Part IV supra, neither the
disagreement of the nonacting spouse over the wisdom of the obligation, 466 nor the acting spouse's lack of good judgment 46 7 in undertaking the obligation, nor the nonacting spouse's lack of knowledge of
the obligation 468 affects its community character. It is necessary, however, that the obligation not amount to a gift, i.e., that it be incurred
for a community "business" purpose, 46 9 although the community ben4 70
efit need not be actually realized.
b. Rebutting the basic presumption.The basic presumption of community liability can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence, 4 71 and the burden of proving that only separate liability was
incurred by the acting spouse rests on the proponent of the limited
liability. 472 Except in situations of a gift of community credit, 4 73 transactions clearly related to separate property, 474 or an effective separate
property agreement between the spouses, it may be impossible to
establish the separate character of the debt of either spouse without a
clear understanding with the creditor that there was to be no community liability. 4 75 As the following discussion indicates, there has been
almost a total erosion of the holding (and the apprehensions it
466. See, e.g., Bellingham Motors Corp. v. Lindberg, 126 Wash. 684, 219 P. 19
(1923); Baker v. Murrey, 78 Wash. 241, 138 P. 890 (1914); Byrne v. Sanders. 17
Wn. 2d 56, 134 P.2d 941 (1943).
467. See cases cited in note 466 supra.
468. Capital Nat'l Bank v. Johns, 170 Wash. 250, 16 P.2d 452 (1932).
469. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933). But
see note 492 and accompanying text infra.
470. Way v. Lyric Theater Co., 79 Wash. 275, 140 P. 320 (1914); Beyers v. Moore.
45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954). It is sufficient if there is some benefit received even
though it is not initially equal to the obligation incurred. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Spangler.
121 Wash. 267. 209 P. 521 (1922).
471. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954). In Zarbell v. Mantas.
32 Wn. 2d 920, 204 P.2d 203 (1949), absence of even indirect community benefit was
shown.
472. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954).
473. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933). In
effect community credit is treated like any other asset which cannot be given unless
both spouses concur. See discussion in Part IV supra and WASH. REV. CODE §
26.16.030(2) (Supp. 1973).
474. Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304 (1916); Piles v.
Bovee, 168 Wash. 538, 12 P.2d 914 (1932); Steward v. Bounds, 167 Wash. 554. 9 P.2d
1112(1932).
475. A community obligation may arise in favor of an intended transferee (essentially quantum mneruit) who has partly performed in a transaction not specifically enforceable because both spouses had not participated. In Graves v. Smith, 7 Wash. 14.
34 P. 213 (1893), plaintiff recovered the value of surveying services even though they
were intended as part payment for an unenforceable contract to convey community real
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raised 4 76) that a community liability could not be found in transactions principally of benefit to third persons, such as obligations arising
through accommodation endorsement, guaranty, or suretyship; the
dimensions of "community debt" have become, in effect, extremely
broad.
The presumption of the community character of the debt created
when funds are borrowed is supported when they are used for community purposes, 4 77 but their use for separate purposes, whether or not
previously contemplated by both spouses, 478 does not overcome the
community presumption. As between the spouses, if the security given
the lender is separate property, the funds acquired may reasonably be
considered to be separate property, 47 9 but this has no bearing on the
character of the obligation. 48 0 The ownership character of funds borproperty. The new requirement ofjoinder in transactions involving community household goods, etc., may also present this problem. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5)
(Supp. 1973).
476. Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 86, 23 P. 638, 690-91 (1890) (Stiles, J.,
dissenting):
A community debt, within the meaning of the act of 1881, ought to be any liability
incurred by either husband or wife during their marriage, and which is not a separate debt by its express terms, or by reason of its being patently for the exclusive
benefit of the separate property of the party contracting it ....
I cannot believe that it was the intention of the legislature of 1881 to withdraw
all this community real estate from liability for accommodation endorsements,
guarantees, and especially official bonds, as well as the hundred engagements that
married men enter into every day, but which have no relevancy to their community interests, and cannot be said to benefit them. It is said that these obligations
can be made good by securing the signature of the wife; but I deny it. If the signature of a husband to the bond of a county treasurer does not make the obligation collectible out of his community real property, because the debt is not one
for the benefit of the community, it is idle to say that adding the signature of the
wife will change the character of the debt and make it so collectible. And so on.
The combinations and confusions are endless, if this doctrine is once announced.
The negative inferences from the quoted language of Judge Stiles' dissent identify well
the dimensions of the community debt concept.
477. See, e.g., Flies v. Storey, 37Wn. 2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950).
478. As in Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934), and In
re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919). See also Gould v. Culver, 148
Wash. 689, 270 P. 93 (1928), in which the wife did not know of the transaction; the
court concluded that the transfer of the funds to the husband's brother was not shown
to be a gift, but rather there was some indication of conveyance of land by the brother
to the husband, which supported the presumption of the community character of the
transaction. The court also noted that the funds borrowed were presumptively community.
479. In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919); In re Bubb's Estate,
53 Wn. 2d 131, 331 P.2d 859 (1958), discussed in 34 WASH. L. REV. 147 (1959). See
also Graves v. Columbia Underwriters, 93 Wash. 196, 160 P. 436 (1916).
480. In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919). The court in Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934), asserted the borrowed funds
were community property available for any community use. This conclusion is con-
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rowed as between husband and wife does not control the character of
the debt. 48s In both In re Finn's Estate48 2 and Auernheimer v. Gardner,483 the funds acquired were separate, but the lender insisted upon
the husband's joinder in the notes; the only reasonable inference is
that the creditor intended to acquire a community obligation, which
makes it extremely difficult to overcome the presumption of a community obligation.
If some community property benefit, direct or indirect, can be
found, the presumption of community liability will not be overcome.
For example, a purpose to benefit the corporation which employs the
husband or of which he is an officer or director will supply sufficient
indirect benefit, 48 4 even though the corporation is insolvent. 48 5 The
position of the surety spouse as a shareholder also evidences sufficient
community property benefit, although if the shares are separate prop48 6
erty the indirect benefit and the attendant obligation will be separate.
Expectation of employment likewise will suffice as a community
488
benefit, 4 87 as will promotion of sale of a community property asset.

The obligation by which funds are acquired will create community
liability even though there is an accompanying lending transaction of
the borrowed funds to a third person which cannot do more than balance the borrowing; 489 the same result follows even though the com-

trary to the intention of the spouses as reflected by the uses made of the funds. Cf.
National Bank of Commerce v. Green, I Wn. App. 713, 463 P.2d 187 (1969), where
the distinction between the character of the obligation and the character of funds borrowed also is unfortunately blurred.
481. Consider also Riverside Finance Co. v. Griffith, 140 Wash. 322, 248 P. 786
(1926); the court concluded that the husband's testimony that he considered his business acquisitions to be separate property controlled even though a purchase money
mortgage signed by both spouses was given for part of the purchase price; as to the
part represented by the purchase money mortgage, this case was overruled by Walker
v. Fowler, 155 Wash. 631, 285 P. 649 (1930), which indicates the presumption of
community debt acquisition was not overcome.
482. 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919).
483. 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934). In Finn's Estate the acquisition was held
to be the wife's separate property; Graves v. Underwriters. 93 Wash. 196, 160 P. 436
(1916), has the same result; as to Aaernheimner, see note 480 supra.
484. Horton v. Donohoe Kelly Banking Co., 15 Wash. 399, 46 P. 409 (1896).
485. Proff v. Maley, 14 Wn. 2d 287, 128 P.2d 330 (1942).
486. Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304(1916).
487. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954).
488. Armour & Co. v. Becker, 167 Wash. 245, 9 P.2d 63 (1932); see also Kuhn v.
Groll, 118 Wash. 285, 203 P. 44 (1922).
489. Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Coffin, 113 Wash. 326, 194 P. 404 (1920):
Malotte v. Gorton, 75 Wn. 2d 306, 450 P.2d 820 (1969). See also Acme Finance Co.
v. Zapffe, 161 Wash. 312, 296 P. 1050(1931).
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posite result promotes only recreational opportunities for the spouse. 490
The latter possibility, and the reasoning in tort cases that recreational activity is beneficial to the community, 4 91 suggest that a comexcept that
munity "business" purpose test may be met by any activity
492
donative.
clearly
or
property
separate
to
related
clearly
While the husband alone cannot give community credit, which is
treated the same as any community asset, an obligation which has no
correlative benefit in a community property sense may be incurred in
return for a previous community benefit. This was the situation, for
example, when the husband joined his son on a note for the price of
land the son purchased, the son previously having worked on the
family farm without compensation. 49 3 Unless the wife objects, the
husband can give community credit to her just as he can give her his
interest in any community property. Such a gift of credit was involved
when borrowed money was used to acquire property subsequently held
to be the wife's separate property in one case, 494 and was used for the
495
wife's separate purposes in another.
A renewal obligation normally will have the same character as the
original obligation, so that a separate obligation will not bind the
community property merely by renewal. 4 96 However, a subsequent
community obligation may result from an intent to give community
credit in support of the separate obligation of a spouse, even though
no benefit can be found to the community property position. 497 A similar problem exists in a transaction reviving an obligation the enforcement of which has been barred. If the original obligation was commu490. Olympia Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. McCroskey, 172 Wash. 148, 19 P.2d 671
(1933).
491. See note 553 infra.
492. See, e.g., Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304 (1916);
Peterson v. Zimmerman, 142 Wash. 385, 253 P. 642 (1927); Sun Life Assurance Co.
v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933). On this reasoning community liability
could be found if a spouse joined in the obligation of a nonprofit corporation in whose
activity the spouse participated, e.g., a charitable or recreational organization.
493. Reed v. Loney, 22 Wash. 433, 61 P. 41 (1900).
494. In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919).
495. Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934). In both this
case and Finn's Estate the wife's separate real estate was mortgaged to secure payment
of the notes both spouses had signed.
496. First Natl Bank v. Estus, 185 Wash. 174, 52 P.2d 1243 (1936); Meng v.
Security State Bank, 16 Wn. 2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943); National Bank of Commerce v. Green, 1 Wn. App. 713, 463 P.2d 187 (1969).
497. This argument was presented in Meng v. Security State Bank, 16 Wn. 2d 215,
133 P.2d 293 (1943), but the payee was unable to establish that the wife had agreed
to give community credit.
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nity in character and the managing spouse has made a payment after
enforcement was barred, presumptively a community purpose was
served by the revival of the obligation, 498 and in the absence of proof
to the contrary, community liability will continue. In Gannon v. Robinson4 99 the court held that the presumption of community liability by
the husband's revival, without the wife's knowledge or consent, of an
obligation discharged in bankruptcy had been clearly overcome by
proof that the act was not for the benefit of the community. Although
the revival would not fall into the category of a gift of community
credit in support of a separate obligation, it is possible that a community purpose was served which ought to recreate the community obligation. The court in Gannon recognized this possibility: "We leave
open the question as to the liability of the community if the husband,
in order to establish a necessary credit standing or to otherwise benefit
the community, revives a discharged community obligation." 50 0
c. Separate liability of the nonacting spouse and the family expense
statute: three-way liability. A spouse's act creating both community
liability and separate liability in the acting spouse ordinarily does not
create separate liability in the nonacting spouse who has not participated in the transaction, i.e., it ordinarily does not create three-way
liability. 50 1 For example, the listing of the nonacting spouse's separate
assets in a financial statement does not establish the necessary promise
to pay, 502 nor is separate liability established by the nonacting spouse's
mere signing of a financial statement.5 0 3 Finding the husband as manager separately liable for the wife's contracts which create a community liability is still possible on the basis of Lucci v. Lucci,5 0 4 but the

author believes such a result is no longer sound after the 1972 amend50 5
ments.
498. Catlin v. Mills, 140 Wash. 1,247 P. 1013, 47 A.L.R. 545 (1926), as explained
in Gannon v. Robinson, 59 Wn. 2d 906, 371 P.2d 274 (1962). Mapes v. Mapes. 24
Wn. 2d 743, 167 P.2d 405 (1946), followed Catlin, concluding that the husband's note
for previous loans, which were barred by the statute of limitations, was executed within
his managing power.
499. 59 Wn. 2d 906, 371 P.2d 274 (1962).
500. 59 Wn. 2d at 907, 371 P.2d at 275.
501. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010, .020, .030 (Supp. 1973).
502. Glaze v. Pullman State Bank, 91 Wash. 187, 157 P. 488 (1916).
503. Yakima Plumbing Supply Co. v. Johnson, 149 Wash. 257, 270 P. 829 (1928).
She may be a party to the contract, however; see cases cited in note 456 supra.
504. 2 Wn. 2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940).
505. Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law--1972
Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527, 548-50 (1973).
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An exception to the general rule that the acting spouse binds only
himself or herself separately and presumptively the community property, but not the nonacting spouse separately, is the family expense
statute. 506 That statute provides that "expenses of the family and the
education of the children, including step-children, are chargeable"
upon the community property of both and the separate property of
either, for which they may be sued jointly or separately. A family may
be without children or dependents and consist simply of husband and
507
wife.
In Yates v. Dohring50 8 the court held that the existence of a family
relationship was a prerequisite to extending liability separately to the
husband for expenses incurred in the wife's room and board, at least
when the creditor knew that the wife had commenced a divorce action
and the spouses were permanently separated. It is possible that dissolution of the spouses' family relationship would not restrict the application of the family expense statute on behalf of a creditor who continued a pre-existing pattern of extending credit or on behalf of a new
509
creditor who knew nothing of the lack of the family relationship.
5
10
However, the separate property agreement cases
arguably indicate
that the subsequent creditor at least could not successfully assert that
the nonacting spouse was separately liable in the absence of the family
relationship, except on the basis of estoppel or similar reasoning.
Whether the obligation falls within the statutory "expenses of the
family and the education of the children" will depend on the type of
expense 511 and on the situation of the particular family. Prior to the
1972 amendments, the court had indicated that the husband's man506.
507.

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (Supp. 1973).
fn reDeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024(1938).

508. 24 Wn. 2d 877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946). Mere separation does not end family
relationships, Russell v. Graumann, 40 Wash. 667, 82 P. 998 (1905); nor does confinement for incompetence, In re DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938); see also
Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wn. 2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963).
509. In Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218, 220 P. 813 (1923), the husband was

able to recover the expenses of her last illness from his wife's estate despite a separate
property agreement in which she agreed not to make any demand for maintenance and
support on the basis, in part, that the payment was not voluntary. The court said,

"[a] s between Mr. and Mrs. Parsons, the relationship of husband and wife had ceased
by mutual agreement, but as to the public they were still husband and wife and as
such, under the statutes and decisions of this court, the husband was liable to pay these
bills." Id. at 223, 220 P. at 814. No cases or statutes were cited by the court.
510. See Part V, text accompanying notes 414-15 supra.
511. Yates v. Dohring, 24 Wn. 2d 877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946) (room and board);
Strom v. Toklas, 78 Wash. 223, 138 P. 880 (1914) (house rental); Roller v. Blodgett,
74 Wn. 2d 878, 447 P.2d 601 (1968) (house rental); In re DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265,
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aging power gave him considerable discretion in determining whether
a doubtful acquisition should be accepted as a family expense. 5 12 That
managing power now rests in either spouse, with the result that the
concern of the nonacting spouse will relate to his or her potential separate liability rather than the ordinary previous concern of the husband about both his separate and the community liability. This will
necessitate, in the doubtful areas, a focus on the appropriateness of the
purchase for the particular family, whether the asset has been used by
the family, whether a family expense statute has a broader sweep than
51 3
a "necessities" statute, and similar factors.
d. Effect of living separate and apart. An awkward and undefined
area of potential community liability exists when the spouses have
permanently separated, under the analysis in Section III-C, without
eliminating the community property character of existing assets. Obviously, the community property does not lose its character merely
by separation, and the necessary management of the community property while the spouses are separated can create obligations. In Dizard
& Getty v. Damson,5 1 4 the wife had expressly authorized the husband
to continue as manager of the community business, and, by implication, the court held, to incur community debts. Therefore, the creditor
could enforce his claim against nonbusiness assets, formerly community property, assigned to the wife in the subsequent divorce. If there
were no express authorization by the nonacting spouse to continue the
community business, there would be some force in the argument that
the scope of the acting spouse's power to incur community liabilities
84 P.2d 1024 (1938) (ordinary maintenance and support); Hinson v. Hinson, I Wn.
App. 348, 461 P.2d 560 (1969) (child support); Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 85
P.2d 1041 (1938) (clothing); Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218, 220 P. 813 (1923)
(expenses of last illness); Russell v. Graumann, 40 Wash. 667, 82 P. 998 (1905) (expenses of last illness); Roberts v. Warness, 165 Wash. 266, 5 P.2d 495 (1931) (medical and surgical care); Butterworth & Sons v. Teale, 54 Wash. 14, 102 P. 768 (1909)
(perhaps funeral expenses). See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2d Husband and Wife §§ 371
et seq. (1968).
The expenses for education of the children would seem in some families to include
college expenses, but the reduction of the age of majority to 18 may affect the result.
Cleaver v. Cleaver, 10 Wn. App. 14, 516 P.2d 508 (1973); held, trial court erroneously
decreed support after age 18 to cover four years of undergraduate college education.
512. Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Woodard, 103 Wash. 612, 175 P. 329 (1918):
Jones, Rosquist, Killen Co. v. Nelson, 98 Wash. 539, 167 P. 1130 (1917); each involving purchase of a piano, in which only separate liability against the wife was found.
the husband not having authorized the purchase, directly or indirectly.
513. The problems are generally discussed in 41 AM. JUR. 2d Husband and Wife
§§ 371 etseq.(1968).
514. 63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964(1964).
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should be no greater than required by the reasonable necessities of the
situation; a creditor might be able to reach only the assets actually
"managed"-for example, the assets used in the business.
After a permanent separation, no community relationship exists
between the spouses to support a presumption of the community character of a debt unrelated to the community property at hand. 51 5 Unless the nonacting spouse could be bound by estoppel or on some similar basis, insulating the community property held by that spouse
would be reasonable, 51 6 even if it should not be insulated from a
"business" creditor. Some other possibilities have been discussed
517
briefly elsewhere.
2.

Antenuptial obligations

As a general proposition, antenuptial obligations of either spouse,
which are necessarily separate obligations, cannot be enforced against
the community property of the spouses, 518 or against the separate
property of the other spouse.5 1 9 Even the obligation of both which
has been renewed after their marriage cannot be enforced against
their community property. 52 0 This so-called "marital bankruptcy" discharge from antenuptial obligations has been narrowed in scope in

515.

Compare the effect of the separate property agreement on subsequent creditors,

discussed in Part V supra.
516. The acting spouse could create only separate liability (except through managing the continuing community property); probably the community property held by
the nonacting spouse would become that spouse's separate property which would not
thereby become reachable; the other community property would probably become the

actor's separate property and thereby reachable by his (or her) separate creditor even
if it might be unavailable to the creditor while it was community property.
517. Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-1972
Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527, 543-44 (1973).
518. Consider, for example, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.040 (Supp. 1973), permit-

ting enforcement against community real estate only for community debts; the inability
of a separate creditor to reach the debtor's half interest in community property. See
also Snyder v. Stringer, 116 Wash. 131, 198 P. 733 (1921).
519. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (Supp. 1973).

520. Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 P. 613 (1919). Just as is true as to
assets, an obligation will retain the character of its origin if it can be traced and
there is nothing but renewals involved in the changes in form. Some of the reasoning
in the out-of-state obligation cases, which formerly might involve only separate liability, could support abandonment of the rule of Katz v. Judd, but the original debt
was there incurred during marriage and thus a change of the Katz rule is not inevitable (or perhaps even desirable). Contrast the reasoning of Escrow Serv. Co. v.
Cressler, 59 Wn. 2d 38, 365 P.2d 760 (1961) and the later analysis of Household
Finance Corp. v. Smith, 70 Wn. 2d 401, 423 P.2d 621 (1967).
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three areas: (1) alimony and child support, (2) federal tax liens imposed by federal supremacy reasoning, (3) new statutory vulnerabil52 1
ity of postnuptial earnings and accumulations.
a. Alimony and child support. In Fisch v. Marler522 the court
identified the conflict between the principle protecting community
property from separate obligations and the principle supporting enforcement of alimony and child support responsibilities after a divorce. The court held the former principle was subordinate to the
latter; alimony and child support claims are enforceable by garnishment of the husband's wages, after his remarriage, at least to the extent that there will not be an inequitable invasion of the community
property rights of the new wife (and family). The court held that the
trial court "had power to exercise its discretion in allocating the gar52 3
nished funds according to the necessities of the parties concerned."
Subsequently, in Stafford v. Stafford,52 4 the court refused to recognize unpaid alimony as a basis for a lien against community real property, although apparently recognizing it as a lien upon community
personal property, noting the difference in the husband's managing
power at that time over personal and real property. This distinction
was long ago abandoned 525 and its revival in Stafford is unfortunate.
The court, however, also noted that the question of the lien quality of
an award of lump sum alimony was not before it; if, therefore, the
Stafford case means merely that the particular antenuptial obligation
in that case will not have normal lien quality against the community
real property, it may be reasonable (but not for the reason stated), and
the case does not necessarily put community real property beyond the
equitable claims and considerations involved in the Fisch case. There
are, as yet, no cases clarifying this point.
The dissenting judge in Stafford suggested that the new wife merely
had married an "encumbered husband"-encumbered with alimony
and child support claims from his former marriage. With one exception, later cases clearly can be rationalized on this theory. Thus, in
Dillon v. Dillon5 26 and Verde v. Verde, 527 the court held that the ali521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
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See note 541 infra.
1 Wn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
Id. at 716, 97 P.2d at 155.
10Wn. 2d 649, 117 P.2d753(1941).
Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917).
34 Wn. 2d 12, 207 P.2d 752 (1949).
78 Wn. 2d 206, 471 P.2d 84 (1970).
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mony obligation fixed at a percentage of the former husband's income
(as reported for federal income tax purposes) was to be calculated
without regard to its community property character from the subsequent marriage, i.e., the entire community interest, and not just the
husband's one-half share, was subject to the claim. In Knittle v. Knittle,528 division one of the court of appeals affirmed the husband's separate liability and community liability for past due child support resulting from a former marriage, but modified the judgment in two
ways:

52 9

It is limited to those community assets which are the result of appellant husband's earnings and accumulations .... It is further subject,
upon a showing of necessitous circumstances by his present wife, to
such adjustment and allocation of the appellant's earnings and accumulations as may appear to the trial court to be just and equitable.
However, in Hinson v. Hinson,5 30 division three of the court of appeals concluded that the former wife's obligation of child support continued after her subsequent remarriage so that her former husband,
having custody of the children, could require contribution from her
one-half share of community property earned by her new husband
(clearly not the "encumbered" spouse). Although somewhat startling,
this result is probably sound. The fundamental idea of community
property law is that the acquisitions during marriage result from the
spouses working in their respective spheres. Hence, the husband's
wages, though received from external sources, are in part "earned" by
the wife maintaining the home. Ergo, there should be no necessary
limitation on the enforceability of this antenuptial obligation only to
wages or other income acquired by the "encumbered" spouse!
b. Federal tax liens. The antenuptial obligation based on federal
tax assessments falls into its own category. Federal district court
judges in Seattle have disagreed over whether the "marital bankruptcy" rule is an inherent substantive incident of community property
ownership, to which Fisch v. Marler531 was a particular and narrow
exception, 5 32 or rather whether the Fisch case on grounds of public
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.

2 Wn. App. 208, 467 P.2d 200 (1970).
Id. at 214, 467 P.2d at 204.
1 Wn. App. 348, 461 P.2d 560 (1969).
1 Wn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
Stone v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 201 (W.D. Wash. 1963).
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policy adopted an exception to the marital bankruptcy rule broad
enough to include federal tax obligations. 533 Both judges agreed,
however, that the marital bankruptcy rule was not to be considered as
a state-created exemption against which a federal lien would prevail.
The reach of the federal tax lien subsequently was resolved by the
federal court of appeals 534 in favor of the federal government on two
bases: (1) federal supremacy over state community property law, and
(2) the interpretation that a spouse had sufficient "property" or "rights
to property" 53 5 so that the community property asset could be sold to
enforce the federal tax lien and half the proceeds of the sale applied to
the antenuptial obligation.
As a result of the holdings in Draperv. United States536 and United
States v. Overman,5 37 permitting the federal government to reach the
debtor's half interest in community property, the problem of the character of ownership of the half not reached by the federal government
will arise. The impossibility of fitting such an asset into the statutory
definitions was largely the basis of the early case 538 frustrating a separate creditor's attempt to reach his debtor's half interest in the community property. No case yet answers the question how the federally
enforced involuntary conversion will affect the spouses' ownership.
It would be possible to conclude that the remaining half has become the separate property of the nondebtor spouse, a result consistent with Spanish law. 539 Alternatively, it would be possible to
argue that an "encumbered spouse" analysis should apply by force of
state law when this involuntary conversion occurs so that both halves
of the particular assets levied upon would be used to discharge the
obligation; in this case there would be no distortion of rights in, or of
the item theory with respect to, any assets remaining after the enforcement. Protection could be afforded to the nondebtor spouse's share, if
equitable 5 40 or necessary, by augmenting his or her share upon total

533. Draper v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
534. United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
535. INT. REV. CODEOF 1954§ 6321.
536. 243 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
537. 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
538. Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892).
539. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 165. Compare id. § 181.
540. Perhaps this could be done on the same basis as in the alimony, child support cases discussed supra.
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dissolution of the community property relationship in the manner
done in the "equitable lien" cases, thus refuting the argument that the
nondebtor spouse would be significantly disadvantaged.
c. New statutory vulnerability of postnuptialearnings and accumulations. In 1969, the legislature amended R.C.W. § 26.16.200541 by
adding two provisos, permitting some antenuptial obligations to be
enforced against subsequent acquisitions of the debtor. The first
proviso subjects the earnings and accumulations of the husband or
wife to their respective antenuptial debts. The varying phraseology of
the proviso, however, poses problems. Difficulties attending the involuntary division of community property earnings, which can result
from the federal tax lien cases discussed above, are avoided by the
provision that the nondebtor spouse has no interest in the earnings of
the debtor spouse (an "encumbered spouse," in effect). But nothing is
said in this respect about accumulations, although earnings and accumulations are made subject to antenuptial debts. Can there be an
involuntary division of accumulations? In addition, the provisos do
not cover "liabilities" but only "debts," while the basic statute speaks
in terms of "debts or liabilities," which may mean that the tort victim
receives no assistance under this proviso. As mentioned earlier, 542 the
distinction between debts and liabilities has been abandoned in some
5 43
situations. The complexities are detailed elsewhere.
The second proviso, requiring that the claim be reduced to judgment within three years of the marriage, will in some cases nullify the
advantage supplied by the statute. Perhaps it would have been better

541. Neither husband nor wife is liable for the debts or liabilities of the other incurred before marriage, nor for the separate debts of each other, nor is the rent
or income of the separate property of either liable for the separate debts of the

other: Provided, That the earnings and accumulations of the husband shall be
available to the legal process of creditors for the satisfaction of debts incurred by
him prior to marriage, and the earnings and accumulations of the wife shall be

available to the legal process of creditors for the satisfaction of debts incurred by

her prior to marriage. For the purpose of this section neither the husband nor the
wife shall be construed to have any interest in the earnings of the other: Provided Further,That no separate debt may be the basis of a claim against the earn-

ings and accumulations of either a husband or wife unless the same is reduced to
judgment within three years of the marriage of the parties.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (Supp. 1973).
542. See text accompanying notes 448-52 supra.
543. See 45 WASH. L. REV. 191 (1970).
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merely to require that the action be commenced within three years, as
is the normal pattern for statutes of limitation. On the other hand, if a
judgment is secured, it apparently will have the normal life of six
years 544 so that the removal of the "marital bankruptcy" immunity
could last long enough to affect many acquisitions by the debtor
spouse over nearly a decade, particularly if the creditor can trace
earnings and accumulations into later-acquired assets; such tracing
545
appears permissible.
B.

Tort Liability

Establishing community liability in the tort area has been considerably simplified by the gradual extension of community liability for the
husband's torts and by the 1972 amendments giving equal management power to the wife. These amendments make inappropriate earlier reasoning that community liability for the wife's tort depended
upon the family expense statute power, the family car doctrine or her
546
position as agent for the husband.
Of course, the tortfeasor spouse is separately liable for his tort,
and, similar to the contractual obligations area, the usual question is
whether the community also is liable. As a general rule, if the tortious
act of the spouse is committed (1) in the course of managing community property or (2) for the benefit of the marital community, there
will be community liability. 54 7 The nonacting spouse ordinarily is not

separately liable unless there would be joint responsibility if the two
548
were unmarried.

544. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.56.190-.210, 6.04.010 (Supp. 1973). Enforcement
process must be fully completed within the six years, see Ferry County Title & Escrow Co. v. Fogle's Garage, 4 Wn. App. 874, 484 P.2d 458 (1971).
545. Cf. West v. Stanfield, 48 Wn. 2d 55, 290 P.2d 704 (1955).
546. See Pruzan, Community Property and Tort Liability in Washington,
23 WASH. L. REV. 259 (1948).
547. These basic propositions, as previously applied to the husband's torts.
are analyzed in Pruzan, supra note 546.
548. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.190 (Supp. 1973). Prior to the 1972 amendments
this section referred only to injuries committed by the wife and insulated the husband, but not community property, from liability. Werker v. Knox. 197 Wash. 453.
85 P.2d 1041 (1938). The statute now makes explicit the insulation of separate
property of the other spouse and covers injuries committed by either spouse. The
reasoning in Werker v. Knox could support three-way liability, separate-husband.
separate-wife, and community, though no separate liability against the husband
was sought. Query whether § 26.16.190 would negate this result.
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The basis of the community liability is said to lie in the principle of
respondeatsuperior,even though there is no principal or master in the
ordinary sense. 549 While there is greater difficulty in finding an intentional tort than a negligent tort within the ambit of the principle, the
tort committed while managing or protecting a community property
asset will result in community liability whether the act is negligent or
5 50
intentional.
Community liability has been imposed in a variety of factual situations. A continuing altercation initially related to community property
interests will impose community liability. 5 51 An assault on a minor
552
child in the care of a husband and wife created community liability.
Negligent injury occurring during a spouse's recreatiolnal activity similarly created community liability on the reasoning that the activity
was beneficial and contributed to the welfare of the community relationship. 5 53 If the tort, e.g., conversion, could confer a direct property
benefit on the community, the basic community property presumption
would dictate that the asset acquired would be community property,
and hence the liability incurred in acquiring (or attempting to acquire)
it would be a community liability. 55 4 Community liability attaches to
tortious acts committed in connection with employment by which
community funds are earned, whether or not the employment is as a
public official. 555 These cases reflect the expansive reading given "re549.

Note the rejection of the idea that there is an entity called the commiunity in

Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425 (1930).

550. See, e.g., Milne v. Kane, 64 Wash. 254, 116 P. 659 (1911) (negligence in
operating a community property taxi); McHenry v. Short, 29 Wn. 2d 263, 186
P.2d 900 (1947) (wilful, fatal beating in ejecting decedent from community property
land or in carrying out task as caretaker of a third person's boat).
551.

McHenry v. Short, 29 Wn. 2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947); Benson v. Bush,

3 Wn. App. 777, 477 P.2d 929 (1970) (initially an altercation over the community
dog); Blais v. Phillips, 7 Wn. App. 815, 502 P.2d 1245 (1972) (assault in parking lot
directly after and as an outgrowth of a trial which concerned management of community property).
552. LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wn. 2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953).
553. King v. Williams, 188 Wash. 350, 62 P.2d 710 (1936); Moffit v. Krueger, II
Wn. 2d 658, 120 P.2d 512 (1941).
554. McGregor v. Johnson, 58 Wash. 78, 107 P. 1049 (1910); DePhillips v. Neslin, 139 Wash. 51, 245 P. 749 (1926); Henrickson v. Smith, 111 Wash. 82, 189 P.

550 (1920) (attorney kept funds received for client in settlement); Local 2618 v.
Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 85 P.2d 1116 (1938); Furniture Workers v. United Brotherhood, 6 Wn. 2d 654, 108 P.2d 651 (1940) (union officers distributed funds on dis-

banding local which plaintiffs, disapproving, argued was tortious).
555. Disque v. McCann, 58 Wn. 2d 65, 360 P.2d 583 (1961) (defalcation as
guardian); Jacobson v. Lawrence, 9 Wn. App. 786, 514 P.2d 1396 (1973) (negligence
of executor in not securing fire insurance); Kilcup v. McManus, 64 Wn. 2d 771, 394
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spondeat superior" by the court, and, while properly speaking there is
no presumption that a tort committed by either spouse creates community liability, few situations have arisen in which the court has not
found some basis for community liability. 556 In two situations, however, the principle still leads only to separate liability of the tortfeasor:
in the purely personal altercation 557 and in alienation of affection558
criminal conversation conduct.
1.

Family car doctrine
As noted in Werker v. Knox,5

59

the ability of the tort judgment

creditor to reach community property has been enhanced by means of
the family car (or family purpose) doctrine-the owner of the car is
5 60
held liable on an agency theory for torts committed by the driver.
Community liability does not flow directly from the doctrine, but
rather from the practical circumstance that the family car usually is
community property and the doctrine ordinarily imposes liability on
the owner. 561 Because the character of the liability resulting from application of the doctrine normally parallels the character of the ownership of the car,5 62 if neither spouse is the tortfeasor, e.g., if their son
is the tortfeasor, the liability will only be community in the ordinary

P.2d 375 (1964) (false arrest by port commissioner-deputy sheriff-thereby abandon-

ing the former community immunity as to "official capacity" torts).
556. See Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 456, 85 P.2d 1041, 1042 (1938). where
the court said "the trend of the law has not been toward relieving the community

from liability for the torts of its individual members, but has been quite definitely in
the direction of finding ways and means of imposing such liabilities upon the community."
557. Newbury v. Remington, 184 Wash. 665, 52 P.2d 312 (1935); Smith v. Retal-

lick, 48 Wn. 2d 360, 293 P.2d 745 (1956); Verstraelen v. Kellog, 60 Wn. 2d 115. 372
P.2d 543 (1962). The Benson and Blais cases, supra note 551, indicate the "purely

personal altercation" is not a broad category.
558.

Aichlmayr v. Lynch, 6 Wn. App. 434, 493 P.2d 1026 (1972). See also Merri-

man v. Curl, 8 Wn. App. 894, 509 P.2d 765 (1973); Schramm v. Steele 97 Wash. 309,
166 P. 634 (1917).
559.
560.

197 Wash. 453, 457, 85 P.2d 1041, 1042 (1938).
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 483-86 (4th ed.

1971)

[hereinafter cited as

PROSSER].

561. Perhaps more accurately, the doctrine imposes liability on the supplier of the
car for use for the family purpose. See PROSSER at 483 et seq. See also Coffman v.
McFadden, 68 Wn. 2d 954, 416 P.2d 99 (1966).
562.
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case of community property ownership of the car. 56 3 The family car
doctrine may also result in three-way liability (separate-husband,
separate-wife and community). For example, the attendant vicarious
liability can be separate if the car is separately owned by one
spouse, 564 community, if the errand during which the injury occurred
is community, and separate on the other spouse if that spouse is the
tortfeasor.
A permanent separation, however, should prevent the doctrine's
5 65
application to impose community liability. In MacKenzie v. Sellner
the automobile involved in the accident had become the wife's
separate property in the property settlement made at the time of the
permanent separation, so a family car doctrine argument would not
extend the liability to the community. The family car doctrine also
ought not apply even if the community property ownership of the car
continued, because the permanent separation would eliminate the possibility of there being a family purpose 5 66 to be served by the use of
the car.
2.

Torts related to management of property

Liability imposed on a property owner, e.g., liability flowing from a
landowner's responsibility, will be community in character if the property responsible for the injury is community property, even if neither
spouse has acted directly. Failure of the managing spouse to carry
properly the responsibility of managing community property should
5 67
impose individual, i.e., separate, liability on the managing spouse.
Prior to the extension of managing power to the wife by the 1972
amendments, in Graham v. Radford568 the defendant wife was held

563.

Cf. Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941), in which the trustee

in bankruptcy asserted a claim based on judgment in a wrongful death action against
the husband and wife, in a community property sense only, and the son.
564. Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99 (1933).
565. 58Wn.2d101,361P.2d165(1961).
566. Cf. Yates v. Dohring, 24 Wn. 2d 877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946), involving the
family expense statute. But, conceivably, a community purpose might be invoked as
suggested supra.
567. The respondeat superior reasoning inherently means the agent or servant is

subject to liability for which the principal or master is also subject to liability. See
PROSSER § 69.
568.

71 Wn. 2d 752, 431 P.2d 193 (1967).
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not to be separately liable through landowner's responsibility when a
child was injured upon coming in contact with a trash burner maintained on community real property. Since any liability against either
the husband's separate property or the community property was
barred by the plaintiffs failure to file a claim during administration of
his estate following his death, the action could succeed only by establishing the wife's separate liability. The court held the wife was responsible only in a community property sense as landowner and affirmed the dismissal of the action. Because the wife had no managing
power at that time, the court's refusal to find her separately liable was
sound.
In this sort of situation, the effect of the 1972 amendments making
each spouse equal manager may be to impose three-way liability, i.e.,
liability on the community property and on the separate property of
each spouse. The court in Graham stated, "the property was owned by
the community, and the duty of maintenance was owed by the community." 56 9 However, the "community" can only perform through the
act of a spouse, and arguably the failure to act or exercise proper
management imposes separate liability upon the manager and liability
upon the community through respondeat superior. If neither spouse
exercised proper management, there may be liability imposed on both
individually, i.e., separately. There are no cases indicating whether
such separate liability of the spouses would be joint, or joint and
several.
That a tort related to separately-owned property will create only
separate liability against the owner is reflected in Freehe v. Freehe.570
While Freehe involved an interspousal tort, 571 a separate propertyrelated tort against a third party plaintiff would impose separate liability on the spouse owning the property, 572 and a persuasive argument can be made for community liability on two bases if a spouse

569. 71 Wn. 2d at 755, 431 P.2d at 194.
570. 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). The court abandoned the rule of interspousal immunity.
571. In Manion v. Pardee, 79 Wn. 2d 1,482 P.2d 767 (1971), the interspousal immunity was assumed but provided no bar for suit on a tort committed before the marriage, since, while the case was on appeal, the parties had divorced, thereby dissolving
the immunity.
572. Perhaps joint and several liability, see Anderson v. Grandy, 154 Wash. 547.
283 P. 186 (1929).
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has mismanaged property: 573 (1) the potential community benefit
derivable from the spouse's labor bestowed on the separately owned
property, 574 and (2) the proposition that tortious conduct of commu57 5
nity business or affairs creates community liability.
3.

Criminal responsibility

Criminal responsibility normally results only in separate liability,
but monetary liability flowing from a crime ought to be community if
the "business" of the spouses is criminal and leads to liability. The
court has held that costs in a criminal proceeding against the husband
for arson could not be enforced against community property,5 76 but
the extension of tort liability to situations in which there is only a purpose to benefit or in which there is no actual business benefit to the
community 577 may portend community liability in some criminal
578
situations.
4.

Effect of living separateand apart

If the spouses have permanently separated, under the analysis in
section III-C, personal injury caused by one will create only separate
liability5 79 in the actor because neither "community" benefit nor a
community property purpose connected with the tort can be found if
the community relationship no longer exists. If, however, the tort was
committed in connection with some continuing community property
management responsibility, the reasoning in the debt cases 58 0 would support a conclusion of community tort liability.
573. Probably not to be found in Furuheim v. Floe, 188 Wash. 368, 62 P.2d 706
(1936), where husband's separate tort was found when he fought plaintiff over agreement to pay for surrender of separate property.
574. Consider the earnings and business profit cases in Part III supra.
575. Reflected, for example, in cases cited in notes 552 & 555 supra.
576.

Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P.2d 699 (1936).

577. Cf. the recreational benefit cases previously mentioned.
578. Thus, in Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P.2d 699 (1936), the crime
was committed in pursuance of a purpose to secure insurance proceeds. Although the
court refused community liability because the crime was outside the scope of management, the respondeat superior principle may not be that restrictive anymore, as later
cases seem to establish.
579. MacKenzie v. Sellner, 58 Wn. 2d 101, 361 P.2d 165 (1961). See also Kerr v.
Cochran, 65 Wn. 2d 211, 219 et seq., 396 P.2d 642, 647 et seq. (1964).
580. Dizard & Getty v. Damson, 63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964 (1964).
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Effect of a Tort or ContractJudgment Against One Spouse

Prior to the 1972 amendments, if the plaintiff sought to assert
community liability for the tort of the wife, it was necessary to join the
husband in the action; a judgment against the wife alone would not
support enforcement against community property. 5 81 A judgment
against the husband alone, whether based on his contract or tort, was
held to be presumptively a community liability on the basis that the
cause of action arose from his act done presumptively as manager of
community property. 582 The 1972 amendments giving the wife equal
managing power should mean that a judgment against her alone for
her contract or tort liability is likewise presumptively a community
liability.
If one spouse is not joined in the action establishing the basic liability, that spouse (as the wife could under earlier law) should be able to
challenge the asserted community character of the liability when enforcement is attempted or by bringing a quiet title action against an
execution sale. 583 Properly speaking, there is no presumption that a
tort liability against only one spouse is more than separate 5 84 and a
showing that a subsequent judgment was based only on the tort of one
spouse should theoretically put the burden on the creditor to prove the
community character of the judgment. However, the ease with which
community tort liability is now established and the general presumption of the community character of a judgment against either spouse
may put the burden on the spouse challenging the community character of the judgment. The question of the character of the liability in
both tort and contract actions can be settled initially if both spouses
58 6
are joined 585 or if the other spouse intervenes.

581. Dolan v. Baldridge, 165 Wash. 69, 4 P.2d 871 (193 I).
582. Woste v. Rugge, 68 Wash. 90, 122 P. 988 (1912); Merritt v. Newkirk. 155
Wash. 517, 285 P. 442 (1930).
583. See, e.g., cases cited in note 582 supra; Wilson v. Stone, 90 Wash. 365, 156 P.
12 (1916); Coles v. McNamara, 131 Wash. 691, 231 P. 28 (1924).
584. Cf. Killingsworth v. Keen, 89 Wash. 597, 154 P. 1096 (1916) (as to the wife);
Strom v. Toklas, 78 Wash. 223, 138 P. 880 (1914) (as to the wife).
585. See, e.g., McDonough v. Craig, 10 Wash. 239, 38 P. 1034 (1894); Anderson
v. Burgoyne, 60 Wash. 511, 111 P. 777 (19 10).
586. E.g., Gund v. Parke, 15 Wash. 393, 46 P. 408 (1895).
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D.

Effect of Death or Divorce on Previously Existing Tort or
ContractLiabilities
If the spouses divorce after a community tort or contract liability is
incurred, enforcement can be had against property held by either
former spouse which had been community property before the divorce, whether or not separate liability was incurred by the spouse
now holding the asset. 587 Fixing the liability as between the spouses in
the divorce decree or the property settlement agreement does not have
any binding effect on the creditor.5 8 8 It is preferable, though perhaps
not necessary, that the creditor or injured party join both divorced
spouses in any action if it is based upon community liability. 589 Any
community managing power obviously ceases at the divorce, so neither
spouse thereafter can create rights against the other.5 9 0
It is convenient to talk in terms of the community as if it were an
entity5 91 and of "community. property" in the estate of the decedent
spouse. (Upon the death of one of the spouses, however, the "entity"
and the community property relationship necessarily ends.) All of the
former community property is administered in the estate of the decedent, 592 and after adjustment for obligations or causes of action then
enforceable against community properties and adjustment for the respective positions the spouses may have had through the "equitable
lien" claim or otherwise, the net community estate to be assigned to
the decedent's and the survivor's respective shares can be ascertained.

587.

McLean v. Burginger, 100 Wash. 570, 171 P. 518 (1918); Capital Nat'l Bank

v. Johns, 170 Wash. 250, 16 P.2d 452 (1932); Dizard & Getty v. Damson, 63 Wn. 2d
526, 387 P.2d 964 (1964).

588. Farrow v. Ostrom, 16Wn. 2d 547, 133 P.2d 974 (1943).
589. United States v. Elfer, 246 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1957); compare Fitch v. National Bank of Commerce, 184 Wash. 294, 50 P.2d 910 (1935).
590. See reasoning in Britt v. Damson, 334 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1964).
591. In Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425 (1930), plaintiff urged the
tort cause of action survived the death of the tortfeasor spouse because the "community" still existed, as reflected in the administration of all community property interests
upon the death of the tort feasor; the court rejected the argument, holding essentially
there was no entity established by the community property statutes, but even accepting

the argument that there was, it ceased to exist when there no longer existed both husband and wife. The survival of the cause of action has been accomplished by WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 4.20.045-.046 (1963). In re Schoenfeld's Estate, 56 Wn. 2d 197,

351 P.2d 935 (1960), clearly involved "entity" reasoning but it is not essential to
the result that community property must be devoted to settlement of community debts
before separate property is.
592. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.070 (Supp. 1973); Ryan v. Ferguson, 3 Wash. 356,
28 P. 910 (1891).
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If the surviving spouse succeeds to the decedent's share, rather than
becoming tenant in common with other persons,5 9 3 an accounting for
the respective shares is not needed.
The immunity of community property to separate obligations disappears at the death of a spouse,5 94 permitting separate obligations of
the decedent or surviving spouse to be enforced against their respective shares of the former community property. If the decedent is separately liable on a claim, such a claim may be barred, as may a community liability, by failure to timely file within the probate nonclaim
statute.5 95 If the claims are properly asserted, the separate liabilities
will not take precedence over community liabilities5 9 6 but will be
effective against any remaining part of the decedent's net half of the
former community property. 597 If the obligation of the decedent was
both separate and community, the creditor's claim is to be charged
first against the community property being administered, without a
5 98
pro-rating on the basis of the size of the respective estates.
If the surviving spouse is separately liable on a claim, the creditor
does not have a claim recognizable in the administration of the community estate, and therefore need not file any probate claim. The
creditor subsequently may reach any assets formerly community property which become the separate property of the debtor-survivor. This
last proposition has also been applied even though the creditor's claim
was one which could have been enforced against either the survivor's
separate property or the community property, but was not asserted in
the administration of the community estate occasioned by the death of
59 9
the other spouse.
Individual liability for federal income taxes on community income
593. See Schlarb v. Castaing, 50 Wash. 331, 97 P. 289 (1908).
594. Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Embree, 2 Wash. 331, 26 P. 257 (1891); Crawford
v. Morris, 92 Wash. 288, 158 P. 957 (1916); In re McHugh's Estate, 165 Wash. 123.
4 P.2d 834(1931).
595. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.40.010 & .080 (Supp. 1973). Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.
2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969); Graham v. Radford. 71 Wn. 2d 752, 431 P.2d 193
(1967).
596. In re Schoenfeld's Estate, 56 Wn. 2d 197, 351 P.2d 935 (1960).
597. See cases cited in note 594 supra.
598. See note 596 supra.
599. Rea v. Eslick, 87 Wash. 125, 151 P. 256 (1915); Roberts v. Warness. 165
Wash. 266, 5 P.2d 495 (1931). In Rea v. Eslick supra the court pointed out there is
no relationship of principal and surety between the community estate and the separate
estate. The proposition appears to be denied in Graham v. Radford, 71 Wn. 2d 752.
431 P.2d 193 (1967), holding that failure to file a claim against the community estate
on which fell liability for unsafe premises owned as community property precluded
assertion thereafter against the survivor (the wife) on whom there was no liability in
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continues despite dissolution of the community relationship by death
or divorce. If a joint return is filed, each spouse is responsible for the
whole tax liability, and if no return is fied, each spouse is subject to
6 00
liability for one half of the taxes owing.
E.

Out-Of-State Creditors

The Washington court has reversed the long-standing inequitable
rules affecting obligations incurred in a noncommunity property
state.6 01 Under prior reasoning, an obligation incurred in a noncommunity property state was necessarily separate, because no law recognizing community property existed in that state. Therefore, when the
obligation was brought to Washington for enforcement, it retained its
"separate" character and could not be enforced against community
property. This rule was rejected in Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v.
Goble;60 2 Washington law now provides protection for the out-of-state
creditor as nearly equivalent as possible to that which the creditor
would have under the applicable law of the other state. 603
In Pacific States Cut Stone, the husband's Oregon contract obligation was enforced in Washington against all of the husband's acquisitions, community as well as separate, but it could not be enforced
against the wife's acquisitions. Note that the wife's ordinary acquisitions in Oregon, a common law state, would be her separate property
and beyond the husband's creditor's reach; but in Washington, her
ordinary acquisitions would be community property, and the husband's obligation would be enforceable against the community property without regard to which spouse was the acquirer. Thus, the results obtained under the rule of Pacific States Cut Stone often will not
be the same as those reached under exclusive Washington facts. Even
if the applicable law comes from another community property state,
the separate property sense. The case relied upon, Hennessey Funeral Home v. Dean,

64 Wn. 2d 985, 395 P.2d 493 (1964), concerns a primary-secondary quality of liability
of the estate and the survivor for funeral expenses. The court's assertion in Graham
that barring of the community claim precluded enforcement of a separate obligation,
"assuming there is . . . separate liability on her part," 71 Wn. 2d at 756, 431 P.2d at

195, is an unfortunate dictum.
600. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). The result in Washington
should be the same.
601.
602.

Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble, 70 Wn. 2d 907, 425 P.2d 631 (1967).
70Wn. 2d 907, 425 P.2d 631 (1967).

603. No attempt is made here to discuss the conflict of laws rules to determine
which state's law is to be applied.
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the result under Washington law will not necessarily be the same as
in a "local" transaction. For example, the husband's antenuptial obligation in California can generally be enforced against community
property, whereas in Washington it may not. Thus, under the Pacific
States Cut Stone rule such a California obligation would be enforced
60 4
in Washington differently than would a Washington obligation.
The conflict of laws rules might still bring other unanticipated results. 605
It may be that the Washington rule adopted in Pacific States Cut
Stone, a contract obligation case, will not be applied to out-of-state
tort liabilities, although the abandoned rule was applied to both kinds
of obligations and there is no sufficient reason to restrict the newly
adopted rule solely to contract problems.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Developments in the 19 years since the author's brief summary of
Washington community property law reflect a continuing belief in the
utility of a community property approach to marital property relationships. Refinements and clarifications of rules developed during this
period support a desirable freedom for the spouses to tailor their
property relationships as they wish. The 1972 amendments establishing management equality of the spouses may effectuate more changes
in relationships with third persons than in the practical relationships
within the marriage. There is a need to accommodate the normal
community property rules to the disruptive effect of changes in enforcement of antenuptial obligations, including alimony and childsupport responsibilities, and the overriding, arguably excessive, intrusions of federal rules under the supremacy clause. On the whole, the
community property policy has been strengthened in these 19 years,
but there are still possibilities for legislative corrections and protections and, of course, for further judicial refinement and clarification.

604. Wunderlich v. Cheff, Civil No. 648395 (King County Super. Ct.) summarized in 17 SEATTLE KING COUNTY B. BULL 1 (1967).
605. Pacific Finance Corp. v. J. Ed. Raymer Co., 68 Wn. 2d 211, 412 P.2d 120
(1966) (wife's guaranty contract does not bind her separate property: scope controlled
by Idaho law); Potlatch No. I Federal Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wn. 2d 806, 459
P.2d 32 (1969) (husband's suretyship liability incurred in Washington controlled by
Washington law though principal obligation incurred in Idaho: no community liability).
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